Pyongyang's reticence on Biden

By Tong Kim

For weeks, North Korea has been silent on the outcome of the U.S. presidential election. Since Joe Biden was recognized as the U.S. president-elect, many world leaders, including Chinese President Xi Jinping and South Korean President Moon Jae-in, have called Biden to congratulate him on his victory.

Russian President Vladimir Putin is waiting for a final certification of electoral votes for Biden, while Trump still refuses to concede defeat, falsely claiming massive election fraud. Xi waited until after the Trump administration's General Services Administration granted transition work to proceed. Kim Jong-un is waiting for more signals to figure out what Biden wants to do with his country. However, Kim is unlikely to reach out to Biden personally.

Pyongyang is scrutinizing every report and commentary on Biden and his transition team published in the U.S. The analysis reads between lines of what Biden says and decodes implications of relevance to North Korea. Biden's picks of Antony Blinken as secretary of state and Jake Sullivan as national security adviser are mixed signals for Pyongyang.

Both Blinken and Sullivan are known hawks on the North and China, who worked with Biden in the Obama administration. They were deeply involved in the failed "strategic patience." But, they are smart people who would not repeat the same mistake.
Jeffrey Bader, who was known as the "architect" of the Obama policy toward North Korea, wrote in his 2012 memoir, "Many of us believed that the most likely long-term solution to the North's nuclear pursuits lay in the North's collapse and absorption into a South-led reunified Korea."

Biden assured last week that his administration would not be "a third Obama term," because "We face a totally different world than we faced in the Obama-Biden administration." He also promised earlier to engage in "principled diplomacy" toward the goal of a denuclearized North Korea in cooperation with allies including South Korea.

North Korea's nuclear arsenal has increased to 20 to 60 nuclear weapons with delivery systems of all ranges from that of 6 to 8 bombs at the start of the Obama administration. The impoverished state does not appear to be on the verge of collapse at any moment, as the Obama team erroneously believed. It is surviving in its struggle against a failing economy from border closings due to COVID-19, crippling sanctions and major storm damage.

The North Koreans are watching how the Biden administration will deal with its own pandemic, a struggling economy, and the "divided states" of America. They are also curious about the functioning of a divided government in case of a continued Republican control of the U.S. Senate. They know the Congress and the American public in general have an unfavorable view of their regime.

Kim Jong-un would not indulge in the possibility of a trilateral summit including Biden during the deferred Tokyo Olympics next year. He has been on the world stage with Trump three times, with Xi Jinping four times and with Moon three times. Biden called Kim a thug likening him to Hitler during a second presidential debate. However, the North's silence on Biden's insult to Kim may have been a deliberate choice to reserve options on the prospect of a Biden presidency.

Pyongyang knows well that Biden's top priority in Asia is China. Washington may remain tough on China, but with a lowered temper in rhetoric. Many believe China is an integral part of a solution to the North Korean issue. Trump's Indo-Pacific Strategy was not different in purpose from Obama's Pivot to Asia ― that is to counter and contain China.

Biden uses the term "Indo-Pacific," which was coined by Trump's people. Obama characterized the U.S. relationship with China as a "relationship of competition and cooperation", and Trump as one of "competition and confrontation" in a full range of military prowess and economic influence to political system. Some favor "cooperative competition" to avoid the worst-case scenario of a conflict with China.

With Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi's recent visit to Seoul, Beijing was pressuring South Korea to resist siding with Washington in the Sino-American rivalry. Pyongyang couldn't care less if Seoul joins the U.S. strategy against China. However, Seoul should decide its position based on the merits of each issue, according to its own interest within the framework of the alliance and as part of its "balanced diplomacy."

On other hand, the North sees an increasing role of the South in influencing Washington's policy. Pyongyang understands the progressive Moon government will try to encourage Washington to pursue flexible dialogue with the North. Pyongyang can and should wait until the Biden administration formulates its North Korea policy, before they make their next move.

Tong Kim (tong.kim8@yahoo.com) is a visiting professor with the University of North Korean Studies, a visiting scholar with Korea University, a fellow at the Institute for Corean-American Studies, and a columnist for The Korea Times.