Strategic engagement with N. Korea

By Tong Kim

The Biden administration is making it clear that it will review its policy toward North Korea in consultation with allies including South Korea and Japan to develop a new strategy to deter Pyongyang's nuclear program, according to White House spokeswoman Jen Psaki last Friday.

There will be "a thorough review of the state of play in North Korea, ongoing pressure options and the potential for any future diplomacy," Psaki said. However, the review should be expedited for completion within a few months, not the six months that George W. Bush's team took in 2001.

Psaki's statement is consistent with testimony by Antony Blinken, Biden's secretary of state nominee, who said before a Senate confirmation hearing, Jan 19: "We have to review the entire approach and policy towards North Korea." Blinken was answering the question of whether he would support a "phased agreement" that would offer sanctions relief in return for a freeze by Pyongyang of its weapons program.

The Biden team's approach to Pyongyang may appear prudent, yet disappointing, given the president's view that North Korea's nuclear program "constitutes a serious threat to the peace and security of the world," and that it does not have an operational plan for a potential, major provocation. We hope that this does not come from the bad habit of bureaucratic inertia, as the Obama administration's North Korea policy was seen as being more reactive rather than initiative-driven.

On the other hand, familiar faces who have dealt with the North have returned to work in elevated positions with the new administration. They include Wendy Sherman as deputy secretary of state, Sung Kim as assistant secretary of state for East Asia and Pacific affairs and Kurt Campbell, the architect of Obama's "Pivot to Asia" policy, as Indo-Pacific coordinator on the White House National Security Council.

Biden has yet to appoint a North Korea policy representative. Pyongyang would welcome it if Wendy Sherman takes up an additional role, as her predecessor Stephen Biegun did. Sherman was in charge of North Korea policy under President Clinton. She was the inventor of snap-back sanctions for the conclusion of the intricate JCPOA with Iran under President Obama.

During his inauguration, President Biden did not mention North Korea, only making a broad statement, "We will repair our alliances and engage with the world once again, not to meet yesterday's challenges, but today's and tomorrow's." In the meantime, it may still be appropriate for the Biden team to send a positive signal for strategic engagement with North Korea before the situation possibly goes out of control, limiting viable options.

Perhaps, one of the immediate challenges is to determine the scale and timing of joint U.S.-South Korean exercises that begin in March. Three factors ― the coronavirus, transfer of operational control, and North Korean reaction ― should be discussed between defense leaders of the alliance, not with the North Korean military, as President Moon suggested during his New Year press conference.

In Washington, retired Army General Lloyd Austin assumed the duties of the secretary of defense Jan 22. He said North Korea was "a wild card" during his confirmation hearing. By tradition, he is expected to support diplomacy. But there is no diplomatic strategy to support yet.

An extension of the New START with Russia that expires Feb 5 is a time pressing foreign policy issue for the Biden administration. The world is safer with, than without, this kind of treaty that keeps caps on the number of deployed nuclear warheads and delivery systems.

One chronic problem with U.S. policy on North Korea has been discontinuity with the change in administrations. The North has learned how to prepare for a periodic reset of U.S. policy towards it. The North would not trust any long-term U.S. commitment that may extend beyond the terms of an incumbent administration.

A review of North Korea should start with a reliable intelligence assessment of the current state of the North's hardware capability, distinguishing what might be mockups or aspirational from the real functional specifications of its arsenal, including the latest SLBM on parade at the end of the 8th Party Congress, Jan 12. It is also important to identify the resources and the timeline for perfecting various nuclear strategic missiles for actual deployment and operation.

The North's intent and purpose to keep its nuclear arsenal is well documented. The Biden administration will not be able to resolve the nuclear issue in its first term. But it can slow down or halt the increasing pace of North Korean threats if it takes the right approach with the right policy. It is time to start a strategic engagement rather than returning to "strategic patience."

Tong Kim (tong.kim8@yahoo.com) is a visiting professor with the University of North Korean Studies, a visiting scholar with Korea University, a fellow at the Institute for Corean-American Studies, and a columnist for The Korea Times.