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The horrifying (but fascinating) assassination of (mild) regime critic, (ex) ruling-clan member and potential (if unlikely) leadership candidate Kim Jong-nam has transfixed the world due to the astonishing chutzpah with which it was undertaken; 007 creator Ian Fleming never scripted a more compelling hit.
At least, this is the assumption. While there is no proven link to the North Korean state yet, the Malaysian murder looks like Pyongyang's handiwork, for the regime has a formidable record of wet work.
Here in the bright, peaceable and normative South, some pundits, including a national assemblyman, have called this a "sloppy job." They criticize the operation for taking place in public, in an airport; for the high-risk weapon used; and for the killers' failure to escape.
I argue otherwise. If we consider high-level assassinations in recent history, the likely motives of North Korean agents, and their known modus operandi, this was dark work, well done.
First, the location. For assassinations, an ex-special operations soldier says, an airport is fit for the purpose. Killers can approach their target through crowds; assuming intelligence of their target, knowing exactly where he will be at certain times; are assured that their target and his security cordon will be unarmed; and can extract him through crowds.
But why in public? Surely, dark affairs are best conducted in dark alleyways? Not so.
Most recent political assassinations have occurred in full public view. Archduke Franz Ferdinand, killed by a Serbian nationalist in Sarajevo in 1914. Holocaust architect Reinhard Heydrich, assassinated by Czech agents on a Prague road in 1942. U.S. President John F. Kennedy, shot in a motorcade in Dallas in 1963. Egyptian peacemaker Anwar Sadat, gunned down by renegade officers at a parade in 1981. The list goes on.
Then, how about the assassins, their weapon and their planning?
The direct operatives appear to be foreign stooges. This is masterly: It adds a layer of deniability and opacity to the operation. Their weapon - a miniaturized weapon of mass destruction, the nerve agent VX, which kills faster than any poisonous snake on earth – has seized the imagination of the world.
One possible error was over-application. If the assassins had deployed a lighter dose more subtly, Kim might have suspected nothing, boarded his plane and died of "natural causes" in mid-flight. But if one motive was terrorism ― that is, to terrify ― then the blatant, open nature of the attack was intentional.
Isn't Pyongyang concerned by the political fallout likely to follow such a public outrage? Probably not. We know from its strategic weapons programs that when it comes to achieving its aims, the regime is risk-tolerant, defiant of diplomatic norms, resistant to international sanctions and deaf to world opinion.
Moreover, capture is par for the course for North Korean assets. In the 1968 Blue House raid, the 1983 Rangoon bombing and the 1987 KAL 858 bombing, the escapes of the operatives/terrorists were clearly secondary considerations. (One exception: The shooting of Kim Jong-il nephew and regime critic Lee Han-yong in Bundang in 1997. His killer was never found.) This bespeaks intense mission focus by operatives and icy ruthlessness by planners.
So, if Kim Jong-un or regime loyalists ordered the assassination, everything indicates a competent job. Pyongyang deployed focused state terrorism to assassinate a potential rival, sending frissons of fear rippling across the globe.
The signal to would-be defectors and regime critics is obvious and ominous: "You are never safe. Wherever you go, we can reach you."
Andrew Salmon is a Seoul-based reporter and author. Reach him at andrewcsalmon@yahoo.co.uk.