By Michael Breen
For some time now since the victory of the Republican candidate Donald J. Trump in the U.S. presidential election, Korean government leaders have been nervously trying to assess what might change.
And so when the new U.S. defense secretary James Mattis came to Seoul last week and warned North Korea that the United States would retaliate vigorously to any use of nuclear weapons, there was an almost audible sigh of relief.
"Any attack on the United States, or our allies, will be defeated, and any use of nuclear weapons would be met with a response that would be effective and overwhelming," he said.
In threatening a vigorous response to serious North Korean aggression (as opposed to localized "provocation" which is up to South Korea to handle), Secretary Mattis was reaffirming longstanding U.S. policy. Nevertheless, that the Trump administration has sought to put North Korea on notice in case future possible U.S.-South Korea disputes related to trade and payment for American troops are misinterpreted as wavering commitment, goes a long way to reassure South Koreans.
But reconfirmation of the willingness to retaliate to the unthinkable is just step one.
Step two of U.S. security policy in this part of the world is the harder question of what to do about North Korea's nuclear weapons development.
Will Mr. Trump continue the policy of the Obama administration and its predecessors through a combination of "strategic patience" and sanctions? Or, will it try something different?
There are two ways to figure that question. One is to look at the broader vision the U.S. under President Trump might have for the Korean peninsula and Northeast Asia. A change of vision could lead to a change of strategy and tactics.
For example, if the American government were to introduce a long-term vision of a free market, democratic Northeast Asia, it would naturally opt for policies and propose Helsinki-type agreements intended, if not to nudge China along that path, to at least support it when it faces the inevitable demands from the middle class for democratic freedoms. The North Korean question could be approached in that same context, and the resolution of the nuclear question put to one side to be dealt with later when North Korea develops and begins to see eye-to-eye with other players in the region.
But, until now, the U.S. has had no such vision and nobody is currently talking about it. The Obama vision for the region was a growing business partnership with China and for a North Korea with no nuclear weapons. That is why his administration was so timid about aggressive Chinese hacking of U.S. targets and the bullying of Southeast Asian states, for example, while not holding back on its criticism of North Korea. My bet is that the new administration will change the China part of this vision and challenge Beijing more vigorously on security and trade matters. But that the North Korea part will remain the same.
So, if there's no new vision regarding North Korea, the second way into the question is to consider what new factors may be motivating U.S. foreign policy formation that may influence the tactical approach to the nuclear question.
Right now, the main factor coloring policy is the viewpoint that Obama was weak in projecting American power. The new administration, for example, believes the Iran nuclear deal to be shabby and Obama's unwillingness to address the ideological element driving Islamic terrorism as the main reason it remains such a global concern.
This view, which is shared by many security experts, may lead to an ABO (anything but Obama) foreign policy. With North Korea, that either means aggressive threats or creative engagement.
Muscularity has, of course, been tried before. As President, Bill Clinton considered bombing North Korean facilities but pulled back from that option after thinking through the possible impact on 50 million South Koreans and a bunch of random foreigners, including your columnist, just across the border. His successor, George W. Bush, rattled the leadership cage by going after the ruling Kim family's money and interests overseas, but backed off from a more vigorous regime change policy.
These measures were as useless as the standard soft approaches ― regional talks, UN resolutions and sanctions ― and each failure led to the same conclusion that the only viable strategy is to wait. We get on with our lives and wait until the North Koreans remove the current leadership and replace it with one that refocuses the national priority from security to the economic welfare of the populace.
Let's just hope that, as the new U.S. administration rumbles toward that station, the train does not jump the tracks.
Michael Breen is the CEO of Insight Communications Consultants, a public relations company, and author of "The Koreans" and "Kim Jong-il: North Korea's Dear Leader."
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And so when the new U.S. defense secretary James Mattis came to Seoul last week and warned North Korea that the United States would retaliate vigorously to any use of nuclear weapons, there was an almost audible sigh of relief.
"Any attack on the United States, or our allies, will be defeated, and any use of nuclear weapons would be met with a response that would be effective and overwhelming," he said.
In threatening a vigorous response to serious North Korean aggression (as opposed to localized "provocation" which is up to South Korea to handle), Secretary Mattis was reaffirming longstanding U.S. policy. Nevertheless, that the Trump administration has sought to put North Korea on notice in case future possible U.S.-South Korea disputes related to trade and payment for American troops are misinterpreted as wavering commitment, goes a long way to reassure South Koreans.
But reconfirmation of the willingness to retaliate to the unthinkable is just step one.
Step two of U.S. security policy in this part of the world is the harder question of what to do about North Korea's nuclear weapons development.
Will Mr. Trump continue the policy of the Obama administration and its predecessors through a combination of "strategic patience" and sanctions? Or, will it try something different?
There are two ways to figure that question. One is to look at the broader vision the U.S. under President Trump might have for the Korean peninsula and Northeast Asia. A change of vision could lead to a change of strategy and tactics.
For example, if the American government were to introduce a long-term vision of a free market, democratic Northeast Asia, it would naturally opt for policies and propose Helsinki-type agreements intended, if not to nudge China along that path, to at least support it when it faces the inevitable demands from the middle class for democratic freedoms. The North Korean question could be approached in that same context, and the resolution of the nuclear question put to one side to be dealt with later when North Korea develops and begins to see eye-to-eye with other players in the region.
But, until now, the U.S. has had no such vision and nobody is currently talking about it. The Obama vision for the region was a growing business partnership with China and for a North Korea with no nuclear weapons. That is why his administration was so timid about aggressive Chinese hacking of U.S. targets and the bullying of Southeast Asian states, for example, while not holding back on its criticism of North Korea. My bet is that the new administration will change the China part of this vision and challenge Beijing more vigorously on security and trade matters. But that the North Korea part will remain the same.
So, if there's no new vision regarding North Korea, the second way into the question is to consider what new factors may be motivating U.S. foreign policy formation that may influence the tactical approach to the nuclear question.
Right now, the main factor coloring policy is the viewpoint that Obama was weak in projecting American power. The new administration, for example, believes the Iran nuclear deal to be shabby and Obama's unwillingness to address the ideological element driving Islamic terrorism as the main reason it remains such a global concern.
This view, which is shared by many security experts, may lead to an ABO (anything but Obama) foreign policy. With North Korea, that either means aggressive threats or creative engagement.
Muscularity has, of course, been tried before. As President, Bill Clinton considered bombing North Korean facilities but pulled back from that option after thinking through the possible impact on 50 million South Koreans and a bunch of random foreigners, including your columnist, just across the border. His successor, George W. Bush, rattled the leadership cage by going after the ruling Kim family's money and interests overseas, but backed off from a more vigorous regime change policy.
These measures were as useless as the standard soft approaches ― regional talks, UN resolutions and sanctions ― and each failure led to the same conclusion that the only viable strategy is to wait. We get on with our lives and wait until the North Koreans remove the current leadership and replace it with one that refocuses the national priority from security to the economic welfare of the populace.
Let's just hope that, as the new U.S. administration rumbles toward that station, the train does not jump the tracks.
Michael Breen is the CEO of Insight Communications Consultants, a public relations company, and author of "The Koreans" and "Kim Jong-il: North Korea's Dear Leader."
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