By Lee Seong-hyon
Despite years of speculation, there is no evidence that the governments of the United States and China have agreed upon a specific action plan in the event of a sudden turmoil in North Korea. North Korean leader Kim Jong-un's recent "disappearance," whether staged or not, awakened the world to the need to prepare for such a contingency. And cooperation between Washington and Beijing is deemed crucial.
In South Korea, there is a taken-for-granted view, almost regarded as "common sense," that there is some sort of "a plan" between the U.S. and China in case chaos breaks out in North Korea. As both Washington and Beijing do not like Pyongyang's nuclear weapons program, the view goes that the two superpowers have already mapped out a plan to secure its nuclear arsenal in the event of a sudden political upheaval in North Korea, such as a coup.
Just like a diehard cult, the belief that the North Korean issue is something that the two world powers remain committed to cooperating on has been powerfully enshrined in the minds of Seoul's academic and policy community. That is the case, they claim, even when the U.S. and China are engaged in an escalating rivalry and distrust these days over the COVID-19 virus origin, not to mention the trade war. They cite the North Korean issue, together with climate change, are the two bedrock global governance items on which Washington and Beijing are bound to take joint action.
Whoever invented this notion deserves credit for imbuing a sense of solidarity and a shared sense of mission between the two unlikely friends. The matter is subject to scrutiny.
In South Korea's cottage industry of policy markets, a popular narrative nodding to this view went something like this. In the beginning, there was the Middle Kingdom. The Kingdom was once lost, but now is found, under the charismatic leader, Xi Jinping. China under Xi has powerfully risen again and grown into a member of the "G2," the two prime stakeholders of global governance; the other being the U.S. Now, China would not sit idle on North Korea's provocative acts as before. A strong and powerful Beijing will no longer tolerate the wanton behavior of its smallest socialist neighbor. Xi, therefore, will teach a lesson to Kim. Little Kim is in trouble now, the narrative went.
However, it turns out that "strongman" Xi is increasingly getting tougher on the U.S., rather than on North Korea. In the midst of the coronavirus pandemic, Xi also said that China will provide "all possible" (li suo neng ji) support to North Korea to tide over the virus.
South Korea's wishful thinking also has spilt over to its understanding of U.S.-China relations. There was a powerful episode that shaped its view. Back in 2013, when China's then-newly minted Communist leader Xi met with Obama in Sunnylands, California, media outlets widely touted it as a "historic" summit. In a "no-necktie" meeting, the two leaders apparently had a frank "man-to-man" conversation and agreed on the cooperative future for U.S.-China relations. South Korean media particularly underscored that the leaders of the U.S. and China also agreed to fully cooperate on the North Korean nuclear issue.
But the reality on the ground was different. The North Korean issue was a "pre-prepared" summit achievement package for the world's eyes to see. It was something that White House National Security Adviser Tom Donilon already coordinated with Beijing when he visited Beijing before the summit.
Now, the same is true of the purported U.S-China agreement on the North Korea contingency. Despite years of speculation, there is no evidence that suggests the U.S. and China have agreed on an action plan in the event of sudden unrest in North Korea. However, it has its own long-running storyline that goes back to 2009.
It is commonly known that 2009 was the first time the U.S. and China jointly discussed the North Korea contingency. At the venue in Beijing of the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), a research arm of China's Ministry of State Security (MSS), Americans and Chinese had their first consultation on the sensitive matter. South Korean media outlets made headlines as such. However, after checking directly with one of U.S. participants in the meeting, things were different than reported. (To be continued)
Lee Seong-hyon (sunnybbsfs@gmail.com), Ph.D., is director, the Center for Chinese Studies at the Sejong Institute.
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In South Korea, there is a taken-for-granted view, almost regarded as "common sense," that there is some sort of "a plan" between the U.S. and China in case chaos breaks out in North Korea. As both Washington and Beijing do not like Pyongyang's nuclear weapons program, the view goes that the two superpowers have already mapped out a plan to secure its nuclear arsenal in the event of a sudden political upheaval in North Korea, such as a coup.
Just like a diehard cult, the belief that the North Korean issue is something that the two world powers remain committed to cooperating on has been powerfully enshrined in the minds of Seoul's academic and policy community. That is the case, they claim, even when the U.S. and China are engaged in an escalating rivalry and distrust these days over the COVID-19 virus origin, not to mention the trade war. They cite the North Korean issue, together with climate change, are the two bedrock global governance items on which Washington and Beijing are bound to take joint action.
Whoever invented this notion deserves credit for imbuing a sense of solidarity and a shared sense of mission between the two unlikely friends. The matter is subject to scrutiny.
In South Korea's cottage industry of policy markets, a popular narrative nodding to this view went something like this. In the beginning, there was the Middle Kingdom. The Kingdom was once lost, but now is found, under the charismatic leader, Xi Jinping. China under Xi has powerfully risen again and grown into a member of the "G2," the two prime stakeholders of global governance; the other being the U.S. Now, China would not sit idle on North Korea's provocative acts as before. A strong and powerful Beijing will no longer tolerate the wanton behavior of its smallest socialist neighbor. Xi, therefore, will teach a lesson to Kim. Little Kim is in trouble now, the narrative went.
However, it turns out that "strongman" Xi is increasingly getting tougher on the U.S., rather than on North Korea. In the midst of the coronavirus pandemic, Xi also said that China will provide "all possible" (li suo neng ji) support to North Korea to tide over the virus.
South Korea's wishful thinking also has spilt over to its understanding of U.S.-China relations. There was a powerful episode that shaped its view. Back in 2013, when China's then-newly minted Communist leader Xi met with Obama in Sunnylands, California, media outlets widely touted it as a "historic" summit. In a "no-necktie" meeting, the two leaders apparently had a frank "man-to-man" conversation and agreed on the cooperative future for U.S.-China relations. South Korean media particularly underscored that the leaders of the U.S. and China also agreed to fully cooperate on the North Korean nuclear issue.
But the reality on the ground was different. The North Korean issue was a "pre-prepared" summit achievement package for the world's eyes to see. It was something that White House National Security Adviser Tom Donilon already coordinated with Beijing when he visited Beijing before the summit.
Now, the same is true of the purported U.S-China agreement on the North Korea contingency. Despite years of speculation, there is no evidence that suggests the U.S. and China have agreed on an action plan in the event of sudden unrest in North Korea. However, it has its own long-running storyline that goes back to 2009.
It is commonly known that 2009 was the first time the U.S. and China jointly discussed the North Korea contingency. At the venue in Beijing of the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), a research arm of China's Ministry of State Security (MSS), Americans and Chinese had their first consultation on the sensitive matter. South Korean media outlets made headlines as such. However, after checking directly with one of U.S. participants in the meeting, things were different than reported. (To be continued)
Lee Seong-hyon (sunnybbsfs@gmail.com), Ph.D., is director, the Center for Chinese Studies at the Sejong Institute.
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