Obama and North Korea

By Tong Kim

For the incoming Obama administration, North Korea will not be the top priority foreign policy issue but it will certainly remain as one of the flash points around the world ― along with a few other hot spots, including Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan, a Bush legacy that the next president will inherit on January 20.

The North Korean nuclear issue is in a worse shape today and it will be much more challenging to deal with than eight years ago when President Bush took over from President Clinton. After Bush refused to follow Clinton's engagement path, North Korea significantly increased its plutonium stockpile, tested a nuclear bomb and announced itself a ``nuclear weapons state."

Whether the Obama administration will forge a different direction from Bush's path or continue with the six-party process with some modifications remains to be seen. President-elect Obama has not spelled out the details on how he would approach the North Korean issue. But he made it clear that his goal would be a complete and verifiable denuclearization.

Fortunately Obama has enlisted several of America's best foreign policy minds to help him meet the diplomatic challenges lying ahead in his presidency. During his campaign and after his election he has demonstrated his ability to make good judgment based on the advice he was getting from his people. There is one president at a time: Obama and his advisers are prudently quiet.

North Korea undoubtedly welcomes the launching of an Obama era, hoping that the new American administration would finally end ``hostility" toward the North and pragmatically accommodate it as a sovereign state for ``coexistence." North Korea is especially encouraged by Obama's claim that he would be willing to meet with its leader Kim Jong-il ``without preconditions." The DPRK wants the security of its system from the United States. Everything else is second in importance.

The latest revelation from the (North) Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) that Pyongyang had never agreed in writing to allow experts to take samples for testing as part of the verification process is a simple example showing the level of difficulty in doing business with the North Koreans. The State Department has relied on its understanding of agreements with the North, but such understanding has often been unilateral only to be rejected by the North at a later point. This has raised the suspicion that one of the two parties is lying or at least misleading.

Despite this and other bad experiences with the North, President Obama will inherit the progress made through the multilateral talks in Beijing, namely the delayed phase-II implementation of disablement. Those involved in the six-party talks are yet to officially agree on and implement a verification protocol on the DPRK's declaration of nuclear programs. In any case, the six-party talks' September 19, 2005 statement _ in which the North committed to a verifiable denuclearization ― will be the foundation for further negotiations for the Obama administration. Denuclearization is still a long haul.

North Korea, despite rumors of its leader's ill health, seems to be more interested in getting ready to ``deal with" the next administration rather than focusing on the unfinished business with the Bush administration. The North is already getting fuel and food aid from the United States under previous agreements.

In approaching North Korea, President Obama is expected to be more flexible in format ― with emphasis on direct talks and high level exchanges to culminate in a summit, perhaps with reordering the sequence of steps to a peace agreement and normalization during the process of a complete and verifiable denuclearization.

Considering the views of his advisers, Obama will be unlikely to reject all aspects of Bush's approach. There will be a review of Bush's policy, and it will take some time for the new administration to announce its new official policy toward North Korea. But it would be highly unlikely that it seeks an ``Anything But Bush" policy. In contrast to its predecessor, the Obama administration is expected to produce a coherent consensual policy from within and in the spirit of bipartisan foreign policy.

With the right kind of policy, the United States should be able to send an unequivocally consistent message to North Korea that Washington is serious about engaging Pyongyang and it accepts the reality of the North Korean system and it is ready to work with the North for mutually pragmatic interests.

Regarding human rights and other sensitive issues for the North Koreans, the Obama administration can launch a quiet diplomacy to convey U.S. concerns, which do not intend to undermine the DPRK regime. It should build mutual trust and induce them to transform their policies and to reform their system by themselves. North Korea is ready for reform for economic efficiency but not for opening because of its fear of losing internal control.

Conducting diplomacy with a country like North Korea that has traditionally resisted foreign intervention and external pressure is not easy, but it is critical to win its trust, without which there would be no genuine resolution to the North Korean issue. Direct talks are one of the best ways to build mutual confidence.

The first thing the next administration may want to do will be to inform Pyongyang of its interest in keeping the New York channel for diplomatic communication, while the administration formulates its North Korean policy. Until then, the Obama policy team should take a fresh look at the fundamental nature of the North Korean nuclear issue _ not just from a perspective of non-proliferation but from a long-term perspective of U.S. alliance with South Korea and Japan, and an evolving U.S. role in the region.

On South Korea, Obama has already promised to strengthen the alliance as a basis for peace and stability in Northeast Asia. South Korean President Lee Myung-bak said he would not oppose an Obama-Kim Jong-il meeting if it helps denuclearization. The timing of such a summit would be difficult to decide, but ideally it should happen when the DPRK has reached a point of no return regarding nuclear development, and the North is on the verge of disposing its last nuclear weapon.

At such a point the United States should be ready to normalize diplomatic relations with the North. Discussion and conclusion of a peace mechanism on the other hand can be realized concurrently with the phase-III negotiation in the current Beijing process for final nuclear dismantlement and disposition of plutonium and nuclear weapons.

While it seems unlikely that another round of six-party talks will be held before the end of the year, no new breakthrough is expected until after the new administration comes in. The advantage of the six-party talks is multiple: recognition of China's role, the opportunity to cooperate on regional security issues, the multilateral nature of security assurance to the North, and cost sharing among the five participants, by which the United States in theory is responsible for only one fifth.

Finally, Obama is a new ray of hope for the future of the Korean Peninsula.

What's your take?

Tong Kim is a research professor with the Ilmin Institute of International Relations at Korea University and an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins University SAIS. He can be reached at tong.kim8@yahoo.com.