Irony of Inter-Korean Relations

By Tong Kim

With a publicly scheduled satellite launch and erratic, unilateral control of access to the Gaeseong Industrial Complex, in addition to intensifying vilification of the South Korea government, North Korea is upping the ante for the South. Yet no breakthrough is in sight to the deadlock of the inter-Korean relations that have reached a dangerous point.

Neither side can afford to further aggravate the situation, as it would be detrimental to its interest. It would not be good for the North if its economically superior southern neighbor turns its back in all-out military confrontation against the North, as it did during the Cold War era. The cost of the North's survival would be higher and its security would be at a higher risk.

It would not be good for the South if its nuclear armed northern neighbor keeps threatening its security and economic activities through provocative statements and intimidating acts of threat. Emotional and physical confrontation, if unbridled, could trigger a calculated or an accidental clash of military forces between the two sides.

The North appears determined to shun the Lee Myung-bak government, which it blames for adopting ``a policy of confrontation" by rejecting cooperation between ``us the same nation." It discredits the South's policy objective of ``coexistence and coprosperity" as a hoax, and the ``Denuclearization and Opening 3000 plan" as an instrument of confrontation.

Pyongyang's conditions for dialogue have incrementally toughened from the premise that Seoul accepts the two inter-Korean summit agreements to an apology for the complete cutoff of dialogue that allegedly resulted from Seoul's ``policy of confrontation." The Commission of the Unification of the Fatherland ― North Korea's authority on relations with the South ― even reiterated that the ultimate condition for dialogue would be the termination of the Lee government.

It is true that until recently the Lee government has made some harsh statements that were disturbing or resentful to North Korea. But many of these words were intended for internal audiences within the South, not intentionally directed at the North. The Seoul government has never officially refused dialogue with the North Koreans. On the contrary, President Lee has expressed his personal interest in meeting with the North Korean leader for ``genuine dialogue" that will truly benefit both sides. The Seoul government never responded to Pyongyang's bellicose rhetoric in kind.

The policy of ``Denuclearization and Opening 3000" was never fully explained by the officials of the Lee government during its first year. Most people, including this writer, interpreted it as demanding the ``denuclearization and opening" of North Korea first, before the South would consider provision of aid to the North. Also, given the North's aversion to opening, this policy seemed doomed to be rejected by Pyongyang.

Belated but important clarification of the government's North Korea policy came from the new unification minister, Hyun In-taek, who was the policy architect and a close confidant of the president, through his speech at a recent press club in Seoul. According to the minister, the policy objective is to achieve peace on the Korean peninsula through denuclearization and eventually to move toward national unification.

To this end, he said his government would take a flexible approach in response to the reality of inter-Korean relations and the international environment surrounding the peninsula. Hyun In-taek and his president see denuclearization as a process, during which the South should ``coexist and coprosper" by building a relationship of peaceful and economic cooperation. They are committed to positively responding to progress in the denuclearizatioin process with adequate measures that would include economic aid.

Despite the indiscreet anti-North Korean talk in the conservative camp in the South, and contrary to the claims on the part of the North, there is no evidence that the Lee government was seeking confrontation or a collapse or absorption of the North. Seoul does not want war.

As for the ``opening" part of the ``Denuclearization and Opening 3000," the Seoul government would not wait until the North opens itself before providing economic assistance. It rather refers to the potential impact of inter-Korean cooperation on North Korea's economic system through exchanges and exposure to inter-dependant market economy. The South cannot force opening on the North: It will be the North's decision to make.

Besides the issues of nuclear weapons and missiles, the Gaeseong Industrial Complex seems to have reached a critical point where both sides may have to make some decisions. Seoul made clear that it will keep the joint operations at Gaeseong, but closing the industrial complex is not an improbable option to consider on either side.

The North Korean military has been tightening the rope around the neck of the complex, ratcheting up the pressure on passages through the border, without explaining the reasons for its actions. In the South, frustrated conservatives have started calling for shutting down the Gaeseong business operations. Some even call for South Korea's withdrawal from the six-party Talks.

If Seoul closes Gaeseong and deserts the multilateral nuclear talks, what does it accomplish? What follow up actions can it take? It stopped economic aid, and it is not talking to North Korea. It is not easy for North Korea to close Gaeseong, either, because such a drastic action would negatively impact the prospect of the North's future joint economic projects with any foreign country. The North does not want to be seen as a chronic violator of international business agreements.

Pyongyang would be less concerned with an immediate loss of revenue ― $32 million ― from Gaeseong. Pyongyang already forfeited its annual revenue of $12 million by closing the Gaeseong tourism project. The suspension of Mt. Geumgang tourism is incurring an additional annual loss of $18 million. The North has been surviving without aid from the South for over a year now. It has even declined to receive humanitarian food aid from the United States.

Time and time again, North Korea has proven to be pressure-resistant from the outside world. Pyongyang would rather take the path of a hard life of suffering than better economic well-being through compromising its system. The North Koreans are foolhardy, but they are not fools.

Knowing the way the North Koreans are, it is unlikely that they will change their mind to re-engage with the South. A new idea, or, perhaps, a new bold approach ― still anchored in the concept of ``principles and flexibility" in policy ― will have to come from the South.

For example, the South should patiently explain what its policy really is toward the North. Instead of waiting for the completion of the phase two disablement, the South should start seeking ``high-level working meetings to lead the North for economic cooperation" in recognition of the progress made thus far in denuclearization.

Inter-Korean tension is not helpful to the United States, the most important ally of South Korea. It also diminishes South Korea's role in the denuclearization process and a security vision for the region. It will be an impediment to Pyongyang's efforts to improve relations with Washington, which would not disregard Seoul's position.

The North should first stop personal attacks on the South Korean president. Would the North appreciate it if the South's government does the same on its ``dear leader"? What the North should also understand is that Mr. Hyun has President Lee's ear. They want dialogue, and together they can make bold decisions. What's your take?

Tong Kim is a research professor with the Ilmin Institute of International Relations at Korea University and an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). He can be reached at tong.kim8@yahoo.com.