By Donald Kirk
The rapid succession of summits between President Yoon Suk Yeol and President Biden and then between Yoon and Japan's Prime Minister Fumio Kishida should in theory open a new chapter in South Korea's two most important relationships with foreign countries.
Certainly, it was great to see these leaders getting together in what appeared to be the friendliest summits imaginable. On sober second thought, however, we have to recognize the downside of both these summits. The fact is South Korea did not quite achieve all it wanted in either of them.
The results of the White House summit were particularly ambivalent. No way, it seemed, was the Biden administration open to demands for South Korea to have nukes on its soil. That goes for nukes planted by the Americans on bases in the South, ready for firing back at the North in case Kim Jong-un makes good on his threats to unleash tactical nukes against the South.
Nor were the Americans the least receptive to South Korea fabricating its own nukes. We assume, after all, their success in making nuclear reactors for power plants, that Korean physicists and engineers could quite quickly produce nuclear warheads, but the Americans don't like that idea.
It's easy to appreciate American reluctance to endorse South Korea's emergence as the world's 10th nuclear power after North Korea. Japan and Taiwan would be the next to want to join the nuclear club and northeast Asia could become a battleground in which tactical nukes were the weapons of choice.
As for planting nukes on Korean soil, the late President George H. W. Bush ordered their withdrawal in 1991 in hopes of convincing the North that its nuclear program was a waste of time and money. Instead, Kim Jong-un's father, Kim Jong-il, invested still more money in nukes and missiles and the North staged its first underground nuclear test in 2006.
Those calling for the return of American nukes to South Korea note that the U.S. has planted nukes in five other countries that do not make them. These include Turkey, Italy, Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands, all NATO allies. Korea's status as an American ally strengthens the argument. No, there is no chance of Japan asking for American nukes. The Japanese, having suffered the atom-bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, totally ban nukes on their soil.
President Biden sought to mollify South Koreans by selling them on extended deterrence and the formation of a nuclear "consultative group." Extended deterrence means nothing, however, other than greater but non-specific defense, and Americans and Koreans will talk about the North Korean nuclear menace whenever they wish, with or without the window-dressing of a "consultative group."
Nor did Biden's promise of a nuclear ballistic missile submarine visiting a South Korean port offer much consolation. Certainly, the sub would not be threatening North Korea. The sub more properly should be on patrol in the Pacific, ready for action when and where needed. A port visit would be irrelevant other than as an attempt to convince Koreans that they could count on America's "nuclear umbrella."
As for the first state visit of a Japanese prime minister to South Korea in 12 years, the idea no doubt was heartening to those who see trilateralism, that is, a de facto alliance of Korea, Japan and the United States, as vital for the region's defense. Beyond all the warm words, including the ritual Japanese apology for its 35-year rule over Korea, nothing much has really changed.
The critics still regard the deal that Yoon and Kishida reached in Tokyo in March for compensation of forced laborers as inadequate, almost a sell-out. Nor will Japan abandon its claim to Dokdo, which the Japanese call Takeshima.
The list of grudges in Korean-Japanese relations goes on and on. All that is clear is that the two need each other in the event of another shooting war with North Korea. Let us not forget that Japan, during the first Korean War, was a vital rear base area for American forces. Japan and Korea are obviously much closer now. Japanese and Korean air and naval forces have staged joint exercises together with the Americans.
One thing, though, is not going to happen. Japanese and Korean soldiers will not play war games on the ground in each other's country. The image of Japanese soldiers again in South Korea, or Korean soldiers on Japanese soil, is beyond imagination.
Donald Kirk (www.donaldkirk.com) covers the confrontation of forces in Asia from Seoul and Washington.
The rapid succession of summits between President Yoon Suk Yeol and President Biden and then between Yoon and Japan's Prime Minister Fumio Kishida should in theory open a new chapter in South Korea's two most important relationships with foreign countries.
Certainly, it was great to see these leaders getting together in what appeared to be the friendliest summits imaginable. On sober second thought, however, we have to recognize the downside of both these summits. The fact is South Korea did not quite achieve all it wanted in either of them.
The results of the White House summit were particularly ambivalent. No way, it seemed, was the Biden administration open to demands for South Korea to have nukes on its soil. That goes for nukes planted by the Americans on bases in the South, ready for firing back at the North in case Kim Jong-un makes good on his threats to unleash tactical nukes against the South.
Nor were the Americans the least receptive to South Korea fabricating its own nukes. We assume, after all, their success in making nuclear reactors for power plants, that Korean physicists and engineers could quite quickly produce nuclear warheads, but the Americans don't like that idea.
It's easy to appreciate American reluctance to endorse South Korea's emergence as the world's 10th nuclear power after North Korea. Japan and Taiwan would be the next to want to join the nuclear club and northeast Asia could become a battleground in which tactical nukes were the weapons of choice.
As for planting nukes on Korean soil, the late President George H. W. Bush ordered their withdrawal in 1991 in hopes of convincing the North that its nuclear program was a waste of time and money. Instead, Kim Jong-un's father, Kim Jong-il, invested still more money in nukes and missiles and the North staged its first underground nuclear test in 2006.
Those calling for the return of American nukes to South Korea note that the U.S. has planted nukes in five other countries that do not make them. These include Turkey, Italy, Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands, all NATO allies. Korea's status as an American ally strengthens the argument. No, there is no chance of Japan asking for American nukes. The Japanese, having suffered the atom-bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, totally ban nukes on their soil.
President Biden sought to mollify South Koreans by selling them on extended deterrence and the formation of a nuclear "consultative group." Extended deterrence means nothing, however, other than greater but non-specific defense, and Americans and Koreans will talk about the North Korean nuclear menace whenever they wish, with or without the window-dressing of a "consultative group."
Nor did Biden's promise of a nuclear ballistic missile submarine visiting a South Korean port offer much consolation. Certainly, the sub would not be threatening North Korea. The sub more properly should be on patrol in the Pacific, ready for action when and where needed. A port visit would be irrelevant other than as an attempt to convince Koreans that they could count on America's "nuclear umbrella."
As for the first state visit of a Japanese prime minister to South Korea in 12 years, the idea no doubt was heartening to those who see trilateralism, that is, a de facto alliance of Korea, Japan and the United States, as vital for the region's defense. Beyond all the warm words, including the ritual Japanese apology for its 35-year rule over Korea, nothing much has really changed.
The critics still regard the deal that Yoon and Kishida reached in Tokyo in March for compensation of forced laborers as inadequate, almost a sell-out. Nor will Japan abandon its claim to Dokdo, which the Japanese call Takeshima.
The list of grudges in Korean-Japanese relations goes on and on. All that is clear is that the two need each other in the event of another shooting war with North Korea. Let us not forget that Japan, during the first Korean War, was a vital rear base area for American forces. Japan and Korea are obviously much closer now. Japanese and Korean air and naval forces have staged joint exercises together with the Americans.
One thing, though, is not going to happen. Japanese and Korean soldiers will not play war games on the ground in each other's country. The image of Japanese soldiers again in South Korea, or Korean soldiers on Japanese soil, is beyond imagination.
Donald Kirk (www.donaldkirk.com) covers the confrontation of forces in Asia from Seoul and Washington.
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