Remembering history as a fact
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By Jean Do
The end of World War II signaled the beginning of a new war on a global scale, known as the Cold War. The settlement of old rivalries and tensions bred new sources of conflict, which divided the world along two ideological fault lines.
As the camps led by the United States and the former Soviet Union respectively vied for diplomatic, economic, and cultural supremacy with added intensity, the Cold War that started in Europe expanded to other parts of the world.
By 1946, this war had engulfed the Middle East and resulted in the division of Germany; by 1947, the Truman Doctrine had begun to create a Western bloc against the Soviet satellite countries of Eastern Europe; by 1949, the breakdown of American nuclear monopoly following the Soviet nuclear test and the looming victory of the Chinese communists hardened American containment policy even further; and by 1950, the outbreak of the Korean War decisively shifted the locus of Cold War ideological conflict from Europe to East Asia.
If we are to take the Cold War as the most profound consequence of the end of World War II, there is no place like the Korean peninsula to reflect upon its legacy. Even though Korea was not high on neither Soviet nor American agenda in 1945, circumstances in other parts of the world, combined with the internal division that predated the liberation from Japanese colonial rule, produced a military confrontation that remain unresolved to this day.
Since the establishment of two separate governments in the northern and southern half of the Korean peninsula in 1948, polarization has characterized the thinking of Koreans and understanding of their history. How the Korean people remember, interpret, and perceive their history are rooted in the tensions and conflicts that escalated since the end of World War II and the onset of the Cold War in 1946.
In this context, the writing of history in South Korea has inevitably been one of polarization and division. There are enduring controversies in the historical interpretation of major events in the contemporary era.
Some of the sharpest points of contention are raised regarding questions such as, for example, should Syngman Rhee be considered a founding father or culprit of national division?; does economic development justify Park Chung-hee’s military coup d’etat and breach of democratic principles? ; should Park Chung-hee’s career in the Japanese army be juxtaposed with Kim Il-sung’s anti-Japanese guerilla movement in Manchuria?; what about the consequences of the 1965 ROK-Japan Basic Treaty and Korea’s dispatch of combat troops to Vietnam?; is the United States partially responsible for the massacre in suppressing the 1980 Gwangju Democratization Movement?; did Kim Dae-jung’s engagement policy prop up North Korea or did it facilitate a meaningful change in inter-Korean relations?
The reason it is so difficult for the Korean people to come to terms with these controversies is that all these events produced not only winners but also victims. But then, there is a whole spectrum of people in the middle who were neither affected by nor took an interest in these historical turning points.
Given these variances in the different historical experience of the Korean people, it might be important to try to remember and interpret history in its complex and multi-linear form. In other words, instead of trying to pin down and confine a historical event or figure in one historical interpretation, it might be necessary to take a more nuanced approach based on as many historical facts as possible.
Yes, Syngman Rhee did advocate a separate government in the southern half of Korea as early as spring 1946, but this happened as a reaction to the intensification of Soviet-style reforms in the North, including land reform; yes, Park Chung-hee did try to justify his dictatorship based on economic results, but it is also true that his regime was committed to a wholesale transformation of Korean politics and economy that could disprove the efficacy of the North Korean developmental model; and yes, Park Chung-hee served in the Japanese army but he was also a nationalist who sought to learn from Japan and emulate the Japanese developmental experience; yes, the United States supported Chun Doo Hwan to a certain degree, but also championed the cause of democracy in Korea; and yes, Kim Dae-jung’s Sunshine Policy of engaging North Korea may have served as a channel for hard currency, but did lay a foundation for inducing incremental change in inter-Korean economic cooperation.
Closing the gap in historical understanding does not necessarily mean searching for a middle ground. Rather, it involves a thought and education process that recognizes the complexity and multi-causality of history.
It means perceiving history as both a convergence and clash of interests, visions, and ideas advanced not only Korean leaders, but how also American, Japanese, North Korean, and Chinese policies have affected the course of developments in Korea.
And equally importantly, it means taking into account the experience and feelings of ordinary Korean people, some of whom celebrate the past, others who wish to deny it, and still others who remain neutral to it.
History should be represented by facts rather than politics; it should be up to each individual to evaluate and judge its personal and national significance.