By Kim Joon-hyung
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The recent visit of the U.S. secretary of state and secretary of defense to Korea and Japan also sparked related controversy. However, such view is hasty, and not serving our national interests at all.
I would like to elaborate on why it is not desirable not only to join the Quad, but also to bring the issue up for discussion. The Quad does not have a substance yet, and it is unclear how it will develop in the coming years. It is true that the U.S. is likely to come out most actively, and that it will try to make use of the Quad to keep China in check if possible.
The Biden administration's foreign policy can be encapsulated as an array of strategies designed to secure a position of strength for the U.S. The Quad can be defined as an instrument to materialize it.
However, this approach is bound to be time-consuming as it is necessary to seek the consent of the allied nations and to justify the cause. And it seems quite absurd to discuss South Korea's participation in the Quad at a time when Secretary of State Antony Blinken himself calls the Quad an unofficial four-way dialogue consultative body.
Secondly, the strategic interests of each participating country do not necessarily coincide. This is why "soft" security issues such as the coronavirus pandemic, climate change and core technologies were at the heart of discussions at recently held ministerial and summit talks. Japan is taking a relatively active stance, and is willing to deepen the U.S.-Japan alliance through this, as doing so would also serve the Japanese government's political interests. However, it is not easy for Japan to choose a path that leads to confrontation with China.
Australia, for its part, has participated in the Quad to brace for China's increasing geopolitical threat in the South Pacific, but also feels burdened by the idea of converting the Quad into a military organization.
The biggest problem is India, which is taking the most cautious steps toward the partnership. Historically, India has faced geopolitical threats as it shares land borders with China. On top of that, the fact that its longtime adversary Pakistan is actively siding with China is an alarming sign from India's perspective.
Third, the end-state of the Quad as envisioned currently by the U.S. could be building a multilateral military system to encircle China. And just as former Deputy Secretary of State Stephen Biegun had mentioned, turning the Quad into an Asian NATO is clearly not the right path forward. A mini-multilateralism indeed is a desirable alternative that could help resolve the security dilemma in Northeast Asia, where a deeply embedded alliance systems sometimes led to conflicts between different blocs.
Fourth, it is hard to imagine Korea joining the already configured Quad as an additional player, not as an original and major actor leading the initiative. Korea is as strategically important as Australia and India, and its global standing remains as strong as those two nations.
There is no clear reason why Seoul should belong in the same category as Vietnam and New Zealand labeled as Quad-Plus countries. On top of that, there is no incentive to join a consultative body that did not involve Korea from the onset and thus does not reflect Seoul's position or desires. If necessary, Korea could have just created a Penta or Hexa to incorporate its vision and values into the grouping.
Then, how should we deal with the issues regarding the Quad? The point is not to rush. We cannot maintain "strategic ambiguity" forever, but there is no need to engage in a heated debate over our participation in the Quad, let alone making a decision. The U.S. government has not officially or unofficially asked the Korean government to participate in the Quad so far. During his recent visit to Korea, Blinken said he understands that Korea-China relations are complicated, just as the U.S.-China relationship is a complex one with three key dimensions.
Korea's position on the three-way alliance between Korea, the U.S., and Japan, I believe, sufficiently explains the country's stance on the Quad. Korea is willing to join military cooperation with Japan on specific issues like the North Korean nuclear problem and disaster response, but would never forge a military alliance with Japan, which will naturally drive us to contain or keep China in check. We can rely on the same approach to cope with the Quad issues in the coming years.
Kim Joon-hyung (joon6895@gmail.com) is chancellor of the Korea National Diplomatic Academy (KNDA).
