By Kevin M. Hockmuth
Over the last several weeks I have read, in this publication and others, the torrent of columns offering insights and advice on how to best address the recent provocative actions undertaken by the North Korean government.
If I may humbly do so, I wish to suggest an approach I have yet to come across: do nothing. For this is the simple yet profound advice offered by the Taoist sage when confronted with many of life's travails and dilemmas.
In the modern conception, positive results are considered the direct result of ``positive" actions and intentionality. However, I believe the best course for dealing with North Korea resides in heeding the wisdom of the ancients, who have a much deeper respect for the power of non-ado. I argue this course will yield the optimal outcome for several reasons.
First, North Korea is not, nor is it anywhere near, a powerful nation. Unable to generate any meaningful power projection unilaterally, it must rely on provoking the reactions of nations that do possess real power.
Thus, the flurry of activity the proceeds the North's provocations in Seoul, Washington, Brussels and New York (at the United Nations) represent Pyongyang's sole mechanism for inserting itself into global power politics.
They are quite aware of the political ethos that commands the ``we must do something" approach that permeates political thinking, both domestic and abroad. They play off this expectation to bolster their image as a real player in international politics. Ignoring their activities will deny them the opportunity to bolster their status through barbs and threats.
Second, it seems evident that none of the principal characters (South Korea, North Korea and the United States) in this drama possesses any real desire to escalate the conflict.
Beyond the military option, Pyongyang's unique degree of isolation leaves very few, if any, options in terms of non-military coercion. Furthermore, the last decade of active engagement of the North by Seoul and Washington has proven ineffective, if not counterproductive, to the stated objective of neutralizing the threat.
Thus, more tough talk by Presidents Lee Myung-bak and Barack Obama in the wake of the latest round of provocations serves only to expose their lack of tools for altering the North's behavior rather than achieving any meaningful results.
To be sure, even if the Kim dynasty were to summarily collapse under the weight of its own malfeasance (as was the case in the Soviet Union), both South Korea and China would be racked with instability caused by the flood of refugees that would surely ensue. Makes one recall the famous proverb: ``Be careful what you ask for, you might just get it."
None of this is to say its menacing neighbor to the North should not concern South Korea. It is merely to point out that continually engaging in the North's game of provocation in tit-for-tat cycles can only be broken by, largely, ignoring their bluster.
It is hard to imagine any scenario under which they will wholly dismantle their nuclear capability via diplomatic means, because they consider this capability their one and only chip to play.
Nor is it advisable for South Korea and the United States to attempt a military strike to remove the threat by force. Further, those waiting for China to engage in activities that could potentially destabilize the North's regime will be waiting for quite a long time, as they have no desire to have the management of North Korea placed upon their lap.
To be sure, the North does possess the capability to inflict major damage on Seoul, but the regime certainly realizes that its annihilation will follow such an action. If the regime were truly suicidal, then I would argue there is nothing that will deter them.
But its actions over the last five decades indicate that it takes its survival as a regime very seriously. Backing Pyongyang into a corner so it cannot escape appears to be the only way a real conflict will occur.
In this scenario, regardless of the outcome on the battlefield, South Korea would certainly lose. Thousands of civilians could die and the economy would collapse, and virtually all foreign capital would flee. Perhaps, it is wise to consider Sun Tzu's sound advice that the best war is the one that is not fought.
Kevin M. Hockmuth is a doctoral candidate in political science (international relations) at Temple University in Philadelphia, Pa. He has taught international politics at Temple and Drexel universities. He is currently writing his dissertation and teaching English at Pagoda Junior Academy in Busan. He can be reached at hockmuth@temple.edu.