Rhetoric and Tension

By Tong Kim

We witness a repeat of history in the Korean Peninsula with the emergence of renewed confrontation. Tension is escalating again between the two Koreas. Following a series of gratuitous statements from some of the key officials of the new government, North Korea appears to have decided to discontinue its dialogue with South Korea and is ready to be cut-off from South's provision of aid.

Yet, there are ways to defuse the current tension and to go back to the engagement track for inter-Korean cooperation for peace and reconciliation toward the eventual goal of peaceful reunification. Despite its threatening bluster at the South, North Korea said it ``would still do its best to keep the June 15 era of reunification going." President Lee Myung-bak said his government wants to have ``genuinely sincere dialogue with North Korea, with open hearts and not for a strategic interest to exploit from each other."

Before we discuss possible remedies, we should look in to what led to this unfortunate situation. The root cause could well be North Korea's intransient policy against opening and reform, which it fears may undermine the security of its rigid system, and/or its indecision to fully give up nuclear weapons. However, the immediate cause is attributed to an imprudent and inconsiderate use of language by South Korean officials and their president.

In this column I had been warning that the new government's North Korean policy ― in the name of ``denuclearization and opening 3000'' ― would not work unless it is refined and revised with creative subtleties before it becomes a fixed policy. I had pointed out that this policy would not be acceptable to the North, if it insists on ``denuclearization first" and if it presupposes ``opening."

One month ago I wrote about the implicit rejection of the policy published in The Chosun Shinbo, a newspaper published by the pro-DPRK General Association of Korean Residents in Japan. Ironically the new government's adherence to ``pragmatism'' is not very ``pragmatic'' when it comes to the matter of inter-Korean relations. Now, the Lee government says it will stick to its ``pragmatic'' policy, without compromising the principle of reciprocity ― no caving in from the pressure of increasing tension and no unconditional provision of aid.

There had been clear signs showing the North's interest to learn about the new administration's policy and to continue its dialogue and cooperation with the South. Since President Lee's election, the North Koreans unsuccessfully tried to meet with Lee's people, while keeping silence on the new government. At the same time, Pyongyang had been scrutinizing every statement coming out of Seoul that is relevant to the North.

President Lee made it unequivocally clear that his government would be different from the two predecessors ― those of Roh Moo-hyun and Kim Dae-jung ― in dealing with the North Korean regime. His government voted for a U.N. resolution condemning the human rights situation in North Korea, demanding its improvement under the justification of universal values. Obviously the North was displeased but that alone was not enough for Pyongyang to wage a volley of vituperative attacks on President Lee himself.

The day after the unification minister said that the South would not expand the Gaeseong Industrial Complex project, absent the resolution of the nuclear issue, the North expelled all South Korean officials from the complex. The minister's statement was consistent with President Lee's ``denuclearization first" policy. Lee also had said on the same day his government would not engage North Korea against ``the will of the people."

Had his minister said something like, ``resolution (or progress) on the nuclear issues is desirable for the expansion of the industrial complex,'' the sensitive North may not have reacted the way it did. I am sure the minister was trying to represent his president's policy the best he could, but I am not sure he had thought of the impact of his statement on Pyongyang.

A more controversial statement came from the ROK's JCS chairman during a National Assembly hearing. When asked what the ROK's countermeasures would be ``if the North Koreans have small size nuclear weapons," the JCS chairman answered: ``The most important thing is to quickly identify the likely location(s) of their nuclear weapons and to strike them before the enemy uses them."

Now this was an avoidable hypothetical question, but South Korea's top military general, not a disciplined diplomat, bungled his response as an earnest soldier with no idea of the repercussions to follow from what he was saying. He did not speak of a ``preemptive strike" plan contrary to the North Korean military's accusation. The South Korean military explained that his answer was made for a hypothetical war situation. President Lee later supported the general's statement as a ``general military answer."

Nevertheless, had the JCS chairman added to his statement ``If we were at war with the North," and had he not used the phrase ``before the enemy uses them (nuclear weapons)," his statement would have had a better chance to be taken as a non-preemptive strike concept.

In the meantime, the North fired ship-to-ship missiles on the west sea and threatened to cut off all contacts with the South. It did not look like the KPA's routine winter exercise. The North Koreans seem to be ready to face a harsher economic plight that will come from its deteriorated relations with the South. In the next two months or so, the West Sea again will be a flash point for an armed clash.

I do not condone the North's accusations based on a distortion of the facts. I deplore Pyongyang's provocative rhetoric including expressions like ``to destroy the South to ashes," taking ``appropriate military response," and particularly personal attacks on the ROK president as ``a traitor" and a ``U.S. sycophant."

Name calling may serve an internal purpose but not a cross-border interest. It does not help the efforts to achieve peace and prosperity but only intensifies tension and confrontation. We have seen the adverse effect of unwarranted rhetoric ― such as President Bush's inclusion of North Korea as part of the axis of evil that did not serve the interest in denuclearization.

The price of an abuse of language could be very costly. We have seen former President Roh Moo-hyun's trouble from his loose tongue. It is not easy watching President Lee and his key officials make public statements. We have already seen too many contradictory and confusing statements from the Lee government to get a good idea of what it wants to accomplish. What's your take?

Tong Kim is former senior interpreter at the U.S. State Department and now a research professor with Ilmin Institute of International Relations at Korea University and an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins University SAIS. He can be reached at tong.kim8@yahoo.com