By Lee Seong-hyon
There is a learning curve for Korean journalists when it comes to Wang Yi, the Chinese foreign minister. In the past, when Wang visited Seoul, they assumed that he was coming to Seoul to prepare for a summit between President Moon Jae-in and General Secretary Xi Jinping. After a few disappointments and another fallen hope from the recent visit by Politburo member Yang Jiechi, they've become wiser. Now, they do "know" Wang's visit is more about the United States than about Korea.
It's always the power rivalry that counts first for the world's economically dominant nations.
Wang is also visiting Japan. His purpose is to "manage" Beijing's relations with Seoul and Tokyo (two key military allies of the United States in East Asia) at a time when China fears that the next U.S. administration under Biden will strengthen the trilateral security cooperation among Seoul, Washington, and Japan to double pressure on China, amid the intensifying U.S.-China rivalry.
However, Xi's visit to Seoul and a summit between Xi and Moon is in the pipeline too. Importantly, Wang could dangle the summit card in front of Seoul's eyes so as to induce Seoul not to fulfill American wishes. It's not certain whether Wang will succeed. Yet, the Moon administration has repeatedly invited Xi to visit South Korea, hoping that Xi's very presence in Seoul and the photo-op between the two leaders of South Korea and China will be seen by the business communities as a signal of the resumption of robust commercial activities, which have been dampened since the THAAD discord four years ago.
Taken together, Wang's visit has implications for the U.S.-China rivalry and it has implications for Xi's visit to Seoul. And the Chinese leader's possible summit with Moon also has implications for the U.S.-China rivalry. Xi will try to coax Moon to distance from Washington in exchange for economic and trade incentives, as well as Korean firms' access to the new Chinese domestic market, to be spurred by the so-called "Dual Circulation" economic policy, proclaimed by Xi recently.
Regarding the timing, in principle, both Seoul and Beijing seem to have agreed to have Xi visit Seoul as soon as the COVID-19 pandemic situation mitigates. But given the resurgence of COVID-19 around the world, with new increases in confirmed cases in both Korea and China, it may take more than a few weeks until Xi sets foot in Seoul.
For the summit goal, there are two questions for South Korea to think about. First, what does Xi's visit to Korea mean from Korea's national interest perspective? Second, will Xi's visit to Korea make the bilateral relationship more future-oriented?
The summit itself, with all the diplomatic decorum and high-end events, carries a public diplomacy effect. But Seoul should also look for the actual benefits. If, as reported by some media outlets, China will merely pedal back all the trade punishments and non-tariff barriers such as bans on products of the "Korean Wave," which Beijing took in the aftermath of the THAAD dispute, it will not be seen as a summit of measurable achievements.
Meanwhile, China seems to have clearer goals to achieve. In addition to preventing Seoul from forging stronger ties with Washington, China also wants the summit to act as a display of Asian countries' superior handling of COVID-19 compared to its Western counterparts. China promotes both internally and externally that China's better management of the Corona pandemic demonstrates the superiority of the Chinese Communist Party system.
It is fine for Seoul and Beijing to share their COVID-19 experiences and lessons. But South Korea should be careful not to be seen as a cheerleader for the Beijing leadership. South Korea should remember the lesson learned in 2015 when then-President Park Geun-hye attended the epic military parade at Tiananmen Square, in the front row, alongside Putin, Xi and other leaders. At that time, many South Koreans misunderstood it as a "diplomatic achievement" because the North Korean representative was relegated to the back row.
The Moon administration should also accommodate the rising anti-China sentiment among the South Korean public, as it prepares for the summit. According to a poll by Pew Research Center, 75 percent of South Koreans have unfavorable views on China, which is the highest recorded figure in South Korea's history. The figure is even higher than that in America where 73 percent of Americans have unfavorable views on China. This warrants China's attention.
Lee Seong-hyon (sunnybbsfs@gmail.com), Ph.D., is director of the Center for Chinese Studies at the Sejong Institute.
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It's always the power rivalry that counts first for the world's economically dominant nations.
Wang is also visiting Japan. His purpose is to "manage" Beijing's relations with Seoul and Tokyo (two key military allies of the United States in East Asia) at a time when China fears that the next U.S. administration under Biden will strengthen the trilateral security cooperation among Seoul, Washington, and Japan to double pressure on China, amid the intensifying U.S.-China rivalry.
However, Xi's visit to Seoul and a summit between Xi and Moon is in the pipeline too. Importantly, Wang could dangle the summit card in front of Seoul's eyes so as to induce Seoul not to fulfill American wishes. It's not certain whether Wang will succeed. Yet, the Moon administration has repeatedly invited Xi to visit South Korea, hoping that Xi's very presence in Seoul and the photo-op between the two leaders of South Korea and China will be seen by the business communities as a signal of the resumption of robust commercial activities, which have been dampened since the THAAD discord four years ago.
Taken together, Wang's visit has implications for the U.S.-China rivalry and it has implications for Xi's visit to Seoul. And the Chinese leader's possible summit with Moon also has implications for the U.S.-China rivalry. Xi will try to coax Moon to distance from Washington in exchange for economic and trade incentives, as well as Korean firms' access to the new Chinese domestic market, to be spurred by the so-called "Dual Circulation" economic policy, proclaimed by Xi recently.
Regarding the timing, in principle, both Seoul and Beijing seem to have agreed to have Xi visit Seoul as soon as the COVID-19 pandemic situation mitigates. But given the resurgence of COVID-19 around the world, with new increases in confirmed cases in both Korea and China, it may take more than a few weeks until Xi sets foot in Seoul.
For the summit goal, there are two questions for South Korea to think about. First, what does Xi's visit to Korea mean from Korea's national interest perspective? Second, will Xi's visit to Korea make the bilateral relationship more future-oriented?
The summit itself, with all the diplomatic decorum and high-end events, carries a public diplomacy effect. But Seoul should also look for the actual benefits. If, as reported by some media outlets, China will merely pedal back all the trade punishments and non-tariff barriers such as bans on products of the "Korean Wave," which Beijing took in the aftermath of the THAAD dispute, it will not be seen as a summit of measurable achievements.
Meanwhile, China seems to have clearer goals to achieve. In addition to preventing Seoul from forging stronger ties with Washington, China also wants the summit to act as a display of Asian countries' superior handling of COVID-19 compared to its Western counterparts. China promotes both internally and externally that China's better management of the Corona pandemic demonstrates the superiority of the Chinese Communist Party system.
It is fine for Seoul and Beijing to share their COVID-19 experiences and lessons. But South Korea should be careful not to be seen as a cheerleader for the Beijing leadership. South Korea should remember the lesson learned in 2015 when then-President Park Geun-hye attended the epic military parade at Tiananmen Square, in the front row, alongside Putin, Xi and other leaders. At that time, many South Koreans misunderstood it as a "diplomatic achievement" because the North Korean representative was relegated to the back row.
The Moon administration should also accommodate the rising anti-China sentiment among the South Korean public, as it prepares for the summit. According to a poll by Pew Research Center, 75 percent of South Koreans have unfavorable views on China, which is the highest recorded figure in South Korea's history. The figure is even higher than that in America where 73 percent of Americans have unfavorable views on China. This warrants China's attention.
Lee Seong-hyon (sunnybbsfs@gmail.com), Ph.D., is director of the Center for Chinese Studies at the Sejong Institute.
