Advent of Centrism

By Tong Kim

In response to calls for a fundamental change in government policy and leadership style, President Lee Myung-bak has proposed for the broadening of ``pragmatic centrism" as a way of social integration to rise above the political divide between progressivism and conservatism. This proposal came after his successful summit with President Obama on June 16 in Washington.

The results of the summit were good news to the conservatives who constitute the major support base for the Lee government. But success in foreign policy seldom enhances a president's standing at home, whereas failure in foreign policy often brings it down.

The conservatives were especially pleased by the reaffirmation of the U.S. commitment to the defense of South Korea, with ``extended deterrence, including the U.S. nuclear umbrella," a ``joint vision" for ``peaceful unification on the principles of free democracy and a market economy," and a joint commitment to the elimination of North Korea's nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, and to ``promote the fundamental human rights of the North Korean people."

Obviously, the progressives who supported the two previous governments were disappointed at the absence of an agreed approach to stave off a continuing escalation of confrontation, which, they believe, may lead to an armed clash with North Korea. They see no difference in Obama's Korea policy from that of Bush. Obama's offer of an opportunity for North Korea to take a path of ``peaceful negotiations" was overshadowed by the predominant overtone of his tough position on North Korean provocations. Neither Obama nor Lee suggested how he would seek negotiations with the North Koreans, who keep ratcheting up the level of belligerence.

Synonymous to ``nuclear umbrella," by definition ``extended deterrence," assures the threat to retaliate against a third party ― North Korea in this case ― with U.S. nuclear weapons, if the North uses its nuclear weapons. This doctrine worked well during the Cold War for the security of U.S. allies, preventing them from developing their own nuclear capabilities. The modifying clause ``including the U.S. nuclear umbrella" must have been inserted in the joint statement at the insistence of the South Koreans, to whom ``extended deterrence" was not enough to alleviate their concerns.

However, as long as a first strike doctrine remains unchanged in the U.S. strategy, ``extended deterrence" with an allied preponderance of advanced conventional arms, may work in both ways: it can strengthen the deterrence but it can conversely risk a suicidal attack from the North. There is a fine line between defense and offense in the new security environment in which a preemptive strike may be justified. In any case, the security situation on the Korean Peninsula is now in Cold War mode. It took the weakening and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union to end the Cold War. The collapse of North Korea is possible but not yet in sight.

The phrasing in the joint statement of seeking reunification ``under the principles of democracy and a market economy" is another political point that President Lee scored for the conservatives. In the past there was no clear U.S. policy on the issue other than the position that it was up to the Korean people on both sides of the division. One problem: North Korea interprets this new phrasing as South Korea's strategy of absorption, endorsed by the United States.

Emphasis on U.S.-Korea cooperation for denuclearization and human rights was not backed by specific measures that may help achieve the goals. Again, sanctions or other coercive measures are not likely to contribute to the resumption of the talks. While it is only right to advocate for human rights, advocacy without pragmatic input has not been effective. The North Koreans regard such pressure as a hostile interference in their internal affairs.

At the White House press conference Lee said he and Obama agreed that ``under no circumstances" would they allow North Korea to possess nuclear weapons. But Obama's statement was more nuanced: ``we have not come to a conclusion that North Korea will or should be a nuclear power," as denuclearization will be pursued vigorously.

By the sentence in the quote above, Obama could have implied that it is too early to tell whether North Korea will be able to develop the full fledged capability of a nuclear power ― which includes miniaturized nuclear warheads mountable on missiles that could reach the United States. Regarding whether North Korea ``should" be a nuclear power, he seemed to refer to a possible future development that might dictate U.S. acceptance of a nuclear North Korea. Then President Obama quickly added the reason why North Korea should not be accepted as such: its ``track record of proliferation."

At the June 22 Blue House meeting that was attended by the representatives of two parties ― the Grand National Party and the Advanced Liberal Party ― but boycotted by the main opposition Democratic Party, President Lee said South Korea and the United States intend to pursue a format of five-party talks from the six-party talks, excluding North Korea. He also said both Seoul and Washington agreed to thoroughly implement strong sanctions against the North for the time being. If the idea of five-party talks is to raise one voice among the five against the North, as the Bush administration had tried so hard to do, it would not work. If it intends to discuss ways to bring the North back to the six-party talks, that may be worth trying.

Lee also said the planned transfer of the wartime operational control can't be canceled but could be postponed beyond 2012, ``if inter-Korean relations become difficult," meaning if the current tensions are not eased or become worse. Although the conservatives ― who see U.S. wartime control as a double guarantee of U.S. commitment ― are still opposing the transfer, President Lee agreed to ``take the lead role" in the defense of South Korea in the joint statement, which means the transfer plan will proceed on schedule, even with some adjustments if necessary, for long-term benefits to both countries.

Lee Myung-bak is not a very popular president now with an approval rating of 25 to 30 percent. His successful strengthening of the alliance should help regain support from the conservatives. However, if he fails to lead the nation from closer to the center, as he claims to be a pragmatic centrist, or if he fails to build a broader centrist base of support to include moderate leftists and rightists, or if his presidency fails at the end of the day, Washington's unqualified support for his government may backfire to revive a new surge of anti-American sentiments in Korea. It happened in the past. What's your take?

Tong Kim is a research professor with the Ilmin Institute of International Relations at Korea University and an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). He can be reached at tong.kim8@yahoo.com.