 |
By Donald Kirk
Deterrence is the new word for defense. When our leaders talk about increasing "deterrence," they mean doing a lot more to defend against enemies. Now the Americans and Koreans are talking about vastly increasing their deterrence against North Korea, which says it's building more and better missiles, and more nuclear warheads too, all for defense.
The problem with talking about ever more deterrence is that no one quite knows what it means. The term that's now in vogue is "extended deterrence," but what does "extend" add to deterrence? Will American and South Korea forces stage more and better military exercises, and will we send big bombers from Guam and Okinawa on patrols along the Demilitarized Zone? Will aircraft carriers be cruising off the east and west coasts of the Korean Peninsula more often?
The Americans are also using the word "deterrence" to put off South Korean desires for more than just rhetoric. A majority of South Koreans think South Korea should be producing its own nuclear warheads, and many also think the Americans should store nuclear warheads in the South as they were doing until 1991 when George H.W. Bush, then president, withdrew them.
The reason Bush ordered the nuclear warheads withdrawn was the vain hope that North Korea might give up its program for building its very own warheads. The North Koreans were far from conducting their first nuclear test, but then, as now, the Americans believed they could make a deal. Americans have a long record of wishful thinking on the topic.
It's disappointing when you go back over the old stories to read the Americans saying the same thing then that they've been saying ever since: if we make a few concessions, go into talks and stick to our basic demand, the North Koreans will show some common sense, see the benefits of denuclearization and drop their nuclear program.
There was probably a lot more chance in 1991 that North Korea would denuclearize than there is today. North Korea at that time was far from fabricating its first nuclear warhead, much less testing one, which did not happen until 15 years later when Kim Jong-il, father of Kim Jong-un, ordered the North's first nuclear test.
Since then, we've had six-party talks (the two Koreas, China, Japan, Russia and the U.S.) and four-party talks (the two Koreas, the U.S. and China) and two-party talks (meetings between President Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un, also between President Moon Jae-in and Kim). They've all wound up in disillusionment and disappointment.
Now the North Koreans are saying they won't talk at all, and we're afraid they'll actually fire one of their latest models for real, maybe taking a shot at Camp Humphreys, the huge American military garrison 65 kilometers south of Seoul, making "extended deterrence" all the more necessary.
So what are the implications for the rest of us, those who are not in the armed forces? The answer is not pleasant to contemplate. Might Korea discourage activists from opposing the Korean-American alliance? Might government forces crack down on dissent from the need for increasing defenses? Should opponents of nearly non-stop military exercises be compelled to knock off their protests?
It's easy to say the protesters, dissenters, activists and opposition politicians represent only a fringe, are a public nuisance and should go either home or to jail, but their right to speak out is intrinsic in any democracy where freedom to oppose policies is an absolute right that we need to respect. If war were to break out, these rights would be open to question, but opponents of policy have the right to speak out in times of peace regardless of rising threats from North Korea.
It's also possible to criticize "extended deterrence" from quite another perspective. Some people will say it's a weak substitute for arming South Korea with nuclear warheads regardless of whether they're made in the South or in the U.S. South Korea's military strength has been rising spectacularly. The South now makes missiles that can hit any target in North Korea, and South Korean industry produces "conventional weaponry" of such lethal quality and quantity as to make the country one of the world's largest arms manufacturers and exporters.
Given the firepower of the South, there's no need for it to go nuclear considering all the nukes the U.S. has amassed on bases in Japan, Guam and Hawaii, also on aircraft carriers. The South does not have to go nuke for nuke against the North to give new meaning to the phrase "extended deterrence."
Donald Kirk (www.donaldkirk.com) covers war and peace in the region from Seoul and Washington.
![[INTERVIEW] Putin uses summit with NK leader to stop Seoul from helping Ukraine: expert](https://img.koreatimes.co.kr/upload/thumbnailV2/a943fc209add47cf8ea82d3a78faf9b3.jpg/dims/resize/178/optimize)
