By Andrei Lankov
In East Asian countries, the 20th century was a golden age of the so-called ``new religions,'' a large array of strange, often bizarre ideological constructs. The ``new religions'' emerged in all countries from Korea to Japan to China.
It is easy to explain why such religious movements briefly enjoyed success in East Asia. For two millennia these countries safely, and generally quite successfully, existed in the ideological space defined by Confucianism ― not quite a religion in the Western sense, but a rather close approximation to it.
Some additional touches were added by the local variety of Buddhism (rather different from the Indian original) and assorted folk cults, which developed into Shamanism in Korea and Shinto in Japan.
However, the Western invasion resulted in the destruction of the traditional world. To many, if not most people, the old Confucian ideology looked completely discredited, since it seemed to be incompatible with the demands of the new age and also responsible for the supposed failure of East Asia to evolve and adjust.
In some cases, Christianity filled the spiritual void, but not everybody was ready to embrace the foreign teaching, especially when the West was seen as a treacherous and predatory enemy.
Hence, virtually hundreds of new religions were born, normally with some noticeable traces of Christian influence, but often with a strong nationalist background as well.
The ``new cults'' were (and still are) especially popular in Japan, so the recent Aum Shinrikyo affair, with its gas attack in the subway, was yet another reminder of this trend.
In Korea, the ``new religions'' reached the height of their popularity in the middle of the 20th century, only to wane in recent decades.
In most ― but not all ― cases, the ``new cults'' could not compete with the managerial skills, funds, and centuries-proven techniques of the Christian missionaries. They still exist, nonetheless, and the largest of them boasts up to half a million supporters.
In Korea, the most important of the new religious movements, and also the oldest of them, was the Donghak and its most popular offspring, Chondogyo (The Teaching of the Celestial Way).
Donghak emerged 150 years ago in the 1860s, being invented by an itinerant prophet named Choe Je-u. It was initially ``designed'' as a nationalistic answer to the challenges posed by the advent of Christianity.
Hence its name, Donghak or ``Eastern Teaching'' which deliberately puts the religion into opposition to Seohak or ``Western Teaching,'' the old name for Christianity.
Despite a deliberate critique of Christianity as unsuitable for Korea, the Donghak-Chondogyo heavily borrowed from its opponent. It is a monotheistic cult, which admits the existence of a unique and omniscient God.
Humans are seen as embodiments of the God, and should be treated accordingly, with the greatest respect and dignity. According to Donghak, all people are equal, and this made the teaching a natural ideology for the largest peasant uprising in Korean history.
It was after the bloody suppression of this uprising in the mid-1890s that Chondogyo leaders chose the present name for their sect, to distance themselves from all rebellious and subversive associations.
The second-largest ``new religion'' is Won Buddhism, founded in 1916 (the early 1900s was boom time for prophets). In spite of its name, and frequent use of established Buddhist expressions, Won Buddhism is not yet another sect of Buddhism, but rather an independent religion in its own right.
Less overtly political than early Donghak, Won Buddhism emphasizes moral self-development, but also self-reliant economic activity. Won Buddhism has also been very efficient in attracting supporters and proselytizing.
Currently it has a university and also a large network of welfare institutions, from kindergartens to homes for the elderly. Hence, Won Buddhism is one of the few ``new religions'' that records an increasing membership while the continual march of Protestantism and other forms of Christianity proceeds apace.
There are also a number of smaller sects, of which many belong to two major teachings ― Daejonggyo and Jeungsangyo.
Daejonggyo emerged in 1909, and it comes as no surprise to find that it contains serious nationalist elements (quite a natural thing for an ideology conceived during a period of utter national humiliation, on the eve of collapse of Korean independence).
The mythical founding father of the first Korean state, Dangun, is presented as the founder of this religion and bearer of the superior truth ― open, first and foremost, to Koreans.
In the colonial era, many Daejonggyo supporters took an active part in the resistance. It is interesting that Gaecheon Day, the Korean analogue of the Foundation Day, was first introduced by Daejonggyo and then won governmental approval as a national holiday.
Another ``new religion'' is Jeungsangyo, founded in 1901. Its founder Kang Il-sun claimed that he had discovered a way to build ``the Kingdom of Heaven on earth.'' Like early Donghak, the Jeungsangyo placed an emphasis on equality and the need for revolutionary transformations.
However, over a few decades the once powerful movement disintegrated into a dozen or so sects, each with its own peculiar cult brand, and none particularly popular.
Once upon the time, the ``new cults'' even had some impact on North Korean politics. The memories of those days are long gone, but I think this will eventually make another interesting story.
Prof. Andrei Lankov was born in St. Petersburg, Russia, and now teaches at Kookmin University in Seoul. He has recently published ``The Dawn of Modern Korea,'' which is now on sale at Kyobo Book Center and other major bookstores. The book is based on columns published in The Korea Times. He can be reached at anlankov@yahoo.com.