Waiting for North Korea

By Tong Kim

With the advent of the conservative Lee Myung-bak government ― which stopped its two predecessors' practice of providing strings-free economic aid to the impoverished North ― the North Koreans seem to have concluded that the South was seeking a regime change and subsequent absorption of the North to achieve unification under South Korea's terms.

The South Korean president and his senior officials made a number of conflicting policy statements and sometimes gratuitous comments that helped the North fall back on a familiar pattern of provocative behavior that had led to the latest crisis for the Gaeseong Industrial Complex last week: It would be wrong to think that the North would not close the complex because of revenue.

When President Lee said that ``waiting was also a strategy," the North Koreans took it to mean that the South was waiting for a collapse of the North Korean system instead of ``waiting for the North to return to dialogue."

When President Lee said his goal was ``to achieve a democratic unification," the North Koreans took it to mean that the South was pursuing absorption. The North's suspicion became deeper when people in and out of government both in Seoul and Washington spoke openly of the possibility of an imminent change to the North Korean power structure due to Kim Jong-il's ill health.

At the outset, the Lee government and the ruling Grand National Party had a clear policy on the North ― to discontinue economic aid and to press for denuclearization while seeking a more reciprocal approach in inter-Korean relations. But they did not have an operative strategy to seek engagement, denuclearization or to expedite a demise of Pyongyang's system, other than stressing closer cooperation with the United States.

During the 2000 inter-Korean summit, Chairman Kim Jong-il asked President Kim Dae-jung: ``Even if we now agree and move on to improve our relations, wouldn't it go back to the starting point if the Grand National Party comes into power next time?" Kim Dae-jung answered, ``The Grand National Party is opposing our policy now because of their interest in partisan politics. But once they are in power, they would follow basically the same policy as ours now, albeit they might make some modifications in implementation." (From Lim Dong-won's book ``Peacemaker")

In short, Kim Jong-il's prophetic concern has become reality. In the wake of the disintegration of the old Soviet Union, North Korea has feared that South Korea, with its growing economic power, might seek absorption of the North or launch an invasion with the backing of U.S. military might.

If the Seoul government was waiting for a sudden change in the North, the Kim Jong-il regime is waiting for the termination of the incumbent government in the South before it considering the resumption of any meaningful dialogue. The North seems to be willing to wait out President Lee's term.

North Korea seemed serious in going along with the process of denuclearization and improved relations with the United States when it allowed the spectacular blow-up of the cooling tower of its Yongbyon reactor in 2008. Then there was cautious optimism. After all, Kim Jong-il said in 2000 that he would not oppose continued U.S. military presence on the Korean Peninsula if the U.S. forces would play the role of a balancer of power in the region.

Backing off from the six-party talks last fall and constantly increasing pressure on the South, North Korea has been making good on the threats it had made. It has also started reacting immediately to any negative statement or action from Seoul, Tokyo or Washington. Following through on an earlier warning, North Korea avowed the alleged futility of the six-party talks after the U.N. Security Council's adoption of a presidential statement condemning the North's missile launch in April. North Korea is not likely to return to the six-party talks.

In Washington the Obama administration, mired in a number of higher priorities ― including the financial crisis, Afghanistan and the legacies of Bush's war in Iraq ― is yet to develop a new North Korea policy. While the administration denounces Pyongyang's provocations, it vows not to lure the North Koreans with any concessions. In four months of the Obama presidency, no meeting has taken place between the United States and North Korea. Washington, too, is waiting for the North to return to the six-party talks.

In the meantime North Korea is waiting for Washington to come up with a more attractive package ― a new policy that is different in both format and substance from the Bush administration. North Korea rightly or wrongly believes its possession of nuclear weapons and missiles, not economic aid from outside, are essential to regime survival.

The North has threatened to produce more fissile material, improve missile technology and conduct a new nuclear test. However, the North has also said that if the United States ends its hostile policy and if its regime security were not threatened, it would negotiate for denuclearization.

The North has not said it would rule out bilateral talks with the United States or oppose a new forum of multilateral talks.

If the current mode of waiting or a strategy of waiting continues in Seoul, Washington, Pyongyang or even in Beijing, if nobody moves first there would only be more tension and more danger at the expense of everybody's interest.

President Lee might want to undertake a total review of his North Korea policy to find a way to persuade the North that he is truly interested in ``co-existence and co-prosperity." President Obama might want to encourage his people to development a more creative, pragmatic strategy based on the reality of North Korea. The United States should lead in meeting the ominous challenge from North Korea threatening international peace and security.

Chairman Kim Jong-il should understand that neither Seoul nor Washington is seeking confrontation but a peaceful solution to the issues of nuclear weapons and missiles, which will benefit his country as well as its neighbors. What's your take?

Tong Kim is a research professor with the Ilmin Institute of International Relations at Korea University and an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). He can be reached at tong.kim8@yahoo.com.