![]() |
During the THAAD spat with China, Seoul displayed an indecisive posture, running around in confusion for more than a year. South Korea paid dearly for that.
In fact, Seoul's indecisive attitude at the time aggravated Chinese perception of the matter because Beijing felt that it was acting "opportunistically" between China and the United States.
Being opportunistic is human nature. It often benefits to behave opportunistically in the realpolitik of international relations. The previous Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se once said "South Korea is getting love calls from both the United States and China" (May 30, 2015). Yun was referring to the strategic value the Korean Peninsula has for the world's two superpowers in East Asian geopolitics.
Then, a question rises as to why China retaliated against Seoul for THAAD? beijing should have worked harder to please Seoul, showering it with economic incentives and political concessions so that it would be leaning toward China, not the United States.
On the contrary, China brutally penalized South Korea, mounting a public opinion warfare to divide South Korean society, engaging in scare tactics against businesses operating in China, withdrawing Chinese tourists, canceling academic conferences and exchange programs, as well as shutting down government-to-government channels.
Amid deepening rivalry between the U.S. and China, Beijing has grouped neighboring countries into three categories. One, staunch U.S. allies such as Japan. China coldshoulders these countries, treating them with a "businesslike" attitude. It keeps a minimum contact with them, while engaging in business when it suits its own interests.
The second group is "pro-China" countries such as the Philippines. They are sensitive to economic incentives. These countries are also keen to utilize China's Belt & Road Initiative (BRI). China showers them with economic benefits to keep them loyal.
The third group is "opportunistic" countries such as South Korea. Instead of luring them with economic benefits, China's recipe is to trample them. The THAAD dispute with South Korea happened to be the first case in point. China was conscious of the "audience effect." That is, it knows neighboring countries would "watch" how China deals with South Korea, when the latter acts against its will. If South Korea goes unpunished, other countries in the region are also likely to follow suit, disregarding Beijing's warnings when similar incidents happen in the future.
China punishes a country like South Korea severely so that it will serve as a "palpable" lesson to the other countries in the region. It's the classic tactic to "kill a chicken to scare the monkey."
Apparently, the government at that time, under Park Geun-hye, was not looped in as to how the Chinese side was approaching the THAAD matter. A then South Korean cabinet minister, visiting Shanghai, even publicly said China wouldn't dare to embark on economic retaliation against South Korea because, trade, by nature, is reciprocal, and it would hurt China as well.
Such a remark was unnecessary, unhelpful and undiplomatic. The comment reportedly further hardened China's resolve to retaliate against South Korea.
The current Moon Jae-in administration witnessed how the THAAD fiasco played out. It is now facing another existential challenge of "God, what should I do between the U.S. and China?" over the Huawei case. It is reported that both the U.S. and China are asking South Korea to honor their respective positions on the highly sensitive matter.
According to local media reports, the government wants to deal with it "in a low key mode as much as possible." The most important thing in diplomatic strategy is that it should be feasible. Unfortunately, Seoul's posture is not.
It will likely offend a Washington that will see Seoul as "not behaving like an ally." Beijing will also likely step up its pressure against Seoul to force the latter, to borrow Metallica's expression, to "Obey your master." Clearly, this is not a situation where South Korea is receiving a love call from either Washington or Beijing.
To remedy the situation; first, the government should immediately organize a taskforce across different departments and agencies. Second, understand the Huawei case is not a trade dispute, but part of a bigger competition and rivalry for global leadership between the U.S. and China. Third, after selecting the head of the taskforce, empower it by trusting it fully, assigning adequate authority to effectively implement missions. Fourth, don't try to mediate between the eagle and the dragon. Fifth, don't even think about the fourth.
Lee Seong-hyon (sunnybbsfs@gmail.com), Ph.D., is director of the Center for Chinese Studies at the Sejong Institute.