Hey, Let Go of My Army!

By Andy Jackson

The alliance is saved! At least that is the impression one gets from reading some newspapers after the election of Lee Myung-bak.

But policies set during the Roh Moo-hyun administration will be the gift that keeps on giving for years ahead.

The ongoing shift of wartime command of Korean forces, agreed to by the Roh and Bush administrations, is a case in point.

Under the current structure, the Combined Forces Command (CFC) controls and coordinates the military forces of both allies on the peninsula. The CFC is commanded by an American four-star general, who would exercise operation control of the forces of both nations through a highly integrated command structure.

The need for an integrated command became apparent early in the Korean War and President Syngman Rhee placed Korean troops under operation control of the United Nations Command (forerunner of the CFC).

Korea gained peacetime control of ROK forces in 1994. Korea forces do not come under CFC operation control until directed to do so by the president of Korea. The loss of wartime command of Korean troops was, and continues to be, voluntary

Korea is not alone in giving up wartime operation command of its forces. NATO has two commands that control allied forces in the event of war or other emergency, both of which are led by American generals.

The need for a single command of allied forces is simple. Without an integrated command structure, effective cooperation between units from different nationalities becomes impossible.

In short, having separate commands for Korean and American forces weakens Korea's defense.

So, assuming that President Roh does not wake up every morning dreaming of ways to make his country more vulnerable, what was his rationale for doing something that weakens Korea's defense?

The answer is ideology. Roh sees wartime control as an issue of pride and sovereignty.

Simply put, Roh views the alliance through a narrow ethnic-nationalist perspective and does not see North Korea as a threat. In the context of Roh's worldview, a loss of operational efficiency in the defense of Korea is less important that restoring was he sees as lost national pride.

He said so himself in an interview with the Yonhap News Agency; ``I hope we kick the habit of feeling insecure unless we have layers of guarantees that the Americans will intervene automatically in the event of war.'' He has also said that those who don't believe South Korean forces can defend the country alone lack ``self-respect.''

Roh's views on the subject are hardly surprising. What surprised and dismayed many Koreans was the speed with which the United States agreed with Roh's position.

Rather than giving up wartime operation control of Korean forces reluctantly, the Bush administration and the Pentagon embraced the idea as a way of giving American forces in the region more flexibility.

The U.S. Department of Defense even sought to transfer the wartime control sometime in 2009, before finally agreeing to an April 17, 2012, transfer date.

Part and parcel of the changing of wartime operational control is the shifting of American forces from their traditional role as a key part of the ground defense of Seoul. American forces are in the process of relocating from forward positions north of Seoul to Pyeongtaek, 70 kilometers south of the capital city.

When that relocation process is complete, America's commitment to Korea's defense in the early part of a conflict will consist mainly of logistical and air support. While South Korean troops are slugging in out on the outskirts of Euijeongbu, America's combat role in the early weeks of fighting would mainly consist of fighter pilots gaining their ace designations by downing MIG-17s.

In short, the Roh-Bush deal gave Korea increased national pride. In return, the U.S. got greater operational flexibility and several thousand fewer body bags in the event of a conflict. It is trade with which both sides seem happy.

With the election of Lee Myung-bak, Koreans who doubted the logic of transferring wartime control will have a chance to try to stop the deal, but they are not likely to get much cooperation from the United States.

Just two days after Lee's massive election victory, U.S. Ambassador Alexander Vershbow shot down any idea that the deal on wartime operational control will be renegotiated, saying that ``the strategic transition plan is already agreed upon and it is being implemented.''

While Lee's election will almost certainly result in a stronger ROK-U.S. alliance, it is unlikely that there will be any American combat troops between the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and the Cheong Wa Dae by the time his term ends.

Andy Jackson teaches American government in the Lakeland College bridge program at Ansan College, Gyeonggi Province. He can be reached at andyinrok@lycos.com