South Korea's security quandary

By Park Jung-won

The most serious security matter facing South Korea today is the threat posed by North Korea's nuclear missiles. Many politicians and experts in South Korea argue that China has no reason to stand behind its neighbor, North Korea, due to the latter's increasingly reckless nuclear posture, and thus China's mediation efforts in inter-Korean affairs should align with South Korea's security aims. While this argument may have been persuasive in the past, in the geopolitical context of the new Cold War, it is now a delusion. The essence of the new Cold War is China's challenge to the liberal order led by the United States. North Korea, despite being an otherwise insignificant, poor country, is able to frustrate and threaten the U.S. with its nuclear weapons. Its misbehavior is thus useful to China.

Nevertheless, there are still people in South Korean society who speak as if China can play a positive role in resolving the North Korean nuclear issue. But it is clear from China's attitude toward North Korea that the security interests of South Korea and China are fundamentally different. Bolstered by Chinese (and Russian) vetoes at the U.N. Security Council, North Korea has continued to test-fire missiles without suffering any U.N. sanctions. How could China be an honest broker for more peaceful relations if it abets North Korea's fearless and provocative acts in this way?

In the past, former President Roh Moo-hyun insisted that South Korea should act as a "balancer" in Northeast Asia because it is sandwiched between continental and maritime powers. In this simplistic model, whichever of the two competing blocs the balancer favors becomes stronger, making the balancer a key player pursued by both sides. In 19th-century Europe, Britain was such a power, and thus it was also a balancer. Unfortunately, in 21st-century Asia, South Korea is neither. Although it is a competitive country on the world stage, it cannot tilt the geopolitical power balance in Northeast Asia on its own.

South Korea needs a strong military alliance to defend itself, and to further enhance its security it should also pursue a "minilateral" approach with countries with which it shares common values. Moreover, China has at times been very rude toward South Korea in their bilateral relations, acting contrary to even basic diplomatic etiquette. Former South Korean President Moon Jae-in, an ardent lover of "peace," uttered nary a word of protest against China when this occurred. By actively participating in various regional minilateral networks, South Korea can respond more effectively to China's rude behavior and increase its "bargaining power" against China.

At the heart of the Aug. 18 summit between the U.S., Japan and South Korea at Camp David, was an agreement by the three countries to jointly respond to common threats. While it may seem natural for countries that pursue the common value of liberal democracy to do so, the creation of the three-way consultative alliance is nevertheless historic, considering previous attempts by the U.S. which failed because of historical conflicts between South Korea and Japan and the domestic political situations of each country. With the Camp David agreements, East Asia's strategic security structure, based on the South Korea-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, has entered a new stage for the first time in 70 years. The fact that the leaders of the three countries, as well as their national security advisers and ministers of foreign affairs, defense, commerce and industry will have regular meetings on economic security, advanced technology, and supply chains means that all significant pending issues will be discussed at the three-country level.

Some worry that North Korea will intensify its hardline provocations as a result of this strengthening cooperation between Seoul, Washington and Tokyo. However, such concerns stem from a misreading of causality. As North Korea's nuclear and missile threats grow increasingly worse, with no effort made by China to stop them, it is right to say that the combined deterrence of South Korea, the U.S. and Japan is necessary and inevitable.

The question is whether this level of institutionalization of trilateral cooperation can effectively respond to a localized provocation by the North, such as a surprise invasion of South Korea. South Korea is the most vulnerable target of North Korea's threats. The U.S. and Japan also feel threatened by the North's nuclear missiles, but the threat is different in nature from what South Korea faces. Although they have made it clear in the Camp David agreement that there is a "duty to consult" between the three countries in case of a contingency, this is not a legally binding duty and is subject to the discretionary evaluation of each country.

North Korea and China will likely try to test the strength of this trilateral solidarity. North Korea can at any time carry out localized provocations against South Korea. When that happens, China will inwardly welcome it, watching from behind while simultaneously showing off its "influence" by acting as a mediator to resolve it. How would the U.S. and Japan respond if North Korea initiated an artillery attack on Seoul combined with a threat to use tactical nuclear weapons? What would happen to the so-called trilateral security cooperation if the U.S. and Japan then failed to respond firmly? It is hard to exaggerate the extent of the damage that South Korea would incur.

To prevent such a nightmare scenario from becoming a reality, South Korea should redouble efforts to expand on the progress made at the Camp David summit through proactive interaction with the U.S. and Japan. And beyond the Camp David framework, South Korea should also undertake self-strengthening efforts. In this regard, it is regrettable that Seoul failed to win concessions from Washington at Camp David on revising the nuclear energy pact between the two countries to develop South Korea's "nuclear potential," at least in the worst-case scenario. No alliance or consultative regime can replace self-defense.

Park Jung-won (park_jungwon@hotmail.com), Ph.D. in law from the London School of Economics (LSE), is a professor of international law at Dankook University.