Sunrise or Sunset Policy?

By Scott Rembrandt

Two weeks ago, President George Bush flew home from the annual APEC meetings held in Sydney for what may be his last meaningful trip to Asia during his presidency. For Korea-watchers in Washington, the events that unfolded in Sydney were bizarre.

In Sydney, Bush held a cordial press conference with Hu Jintao after a 90-minute summit meeting.

In contrast, after meeting for 60 minutes with President Roh Moo-hyun, Bush held a press conference with Roh, in which it appeared that the South Korean president ambushed President Bush with questions on when the United States would support a declaration ending the Korean War.

While the Korean government and media continue to insist that translation errors are to blame for President Roh's repeat queries, nobody in Washington is buying this.

Instead, they see Roh's questioning as an attempt to position himself before the inter-Korean talks to the possible detriment of the U.S.-ROK alliance and the six-party process.

The summit debacle raised two troubling questions in the minds of many in Washington. Why do relations appear to be better between President Bush and a leader of a China than with the leader of a staunch U.S. ally? And is it any wonder that many U.S. government officials and Korea experts cannot wait to see President Roh go?

These concerns reflect deep, and perhaps, unfair American unease over President Roh's decision to attend an inter-Korean summit with Kim Jong-il in Pyongyang on Oct. 2-4, only 10 weeks before Korea's Dec. 19 election.

Many here view the Sunshine Policy, no matter how well-intentioned in theory, as a policy of appeasement in practice.

Absent reciprocity or a policy of North Korean action in exchange for South Korean action, they argue, South Korea is like an unrequited lover perpetually spurned that continues coming with bouquets of gifts, singing ``Do you love me,'' from the aptly-titled 1960s musical Fiddler on the Roof. You can guess who they think the fiddler is.

The time has come to prove the critics wrong, to learn from past mistakes, and to live up to the promise of the first inter-Korean summit in 2000.

A review of the North-South joint declaration on June 15, 2000 reveals both the successes and failures of the last seven years. In both, both sides promised to resolve the question of reunification independent of foreign influence.

This may make eminent sense to most Koreans, but worries some in the Bush Administration, as President Bush's recent statement at APEC that the United States will only support an end to the Korean War (let alone unification) when Kim Jong-il gives up his nukes.

Improving bilateral Korean ties without continued progress on denuclearization and consultation with Washington makes the Bush Administration nervous. What then, should Seoul do?

While Seoul will be criticized in some corners no matter what happens in Pyongyang in October, it can minimize criticism by informing Washington in advance of the proposals and incentives it will offer Kim Jong-il.

Seoul could also benefit by issuing a declaration at the conclusion of the summit that restates North Korea's commitment to denuclearization pursuant to the 1992 agreement between the ROK and DPRK.

The first summit declaration also expressed agreement to promptly resolve humanitarian issues. The results have been mixed. While over 14,000 Korean family members separated across the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) have met between 2000 and 2007, this is far too few, given the 92,000 living South Koreans with family members on the other side of the border.

North Korea has also held the family meetings hostage at times to political considerations. It cut-off the reunions following the South Korean reaction to its July 2006 ballistic missile tests.

The Koreas' failure to make any progress on the issue of South Korean abductees still living in the North and South Korea's apparent plans not to even raise the issue during the October summit leads many in Washington to question the proposition that South Korean policies have altered North Korean behavior for the better.

South Korea should instead aim for an acceleration of family reunions in person (as opposed via videoconference) following the summit and measurable progress on resolving the fate of the South Korean abductees.

The third significant part of the July 15 declaration relates to economic cooperation. This is both where Seoul has been the least and most successful and what troubles Washington most.

From the vantage point of Washington, the Mount Geumgang project is merely a cash funnel to Pyongyang and a huge mistake; the Gaeseong Industrial Complex, on the other hand, remains a question mark, but an intriguing possibility.

Whatever its merits, critics of Mount Geumgang in Washington see it as a South Korean ghetto, reportedly employing only 1,000 workers, half of whom are Korean-Chinese, not North Koreans, walled off from North Korea.

The Sunshine Policy's success in American eyes is largely tied to Gaeseong. If it can serve as the Trojan horse of capitalism in North Korea that someday employs 500,000 North Korean workers (or nearly one of every 50 North Koreans) as planned, then it will likely garner American support.

But, for the time being, 23 small and medium enterprises and 16,000 workers are a good start, but nothing to be taken too seriously since North Korea's willingness to reform and open up can only be tested once Gaeseong grows sizeably.

Coming out of the inter-Korean summit, President Roh needs more than a vague declaration of future economic cooperation or obligatory agreement to peacefully resolve the Korean War. He needs results.

Both his legacy and South Korea could benefit from the North publicly committing to develop Gaeseong or other special economic zones together with South Korea and by agreeing to hold the next inter-Korean summit meeting at Gaeseong.

Further for the U.S.-ROK alliance, he needs to ensure that South Korean benefits promised in Pyongyang neither undermine the six-party talks or are seen to undermine the North's denuclearization.

These steps could go a long way in restoring faith in South Korea's engagement policy and President Roh's reputation in Washington. Otherwise, at least in Washington, the summit will be nothing more than Roh's sunset policy.

Scott Rembrandt is the director of research & academic affairs at the Korea Economic Institute in Washington.