By Tong Kim
When President Obama meets with President Lee Myung-bak this week, they are expected to reaffirm the importance of the U.S.-ROK alliance and to announce that they agree over how to deal with North Korea. The KORUS FTA, pending ratification by the U.S. Congress and the Korean National Assembly, will be another important item for discussion. Obama will express his appreciation of Lee's decision to expand Korea's Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Afghanistan.
The Obama administration has made its long-delayed decision to send Ambassador Stephen Bosworth to Pyongyang for direct talks with the North. The actual timing of his trip is likely to be announced upon completion of President Obama's consultations with the leaders of China and South Korea. Obama already met with the Japanese prime minister in Tokyo en route to the APEC meeting in Singapore, where he also conferred with the Russian president.
These timely summit consultations certainly contribute to the building of a unified multilateral stance on the issue of denuclearization. Although the five countries concerned have different perceptions regarding the threat of a de-facto nuclear North Korea, they all agree that the North should return to the six-party process. All five view the process as the best way to achieve a nuclear free Korean Peninsula.
Jeffrey Bader, White House NSC director for East Asia, in a recent briefing at the Brookings Institute in Washington, said, ``We are less interested in process than we are in outcome." A desirable outcome from the initial round of bilateral talks that will soon take place in Pyongyang would be that the North Koreans accept the six-party process ``as the right framework"; that ``denuclearization is the agenda"; and that Pyongyang reaffirms its commitments to the agreements from the Sept. 19 Joint Statement of 2005.
Washington seems to have the right policy goal. It seems determined not to buy the same horse again. It seems determined not to negotiate an acceptable cap on the North's nuclear arsenal under any circumstances, even if the North may offer solid assurances against proliferation of nuclear technology and fissile materials. North Korea has the problem of credibility in the course of fulfilling its promises.
Yet, process is important to produce outcome. According to various sources, Ri Gun, director-general for U.S. affairs at the DPRK's foreign ministry ― who recently visited the United States to attend academic conferences ― assured Washington that Bosworth would meet with Kang Suk-ju, on whom North Korean leader Kim Jong-il heavily relies when it comes to foreign policy.
Before Bosworth sees Kang, he will likely have discussions with vice foreign minister Kim Kye-gwan, who has been Pyongyang's chief negotiator for more than a decade, and some other senior DPRK officials.
However, it is not clear what outcome Bosworth's visit may produce. What is clear at this point is that the North Koreans will repeat their known positions ― that the U.N. Security Council resolutions were unfair to their rights to develop a space satellite, and that they were forced to develop nuclear weapons because of ``hostile U.S. policy" as well as nuclear threats from the United States.
The North Koreans would not hesitate to demand that an Indian model, not a Libyan model, be applied to them. Their familiar list of conditions includes a peace agreement to end the technical state of war in Korea, normalization of relations with the United States, lifting of U.N. sanctions, withdrawal of the U.S. nuclear umbrellas extended to South Korea and Japan, cancellation of joint U.S.-ROK military exercises, redefinition of the role of U.S. troops in Korea, provision of light water reactors, and even the implementation of global denuclearization.
The North Koreans should understand that their military capabilities ― including nuclear bombs, missiles, and chemical and biological weapons ― pose serious threats to the security of South Korea and the region. On the other hand, the North may fear the growing economic power of the South, enabling development and acquisition of more sophisticated weapons systems. The North should understand that without the U.S. defense commitment, the South could also opt to develop nuclear arms.
Only one week in advance of Obama's visit to Seoul, a new naval clash occurred in the West Sea, in which a North Korean patrol boat was severely damaged by the superior South Korean navy. The North Korean military warned that it would use ``merciless military action," from which the South would pay a ``high price" for the consequence of the naval incident.
Although the North Koreans are not likely to provoke another military collision with the South at sea or on land, as they are preparing for Bosworth's visit, they have carried out revenge on past defeats. In the first sea battle in 1999, the North Korean navy lost tens of sailors and a vessel. But, in 2002, the North retaliated against the South in an unprovoked attack, which took the lives of several South Korean sailors and caused serious damage to one of their ships.
The latest exchange of fire deepens the concerns of many South Koreans about the planned transfer of wartime operational control from the United States to South Korea by April 2012. They are particularly worried about how a new security arrangement would meet the continuing need of a strong deterrent against threats from the North.
Military authorities on both sides are confident that the alliance is in good shape and that there will be no problem in the transfer of operational control. But a group of retired generals of South Korea has petitioned for a deferment of the OPCON transfer until after the resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue.
There will be no genuine peace on the Korean Peninsula without North Korea's abandonment of nuclear weapons. The nuclear issue will not be resolved without addressing the security, political and economic concerns of North Korea. There will be no reduction of tensions without improved inter-Korean relations. There will be no improved inter-Korean relations without mutual reconciliation and cooperation.
A North Korean collapse may help us find a different way forward. But the North has so far proven its tenacity to survive pressures from within and from targeted sanctions from without. A collapse of the North Korean system would inevitably bring about a new set of uncertainties in the mist of conflicting interests among the United States, China and South Korea. All should endeavor for an early denuclearization.
What's your take?
Tong Kim is a research professor with the Ilmin Institute of International Relations at Korea University and an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). He can be reached at tong.kim8@yahoo.com.