News story after story about U.S. spying on Korea is confusing many here who have long regarded America as their most reliable protector. A latest report, by the New York Times, shows Seoul has been one of the "focus areas" of the NSA's eavesdropping operations in four categories, including diplomatic decision-making.
Yet for those in the know, this may not be big news, as shown in the rapid shift of the European reaction to the rampant collection of electronic communication data by Washington ― from initial shock and disillusion to acceptance as established facts.
The foreign ministry, which had been under fire for its belated and lukewarm responses to earlier reports of U.S. spying, is moving quickly this time around to demand a plausible explanation. If past experiences are any guide, however, it is doubtful whether Korean diplomats will get anything further than a promise of "policy review" from their U.S. counterparts.
Still, Seoul should try to do far more than just asking for a cursory apology and an empty pledge against any future repeat, not least because allies can have difference of interests on economic and diplomatic issues, if not in security.
How can Korea expect a mutually beneficial relationship with the United States if Washington comes to the negotiation table fully aware of Seoul's strategy in such matters as renewing their bilateral nuclear agreement and deciding each other's share of costs anew in stationing U.S. troops here?
Yes, friends spy on friends in this harsh world that puts national interests ahead of all else. But there should be certain minimal rules to be kept between allies if they are to call one another by that title at all. It is important for Seoul to take part in making new guidelines on spying operations, like those being suggested to regulate the conduct of U.S. intelligence operations on European soil.
The ongoing global debate on what intelligence agents should do or should not do must be an occasion to reflect on the activities of Korea's state spy agency ― the bungled efforts years ago by some National Intelligence Service agents to steal the laptop computer of Indonesian delegates visiting here to discuss the purchase of Korea's fighter jet trainer comes to mind. We thought the comedic fiasco as an inevitable result of NIS putting priority not on national security but on the security of a particular administration or political power.
As seen in the global examples, major governments allow their agents to spy foreigners, even including their top leaders, but are far stricter on snooping on their own citizens. Exactly the opposite seems to be true in this country where NIS agents are busy bugging the critics of government instead of foreigners suspected of harming Korea's national interest or even North Korean operatives. Korea's intelligence officers have even done what none of their foreign counterparts dared to do: meddling in domestic politics and elections.
Still, the NIS is refusing to do away with its domestic espionage division under the pretext of North Korean threats, with presidential backing. All this forces Koreans to envy ― rather than decry ― the no-holds-barred intelligence war across the Atlantic.