International stability sometimes requires foreign policy ambiguities and contradictions

By Lee Jong-eun

In international relations, political actors' ambiguous, inconsistent behaviors are frequent subjects of debates and controversies. To some critics, U.S. President Joe Biden's recent Saudi Arabia visit to request the latter's cooperation in the global energy market contradicted his administration's pledge to counter autocracy and advocate human rights as core foreign policy values.

To other critics, South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol's equivocal response toward U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taiwan was inconsistent with Yoon's campaign pledge to be assertive toward China. To other critics, Western Europe's pledge to defend Ukraine from Russia's invasion is undermined by the former's restraint in providing more sophisticated weapons for Ukraine and completely suspending energy imports from Russia.

Often, newly established governments criticize what they portray as their predecessors' ambiguous, contradictory foreign policies, then proclaim that their new foreign policies will be instead clear and principled. Eventually, however, most governments, regardless of their ideological orientation, make decisions that fall short or deviate from their foreign policy pledges.

In South Korea, the Lee Myung-bak government, which criticized its predecessors' engagement policy toward North Korea as wasteful spending, continued to permit the flow of aid to North Korea through the inter-Korean Kaesong Industrial Complex. The Moon Jae-in government, which questioned the legality of the 2015 Korea-Japan Comfort Women Agreement signed by its predecessor, eventually acknowledged the document as an official bilateral agreement.

To be accused of foreign policy inconsistencies and contradictions poses risks for governments. The losses of policy credibility could result in domestic political backlashes and suspensions of international cooperation. However, ambiguities and contradictions are not only common but perhaps necessary attributes of international affairs.

A government which seeks to implement a certain foreign policy will likely face challenges from domestic and external actors opposed to the policy. Against such opposition, the government risks experiencing policy costs that could jeopardize fulfilling other vital foreign policy goals. Should the U.S. pressure countries in the Global South to participate in robust sanctions against Russia, at the risk of alienating these countries to drift away from the West?

Should South Korea pursue a trilateral security alliance with the U.S. and Japan at the risk of its economic partnership with China? While some hardliners advocate that certain foreign policy objectives are more important than all others, the geopolitical reality is that governments are often compelled to balance competing foreign policy interests and objectives.

There is a valid criticism that unrealistic foreign policy objectives are the cause for states' "hypocritical" policy behaviors. For example, the goal of nuclear nonproliferation has been criticized for forcing the international community to deny recognition to de facto nuclear weapons states like India, Pakistan and Israel. Disavowing costly, unattainable foreign policy goals might be the easiest way to reduce the need for policy ambiguities and contradictions.

Unfortunately, domestic and international constraints often prevent countries from disavowing long-held foreign policy goals. For example, the U.S. is unlikely to abandon formally the goal of denuclearizing North Korea or dismiss the importance of international democracy and human rights promotion.

Subsequently, how countries could signal a commitment to foreign policy goals without experiencing undue costs remain an unavoidable policy challenge. Despite risks and criticisms, policy ambiguities and contradictions display governments' endeavors to bridge the gap between stated policy goals and policy constraints.

The governments might hedge support for a policy goal with an undefined level of commitment to test the expected costs. U.S. commitment to defend Taiwan but not formally support Taiwan's independence; South Korea's participation in the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), but reservation toward membership in the Quad are examples of policy deliberations that might appear to some critics as strategic ambiguities.

The governments might also attempt to offset foreign policy costs through countermeasures. The recent killing of Al Qaida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri by the U.S. military might appear to contradict the U.S. strategic withdrawal from Afghanistan, but it could also be the Biden administration's attempt to balance the excessive decline of the U.S.' security commitment in the Middle East region.

Some analysts warn that ambiguities and contradictions create geopolitical uncertainties threatening international stability. The mixed signaling of the West's security commitment to Ukraine might have motivated Russia's "special military operations." Similar security crises could occur in East Asia if the U.S. and its allies do not convey strategic clarity. However, in geopolitical disputes where actors have incompatible goals and interests, policy ambiguities might also serve as creative solutions that avert crises and maintain international stability.

A carefully crafted ambiguity permits international actors to achieve mutual "face-saving" consensus by blurring the costs of compromise. "Informal reciprocity" and "tacit compliance" might be less costly for international actors to abide by than explicit concessions. Drawing from the Korean proverb, "give a disease then give a medicine," international actors might alternate aggressive and conciliatory policy behaviors to adjust strategic balance in their geopolitical interactions. Fluctuations of foreign policy behavior could then have a positive role in deterring international disputes from severely deteriorating or rigidly remaining in gridlock.

Do foreign policy ambiguities and contradictions undermine the stability of the "rules-based international order?" Or do they provide nuances that preserve international stability threatened by conflict over rules and principles? Both are possible outcomes. The key difference between actors who use ambiguities and contradictions to reinforce international stability and actors who fail might be that the former carry credibility that permits the latitude of "cutting some slack" in making exceptions to their professed policy goals and principles.

The paradox of international stability might be that credibility and contradictions are "two sides of a coin." International actors must acquire credibility to implement persuasively less credible aspects of their foreign policy.

Lee Jong-eun (jl4375a@student.american.edu), a Ph.D. candidate, is an adjunct faculty member at the American University School of International Service. Prior to this, he has served as a South Korean Air Force intelligence officer. His research specialty includes U.S. foreign policy, South Korean politics and foreign policy, alliance management and East Asian regional security.