Still Split on North Korea

By Tong Kim

After a new opportunity for direct talks between the United States and North Korea emerged, the Obama administration seems to be going through a deliberation process to determine whether to send Steve Bosworth, the top representative on North Korea, to Pyongyang and what he should say to the North Koreans if he is sent. It is likely that they have already completed such an internal policy review.

According to the Nelson Report, a sometimes juicy daily email widely read with interest among North Korea watchers, a Deputies Committee meeting ― chaired by the deputy national security advisor and participated in by key under secretaries from the State and Defense Departments as well as the deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency ― was supposed to meet at the end of last week to discuss the timing and the message for Bosworth to convey to the North Koreans.

Judging from a flood of reports on this development, the administration is ready to start bilateral talks prior to the resumption of the six-party talks. The Obama administration had insisted that any direct talks would be possible only within the context of the six-nation process, if the North returns to it. Holding direct talks prior to the resumption of the multilateral talks is a visible shift in format, but not in substance.

The official purpose of such bilateral talks would be limited to bringing North Korea back to the six-way conference, as I suggested in my last column. The State Department said there is a ``consensus'' among other participants of the multilateral meeting, including China, Japan and South Korea, that Washington should positively consider accepting Pyongyang's invitation for Ambassador Bosworth to visit the North.

As of this writing, Washington has not responded to Pyongyang regarding the visitation.

Part of the international ``consensus'' is to reject North Korea as a nuclear power and achieve the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, a consistent policy goal of the Obama administration.

Interestingly enough, we now know Pyongyang issued the invitation based on former President Bill Clinton's ``private'' suggestion to North Korean leader Kim Jong-il, whom Clinton talked to on Aug. 5 to obtain the release of two American reporters.

On Sept. 18, Kim told a Chinese special envoy, Dai Bingguo, that North Korea is willing to resolve its nuclear and other issues ``through bilateral or multilateral talks.'' If the multilateral discussions the North Korean leader referred to are the six-party talks, it could be construed as his acceptance of the U.S. premise of bilateral negotiation within the six-country conference.

For the six-party process to succeed, direct U.S.-DPRK negotiation is indispensible, as we have seen. Yet, North Korea's argument that the nuclear issue should be settled directly between Washington and Pyongyang ― as was the case for the 1994 Agreed Framework ― is no longer acceptable. The reality is the threat level of the North's nuclear programs has been raised higher with its increased capabilities. In addition, the four neighboring countries ― China, South Korea, Japan, and Russia ― who have participated in the multilateral nuclear talks would refuse to be excluded from the process of denuclearizing North Korea.

Because of the North's increased number of nuclear bombs since the abrogation of the Agreed Framework, the economic price of denuclearization has gone up much higher, assuming that the communist regime is bribable. And it would make sense to share the burden of cost among the five participants. Political rewards such as a peace agreement and diplomatic normalization would also be part of a comprehensive package for denuclearization.

Kim's recent conciliatory gestures ― called ``a charm offensive'' ― that brought about the possibility of bilateral discussion has triggered a heated debate between liberals and conservatives within and between Washington and Seoul. The main point of opposition to dialogue regardless of its form argues it would be a waste of time, since North Korea would never give up its nuclear weapons.

President Lee Myung-bak and his administration seem to be determined to continue their tough policy on North Korea until it shows ``a genuine intent'' for denuclearization. South Korea's foreign minister said the North's nuclear weapons are targeted at the South and Pyongyang would be willing to use them to unify Korea under its Communist system. The Lee administration is firm on its position that the international community should not relax the sanctions on the recalcitrant regime.

President Lee believes the effectiveness of the U.N. sanctions has forced North Korea's ``conciliatory tactic'' designed to avoid a crisis from continued sanctions. He said ``there is no sign of change in North Korea's intent to further develop its nuclear program until it is recognized as a nuclear state.'' Lee's position seems to have hardened after the charm offensive began. He seems to have stepped back to his earlier policy of ``denuclearization first before providing economic aid.''

Proponents of dialogue for denuclearization argue there is no other option to resolve the issue except negotiation, and there is no way to know the North's true intentions unless we engage them seriously. They believe the dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear program is still possible through an exchange of denuclearization for rewards.

Speaking at the National Press Club on Sept. 18, a leading opposition politician, Chung Dong-young, whom President Lee defeated in the 2007 presidential election, called on the United States and South Korea to seize ``this new opportunity for dialogue'' to find out ``what their real intentions are.'' Chung, without criticizing Lee's hard-line policy, strongly supported the prospects of direct talks between Washington and Pyongyang as a prelude to the resuscitation of the six-party talks.

Chung believes ``it is possible to achieve the dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear weapons through direct talks'' if the North is given ``what it wants,'' which includes a formal ending of the Korean War, security assurance and normalization of relations with the United States. He also called for President Obama to invite Kim to Washington ``to open and reform North Korea,'' as Nixon met with Mao in 1972 to open China.

Conservatives in Washington and Seoul believe in the efficacy of sanctions, hoping North Korea, despite Kim's recovery of health, will eventually capitulate to international pressure. Liberals in South Korea are waging opposition to the Lee government's North Korea policy, while conservatives are guarding any possible U.S. move to make a deal with the ``bad guys'' in Pyongyang. The conservative Seoul government is more defiant to criticism from the left than the Obama administration is to criticism from the right.

What is clear is that Kim is providing a new opportunity for nuclear talks. What's your take?

Tong Kim is a research professor with the Ilmin Institute of International Relations at Korea University and an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). He can be reached at tong.kim8@yahoo.com.