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The Trump-Kim summit in Vietnam inevitably creates the public impression that the "bottom to top process" doesn't work. The "top to bottom process" doesn't work either. Trump's "art of the deal" proved to be the "art of no deal." Now what? Let us turn to the Chinese, the descendants of Sun Tzu, a great strategist who penned "The Art of War" 2,500 years ago.
There are three items of interests when it comes to the "China Angle" on the second Trump-Kim summit that just collapsed. First, the immediate reaction from China was a sigh of relief. This reveals a very complex emotional mismatch.
Officially, China also expressed good wishes for the success of the summit. It is important to appreciate that China is sincere in its wishes. Beijing also wants to see the denuclearization of North Korea. Nuclear disarmament (wu he) ― of the Korean Peninsula ― is one of the top priorities in China's policy toward the two Koreas, along with peace (bu zhan) and stability (bu luan).
In addition, Pyongyang's nuclear facilities, particularly the sites of its previous tests were near the Chinese border, endangering the safety of that country's Chinese population in its northeastern region (Dongbei). But the devil is in the details.
From China's perspective, this important geopolitical ball game on what Beijing inherently sees as "China's own turf" in Asia has been mainly played by the United States, a faraway offshore power. In other words, China is absent from a big deal underway in its own region. This makes it feel marginalized from its due place.
Beijing believes that the collapse of the Trump-Kim summit is a warning to the relevant stakeholders about the importance of China in its mediating role. After all, it is seen as the country that wields the largest influence over North Korea.
China also played host to the multilateral consortium that tackled North Korea's nuclear issue for years, called the six-party talks since 2003. Even though it is in a "coma" state at the moment, China still regularly calls for the resumption of the talks as a proper way to deal with Pyongyang's nukes.
Second, China believes that the chance for the success of the denuclearization talks will remain low, if not uncertain, if they are completely left to Trump and Kim, these two individuals alone without third-party "adult supervision." And that adult is China.
There is a view that Trump wouldn't dare to walk away if the summit was held in Beijing, with Xi Jinping's mediation. In Asia, particularly, walking away from a pre-arranged meal is seen as rude. Trump wouldn't have done that to Xi, the logic goes.
In addition, China sees that given the decades of deep-seated mistrust and the sheer complexity of the nuclear issue, the negotiations should have been seen as a long-haul game. After all, the U.S. and North Korea fought against each other during the 1950-53 Korean War. The war didn't end with a formal peace treaty. That means they are still technically in a state of war.
Their on-and-off nuclear negotiations have a protracted 26 years of history. There is accumulated frustration and mistrust due to broken promises made by North Korea. North Koreans also have their share of a long list of American deal breakers.
Third, in this vein, China hopes to be "invited" to the nuclear deal arena to play the role of a referee between Trump and Kim, who will follow ground rules mapped out by China. In 2017, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi proposed a "dual track" mechanism to nail down the long-standing nuclear conundrum.
One, a "dual suspension" (shuang zan ting) is for North Korea the suspension of its nuclear and missile tests, and for the U.S., the suspension of joint military drills with South Korea. Wang said on Feb. 27 that the double suspension was realized on the Korean peninsula following the first Trump-Kim summit held in Singapore last year. In other words, things have proceeded according to the Chinese formula.
Two, looking ahead, China believes that the American formula of "denuclearization first, compensation second" will not work, given the aforementioned long-held mistrust by North Korea. Therefore, China will more vigorously advocate its own formula, the "dual track approach" (shuanggui bingxing) of the synchronization of denuclearization and a peace process.
In the event that the U.S. is less enthusiastic about this solution, China is likely to reach out to Russia, and also to South Korea, to garner international support, conducive to its approach.
Lee Seong-hyon (sunnybbsfs@gmail.com), Ph.D., is director of the Center for Chinese Studies at the Sejong Institute.