West should critically evaluate strategies of Cold War

By Lee Jong-eun

As the world begins 2023, the geopolitical situation around the world is not bright. In Europe, the Russia-Ukraine War has dragged on for nearly a year, while the prospects of an escalation are stoking international security anxieties. In East Asia, North Korea threatens to conduct a seventh nuclear test and perfect its ICBM capability to place the U.S. mainland in its crosshairs.

Geopolitical tensions between the U.S. and China continue to worsen, particularly on the issue of Taiwan's sovereignty. In Africa, South America, and even the Southern Pacific Islands, the West competes against Russia and China for strategic partnerships with regional players.

It has increasingly become common for international observers to describe today's geopolitics as the "new Cold War," the resurgence of the rivalry between the West and the non-Western powers and alliances. Then, could the Cold War strategies of the past also help the West win the new Cold War? Before answering this question, it is important to critically assess the characteristics of these strategies. In particular, I highlight three strategies that were subject to intense policy debates and controversies: the Kirkpatrick Doctrine, Reagan Doctrine, and Double-Track Nuclear Deterrence.

The Kirkpatrick Doctrine was integral to the U.S. strategy of containing communist expansion in the 1980s. U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Jeanne Kirkpatrick advocated that America should strategically support anti-communist dictatorships in developing countries. Distinguishing communist totalitarian regimes from non-communist authoritarian regimes, Kirkpatrick articulated that the U.S. should prioritize containing the security threat from communist powers committed to expansionist agendas, through alliances with political regimes that pose less of a threat to international security.

The Reagan Doctrine advocated providing aid to anti-communist groups engaged in armed resistance against pro-Soviet regimes. In contrast to direct U.S. military intervention in the Vietnam War (which ended in a defeat), U.S. President Ronald Reagan sent military aid to "freedom fighters" in Nicaragua, Angola, Cambodia, and Afghanistan to "roll back" communist advances. The U.S. support for these resistance groups pressured the Soviet Union also to expand support for its allied regimes. The Soviet-Afghan War, in particular, inflicted severe military and financial costs on the Soviet Union.

The Double Track Decision was NATO's response to the Soviet deployment of nuclear missiles in Europe. In 1979, NATO announced its intention to deploy nuclear-capable Pershing II medium-range missiles in Western Europe by 1983 if the USSR did not withdraw its SS-20 medium-range nuclear missiles from Eastern Europe before then. When the USSR disregarded the warning, NATO deployed U.S. nuclear missiles to restore the nuclear balance in the European theater. Burdened by the cost of the nuclear arms race, the USSR eventually signed the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty with the US in 1987, disarming all medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe.

The USSR collapsed in 1991, ending the Cold War with the West's victory over the Soviet bloc. The three strategies I described have been credited by some strategists for contributing to the West's victory and have also been advocated as applicable to the new Cold War.

Despite the Biden administration's proposal for an "alliance of democracies," there is an advocacy for the U.S. to strategically partner with semi-democratic or even non-democratic states to ensure their alignment with the West. Careful to avoid direct warfare with Russia, the West has instead expanded military aid to Ukraine to deteriorate Russia's military and economic capacity in a war of attrition.

In East Asia, North Korea's nuclear threats have intensified policy debates among U.S. allies on strengthening extended nuclear deterrence. The advocates for the redeployment of U.S. tactical nuclear missiles, or even independent nuclear armament, have become prevalent in the domestic politics of South Korea and Japan.

However, the reintroduction of past Cold War strategies should also entail an evaluation of their costs and risks. The Kirkpatrick Doctrine was controversial for tolerating political repressions of U.S.-aligned authoritarian governments in Latin America and Asia. The Reagan Doctrine, despite credited success in draining Soviet military resources and contributing to the USSR's eventual collapse, received criticism for engaging in "proxy wars" and prolonging conflicts and destruction in multiple countries. NATO's Double Track Decision increased security anxieties among European citizens, spurring widespread protests throughout Western Europe in the early 1980s against the escalation of a nuclear arms race.

Although the Cold War strategies of the '80s might have contributed to the West's victory in the '90s, the risk that more adverse consequences could have occurred cannot be dismissed lightly. The political resentment toward pro-U.S. authoritarian governments could have provided strategic opportunities for the USSR in developing countries and fractured the West's alliances. The proxy wars could have destabilized the regions and drained the West's strategic resources as much as the Soviet Union's. Facing today's geopolitical challenges, if the West adopts similar strategies, it should also be prepared to experience similar risks and costs.

For example, the war in Ukraine could eventually cause Putin's Russia to collapse, but could Europe endure years of military costs and destruction for this outcome? Would the redeployment of tactical U.S. nuclear missiles in East Asia restore nuclear balance in the region? Even if it did, would a nuclear balance deter conflicts and provocations in the region?

For policymakers often reminded to "learn from history," there is an appeal to rely on the "tried and tested" strategies for recurring geopolitical conflicts. However, in learning from the past, the West has an opportunity to explore what might be alternative approaches to "winning" a new Cold War. After observing the costs and risks associated with the strategies of the past, I hope today's strategists will be able to devise strategies that would ensure that the new Cold War is also overcome, but with fewer security anxieties, military costs, or sacrifices of political principles.

Lee Jong-eun (jl4375a@student.american.edu), a Ph.D. candidate, is an adjunct faculty member at the American University School of International Service. His research specialties include U.S. foreign policy, South Korean politics and foreign policy, alliance management and East Asian regional security.