Containment or Denuclearization

By Tong Kim

After a recent barrage of U.S. policy statements and North Korea's negative reactions to them, the North is back on the center stage, despite public fatigue from a seemingly endless stalemate in denuclearization.

This is an ironic development against the U.S. intent ― as expressed by U.S. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton on July 20 ― to deny North Korea's ``constant demand for attention." Given the grave nature of the nuclear issue, it would not be prudent to ignore the North Koreans.

Now it appears clearer that the United States wants to pursue a two-track approach to North Korea with an expanded set of tough sanctions under the UNSC resolution 1874, while offering a new ``comprehensive package" of nuclear dismantlement that ``would be attractive to North Korea" in the words of Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell on July 18.

At the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in Thailand, the South Korean foreign minister Yu Myung-hwan said the U.S., China, Russia, South Korea and Japan all agreed to keep the door open for a dialogue with the North, while enforcing UN sanctions. But he said during Campbell's visit to Seoul that there was only a ``conceptual discussion" of what the U.S. initiated package deal would consist of and its purpose would be to achieve denuclearization.

However, the center of gravity in U.S. policy is still focused on sanctions and pressure ― to show the North Koreans that their provocative actions have consequences and to slow down North Korea's missile program. Sanctions alone, even with China's more active participation, would not end the North's nuclear programs.

As sanctions take effect, the North Koreans are likely to concentrate more on a continued nuclear program, to add more weapons to their arsenal through their proven plutonium technology and to refine their nuclear devices, for which resources are more readily available locally than for the missile program ― and a third nuclear test is possible.

At the ARF, Secretary Clinton officially confirmed the United States wants the DPRK to return to the six-party talks, although the U.S. would not reward the North just for returning to the table. The U.S. would offer a package deal, including normalization of relations and other incentives, if the North decides to take irreversible steps to denuclearization.

Yet, the U.S. proposal was rejected outright on the spot by North Korean representatives attending the conference. The North Koreans said they do not oppose dialogue but aparently, they are thinking of a different format for discussions under different conditions that would be unacceptable to the United States.

The North has consistently argued its nuclear program was the result of hostile U.S. policy and the U.S. nuclear threat. On July 15 Pyongyang's president of the presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly Kim Yong Nam said the six party talks ``have ended forever" because his country can have ``no dialogue where the principle of sovereign rights and equality are denied." Even before that, the North declared its dissociation from the six-party talk, freeing itself from any binding obligations from the talks. (North Korea's foreign ministry statement on April 17)

The United States, while mindful of the security concerns of South Korea and Japan from the threat of North Korea's weapons of mass destruction, does not regard the North's present capability as a direct threat to the United States. This assessment has been made by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, and most recently by Clinton and her spokesman, P.J. Crowley, who said on July 21 that North Korea represents ``an infinitesimal threat to the United States directly."

North Korea is not a threat to China. The threat of a nuclear Japan to China has been a selling point for Chinese cooperation in pressuring the North. China increasingly seems to be counting on the obstacles to Japan's nuclear armament ― Japan's constitutional restrictions and strong national sentiments against nuclear weapons as the only country that has been attacked by nuclear bombs. China supports denuclearization but opposes the collapse of North Korea.

Obviously, one of the serious U.S. concerns is a possible arms race in the region. If countries like South Korea and Japan decide to go nuclear, provoked by a fully nuclear North Korea, it would undermine the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and diminish the significance of President Obama's agreement with Russia for nuclear reductions. Japan or South Korea would find it difficult to opt for nuclear development against U.S. policy and in view of the security alliance with the United States, under which they are provided a U.S. nuclear umbrella.

For now and for the foreseeable future it is unlikely both the North and the United States would back down from their adamant positions and accept demands from the other party. The talk of ``straws in the wind" for a dialogue that started with the U.S. offer of a package deal had quickly evaporated. The Financial Times reported on July 21 that the South was offering a $40 million aid program to the North, which was subsequently denied by the South Korean foreign ministry, had also contributed to the speculation of talks with the North. Now there is no prospect for holding diplomatic negotiations.

In the meantime, the implementation of sanctions and pressure policy will be reinforced, but whether they can really bring about change in North Korean behavior is questionable. If negotiation or military action is ruled out, the only viable alternative might be an indefinite containment plan with increased deterrent and sanctions. In such a case, heightened tensions will be a fact of life on the Korean Peninsula.

George Kennan's containment policy against the Soviet Union paid off when the Soviets crumbled themselves from within. Waiting for the success of a new containment policy would be like waiting for a North Korean collapse, which nobody knows when, how, or even whether it will happen.

North Korean cargo ship Kang Nam, which appeared to be heading for Myanmar then turned around to return to the North, is cited as an effective result of U.N. sanctions. Recently, U.S. Pacific Force Commander Admiral Timothy Keating said he did not know what was on the ship, why the ship returned, or whether the North Koreans were playing to get attention or to ratchet up tensions. He also said he did not know the accurate state of Kim Jong-il's health, his mental acuity, or his succession plan.

The U.S. Pacific Commander, who receives the best available U.S. intelligence reports, and to whom the U.S. forces in Korea report, also said he did not know what would happen if Kim Jong-il cedes control or if he is no longer capable of exercising control, although his command has a number of options to take in concert with South Korea and in discussion with the State Department "in the event of uncertain succession in the North."

Beyond speculation, very little is known about what's gong on in the North Korean leadership. Engagement is a good tool to learn about North Korea.

What's your take?

Tong Kim is a research professor with the Ilmin Institute of International Relations at Korea University and an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). He can be reached at tong.kim8@yahoo.com.