By Bernhard J. Seliger
These days, hundred thousands of Koreans follow each week the new suspenseful drama "Money Heist: Join Economic Area," a remake of an extremely successful Spanish drama, "Le casa de papel," in which a group of brilliant thugs rob a mint. Pretending to rob a bank, indeed they print their own money.
In the Korean version, the mint is located in the middle of the "Joint Economic Area," formerly the Joint Security Area or Panmunjeom. According to the Korean remake, both Koreas decided on a confederation type unification scheme, with joint economic activities and joint money.
And the mint, run jointly by a South Korean director and his second from the North, is at the center of it. That allows for a lot of observations on the future potential interaction of North and South Korea, with a surprisingly negative view on the behavior of South Koreans, who are represented as arrogant and ignorant of North Korea at the same time.
And, naturally, this kind of drama does not work without a dose of sex, represented by the beautiful North Korean defector, who plays a center role in the scheme of the money heist. Fiction does not have to follow reality; indeed it would be dull, if it only followed reality. And "Money Heist" is good fiction.
But unfortunately, reality long discarded with the one basic assumption of "Money Heist": Namely, that South Korean wealth has a kind of magic attraction not to the ordinary North Korean citizens, but rather to its elite, and that this money ― if only offered in sufficient quantity and with the sufficiently generous mind ― can change North Korean politics.
This belief, which ran strong into the last government under President Moon Jae-in, has been the basis for a number of miscalculations regarding North Korea's nuclear program, and indeed the very nature of its regime. In the early 2000s, when North Korea embarked for the second time, and this time in earnest, on its clandestine, and later open pursuit of nuclear weapons, it was the prevailing wisdom of analysts that this was in reality an outcry for more material aid.
The 1990s seemed to have shown that a promise for shared wealth (that time, the light water reactors and energy aid promised by the U.S. for a freeze of the nuclear program) could trade away the nuclear threat.
But the 1990s were a time of extreme economic distress, of a crumbling leadership and a dying leader. Already Kim Jong-il, though maybe more willing to consider such a trade-off, did stubbornly follow the path to nuclear armament. And it became much stronger under the current leader, Kim Jong-un.
Indeed, now a "Joint Economic Area" seems to be only thinkable as a generous concession by North Korea to the South, not the other way round, as a concession of the South for the North to give up its military ambitions.
Even the strong economic burden put on North Korea through the various sanctions on its nuclear program, of which only the 2016/2017 sanctions really bite, those preventing North Korea from most exports, including those of labor, did not generally make North Korea willing to concede anything of its nuclear program.
The same is true for the disastrous effect of the self-isolation due to COVID-19. It hurt the North Korean economy, but this did not at all change the mind of its leadership. And, even more distressing, the line of thinking mostly having substituted that of trade-offs of nuclear armament against economic aid, also slowly crumbles, namely the idea that North Korea's arms are purely defensive, essentially the capacity to withstand an invasion by the U.S. and/or South Korea.
The newest rounds of arms development, looking into tactical nuclear weapons plus different ways to deliver them, clearly shows a different kind of thinking of employment of these weapons: as offensive weapons, or weapons able to exert pressure on the South, i.e. for blackmailing the South.
Ironically, the very reason economic inducements can do so few in unification policy is that they do work for ordinary North Koreans. The main, and justified, fear of the North Korean leadership is that money (i.e. a market economy) corrupts the citizens and turns them away from the worship of state, party and leadership. Indeed, it would.
The keen observation on what happened in Central and Eastern Europe gave ample examples for that. For the citizens, huge potential gains in living standards and freedoms both are irresistible. The only way to prevent them for expressing their preferences for these is to isolate them as much as possible from contact with these evils (from the point of view of the rulers).
This leaves those thinking of a "Joint Economic Area" with several unpleasant truths: First, the interest of North Korea in economic cooperation with the South is extremely limited, and currently even non-existing. This is true even if this economic cooperation does not have a prerequisite of North Korean concession in the military field.
The reason is simply that the corruption of souls by experiencing a functioning market system is too great to be tolerated. Second, even reaching out the hand for aid without preconditions, like for the weakest members of North Korean society suffering from malnourishment and hunger, is not likely accepted.
Because this would even more cement the view of the economic superiority of the South Korean economy. While the intent of the new government (and also the former ones) to give non-concessionary aid, is good, the actual implementation is unlikely.
The only way any progress can be imagined is though indirect communication, for example in international or multilateral settings.
One of the consistent policy goals of North Korea throughout its existence was the desire to be recognized as a "normal" state, not a pariah state it is in most international relations. Granting this recognition in certain areas, say in multilateral frameworks on environmental policy, will at least allow partial interaction. It might even lead to larger scale humanitarian aid in an international framework.
Even better would be programs to allow North Korean students and mid-level functionaries travel and learn abroad. Such a strategy does not make South Korean military preparedness and armament unnecessary. But it would give hope for a gradual, and maybe accelerating change, more than dreams of a Joint Economic Area.
Dr. Bernhard J. Seliger is resident representative of Hanns Seidel Foundation (HSF) in Korea, based in Seoul. Before the COVID-19 outbreak, he frequently traveled to North Korea, where he implemented projects on forestry, environment and renewable energy as well as medical cooperation. He is honorary citizen of Seoul and Gangwon Province.
 |
In the Korean version, the mint is located in the middle of the "Joint Economic Area," formerly the Joint Security Area or Panmunjeom. According to the Korean remake, both Koreas decided on a confederation type unification scheme, with joint economic activities and joint money.
And the mint, run jointly by a South Korean director and his second from the North, is at the center of it. That allows for a lot of observations on the future potential interaction of North and South Korea, with a surprisingly negative view on the behavior of South Koreans, who are represented as arrogant and ignorant of North Korea at the same time.
And, naturally, this kind of drama does not work without a dose of sex, represented by the beautiful North Korean defector, who plays a center role in the scheme of the money heist. Fiction does not have to follow reality; indeed it would be dull, if it only followed reality. And "Money Heist" is good fiction.
But unfortunately, reality long discarded with the one basic assumption of "Money Heist": Namely, that South Korean wealth has a kind of magic attraction not to the ordinary North Korean citizens, but rather to its elite, and that this money ― if only offered in sufficient quantity and with the sufficiently generous mind ― can change North Korean politics.
This belief, which ran strong into the last government under President Moon Jae-in, has been the basis for a number of miscalculations regarding North Korea's nuclear program, and indeed the very nature of its regime. In the early 2000s, when North Korea embarked for the second time, and this time in earnest, on its clandestine, and later open pursuit of nuclear weapons, it was the prevailing wisdom of analysts that this was in reality an outcry for more material aid.
 |
| A poster of Spanish Netflix original drama, "Money Heist" (Le casa de papel), left, and the Korean remake, "Money Heist: Joint Economic Area" / Courtesy of Netflix |
The 1990s seemed to have shown that a promise for shared wealth (that time, the light water reactors and energy aid promised by the U.S. for a freeze of the nuclear program) could trade away the nuclear threat.
But the 1990s were a time of extreme economic distress, of a crumbling leadership and a dying leader. Already Kim Jong-il, though maybe more willing to consider such a trade-off, did stubbornly follow the path to nuclear armament. And it became much stronger under the current leader, Kim Jong-un.
Indeed, now a "Joint Economic Area" seems to be only thinkable as a generous concession by North Korea to the South, not the other way round, as a concession of the South for the North to give up its military ambitions.
Even the strong economic burden put on North Korea through the various sanctions on its nuclear program, of which only the 2016/2017 sanctions really bite, those preventing North Korea from most exports, including those of labor, did not generally make North Korea willing to concede anything of its nuclear program.
The same is true for the disastrous effect of the self-isolation due to COVID-19. It hurt the North Korean economy, but this did not at all change the mind of its leadership. And, even more distressing, the line of thinking mostly having substituted that of trade-offs of nuclear armament against economic aid, also slowly crumbles, namely the idea that North Korea's arms are purely defensive, essentially the capacity to withstand an invasion by the U.S. and/or South Korea.
The newest rounds of arms development, looking into tactical nuclear weapons plus different ways to deliver them, clearly shows a different kind of thinking of employment of these weapons: as offensive weapons, or weapons able to exert pressure on the South, i.e. for blackmailing the South.
Ironically, the very reason economic inducements can do so few in unification policy is that they do work for ordinary North Koreans. The main, and justified, fear of the North Korean leadership is that money (i.e. a market economy) corrupts the citizens and turns them away from the worship of state, party and leadership. Indeed, it would.
The keen observation on what happened in Central and Eastern Europe gave ample examples for that. For the citizens, huge potential gains in living standards and freedoms both are irresistible. The only way to prevent them for expressing their preferences for these is to isolate them as much as possible from contact with these evils (from the point of view of the rulers).
This leaves those thinking of a "Joint Economic Area" with several unpleasant truths: First, the interest of North Korea in economic cooperation with the South is extremely limited, and currently even non-existing. This is true even if this economic cooperation does not have a prerequisite of North Korean concession in the military field.
The reason is simply that the corruption of souls by experiencing a functioning market system is too great to be tolerated. Second, even reaching out the hand for aid without preconditions, like for the weakest members of North Korean society suffering from malnourishment and hunger, is not likely accepted.
Because this would even more cement the view of the economic superiority of the South Korean economy. While the intent of the new government (and also the former ones) to give non-concessionary aid, is good, the actual implementation is unlikely.
The only way any progress can be imagined is though indirect communication, for example in international or multilateral settings.
One of the consistent policy goals of North Korea throughout its existence was the desire to be recognized as a "normal" state, not a pariah state it is in most international relations. Granting this recognition in certain areas, say in multilateral frameworks on environmental policy, will at least allow partial interaction. It might even lead to larger scale humanitarian aid in an international framework.
Even better would be programs to allow North Korean students and mid-level functionaries travel and learn abroad. Such a strategy does not make South Korean military preparedness and armament unnecessary. But it would give hope for a gradual, and maybe accelerating change, more than dreams of a Joint Economic Area.
Dr. Bernhard J. Seliger is resident representative of Hanns Seidel Foundation (HSF) in Korea, based in Seoul. Before the COVID-19 outbreak, he frequently traveled to North Korea, where he implemented projects on forestry, environment and renewable energy as well as medical cooperation. He is honorary citizen of Seoul and Gangwon Province.
