Is Denuclearization Possible?

By Tong Kim

The United States has repeated its readiness for direct talks with North Korea, but it does not seem to have decided whether, when, or under what conditions to send Ambassador Stephen Bosworth to Pyongyang. The North Koreans are holding their breath to see if Bosworth will come to their capital. If the U.S. administration had decided, it has not yet made an announcement.

Is denuclearization still possible, given North Korea's security policy of nuclear deterrence and its stated objective of seeking U.S. recognition of the status of a nuclear armed North Korea? Since January this year, the North Koreans have reiterated that while ``not opposing denuclearization,'' it would never give up its nuclear weapons as long as ``U.S. hostile policy'' remains. The North's definition of the ``hostile policy'' stretches out to include nonexistent U.S. nuclear weapons in South Korea, a U.S. nuclear war plan, and ``U.S. policy to isolate and stifle North Korea.''

After 15 years of a vicious cycle of crisis, negotiation, agreement, negation, return to the status quo, the prospect of complete denuclearization is murkier than ever before. Both Pyongyang and Washington are responsible for this undesirable situation.

Both skeptics and realists believe that the best outcome from any bilateral or multilateral negotiation would be a phased package deal that would cap North Korea's nuclear arsenal and prevent proliferation but allow the North to keep its nuclear weapons indefinitely until its regime collapses or until political and economic relations improve between the United States and North Korea.

As Defense Secretary Robert Gates quipped, why should the U.S. ``buy the same horse twice?'' One can argue that we only paid a down payment for the horse, and the deal broke before the horse was paid off. A more important question might be, ``Is the horse still for sale?''

Now the horse, if it refers to the plutonium production facilities at Yongpyon, has created offspring ― nuclear weapons. And the North Koreans are likely to sell the old horse again, but they do not want to sell the baby horses, at least not at this point.

To recap the U.S. policy on North Korea, the United States will not accept the North as a nuclear power; it still seeks a complete and verifiable dismantlement of North Korea's plutonium and uranium programs, as well as its nuclear weapons; and it will not go alone without its allies and partners in the region. To these ends, the United States will be willing to offer a comprehensive package. It will maintain a two-track approach of dialogue and sanctions. The United States will keep the current sanctions in place until North Korea takes irreversible measures toward denuclearization.

Judging from several indicators, the U.S. administration is about to start direct talks with Pyongyang now that it has garnered the active or passive support of the four other concerned countries ― China, Russia, South Korea and Japan ― provided that such direct talks should focus on bringing the North Koreans back to the six-party talks.

However, it may be necessary in initial bilateral talks to preview a comprehensive package to the North without negotiating its substance. This could include, in addition to the discussion of denuclearization, issues of proliferation, missiles, normalization of relations, a peace agreement to supplant the 56-year old armistice agreement, illicit international activities, and even human rights.

Skeptics and realists also agree that dialogue is better than no dialogue even if it may not achieve full denuclearization. Dialogue and engagement should at least help ``manage'' the problem of North Korea's nuclear ambition or pave the way to eventual denuclearization.

Skeptics favor continued sanction pressures, believing that sanctions bite. But street scenes in Pyongyang with heavier traffic, including taxis and seemingly vibrant market activities, according to an American who returned from Pyongyang last week, show that the sanctions are not biting ordinary people in North Korea. The North Koreans who met their separated families at recent reunions did not appear to be suffering from malnutrition or starvation: they looked healthy for their ages and appeared well dressed. This is not to disregard the cold reality that life in the rural areas is known to be much harsher.

Realists have argued that sanctions alone, without China's full participation, would not end the North Korean nuclear program. Sanctions make it more difficult for the North to trade arms and materials and to keep generating revenues from illicit activities for perfecting its missiles and nuclear weapons. They may help deprive North Korean leaders of a privileged life style. Sanctions will also reinforce the containment of proliferation. However, this is about the limit of the effectiveness of sanctions.

If and when Bosworth goes to Pyongyang and if he meets with First Vice Foreign Minister Kang Suk-ju ― who has direct access to Chairman Kim Jong-il ― instead of Vice Minister Kim Gye-gwan, the normal interlocutor for American visitors, he will have a better chance for success.

Former Assistant Secretary of State Chris Hill went to Pyongyang twice but never met with Kang, whereas two presidential special envoys ― Bill Perry in 1999 and James Kelly in 2002 ― were allowed to have meetings with him, the most influential foreign policy advisor to Kim Jong-il. If Washington seeks a bilateral meeting in a third country, there would be no chance for Kang to show up, unless Washington sends Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg.

In the meantime, President Lee Myung-bak's offer of ``a grand bargain,'' was rejected outright by the North as a ``ridiculous proposal,'' even before Seoul had a chance to reveal the details of that offer. The North has always claimed that the nuclear issue is a matter to be settled between the United Sates and them. In a summary, Lee's plan would provide North Korea with security assurances ― both negative and positive ― and economic incentives if ``the North irreversibly dismantles the key components of its nuclear program'' in a one-time deal, instead of repeating the prolonged, phased negotiations that have failed in the past.

The concept of President Lee's ``grand bargain'' may have been essentially the same as that of the U.S. administration's ``comprehensive package,'' except for the phasing and timelines for the denuclearization process. The problem was the timing of the announcement of Lee's plan, which coincided with an imminent prospect of direct U.S.-North Korea dialogue. Acting out of his political need to address the rising concerns among South Koreans that they might be left out of the process, he came up with the ``a grand bargain,'' a nebulous but attractive phrase. The South Korean president seemed to have wanted to assert a key role in denuclearization.

South Korea's role is important in dealing with the North Korean issue. Its security is directly threatened by North Korea's nuclear weapons. Seoul can also exercise significant influence on Washington's North Korean policy. Yet, a strengthened South Korean role is more likely to derive from improved inter-Korean relations.

Is denuclearization still possible? My answer is, yes. I will discuss why in my next column.

What's your take?

Tong Kim is a research professor with the Ilmin Institute of International Relations at Korea University and an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). He can be reached at tong.kim8@yahoo.com.