By Lee Seong-hyon
China is paying keen attention to what kind of "new path" Kim Jong-un will take in 2020.
First, China believes that South Korea and the U.S. "overreacted" to North Korea's reference to the "Christmas gift," which heightened the crisis on the Korean Peninsula. The very idea of this so-called gift drew wide attention to the point that Trump also mentioned it publicly.
The U.S. media began to report it as Kim's "Christmas gift." Advanced U.S. reconnaissance planes and surveillance aircraft were deployed on the Korean Peninsula one after another. Tensions rose.
However, the term "Christmas gift" was not Kim's wording, but that of Vice Foreign Minister Lee Tae-sung. In his Dec. 3 statement, Lee said, "What remains is America's choice and what it chooses for the upcoming Christmas gift depends entirely on the U.S. decision."
Lee, as a specialist on the U.S., may have succeeded in drawing attention by mentioning the special American holiday. But the deadline set by Kim was the "year's end," not Christmas. In other words, the foreign ministry official uttered "Christmas" and insinuated it to be a deadline, which was different from the wording from the supreme leader. Given the nature of the North Korea's political system, in which people recite the words of the nation's top leader almost verbatim, the mistake of by Lee warrants reprimanding, a Chinese observer said. It partially explains why China was relatively "calm" about the situation on the Korean Peninsula, unlike South Korea and the U.S.
The different threat perception by China regarding the "Christmas gift" also influenced the Chinese interpretation of Kim's seven-hour remarks at the Workers' Party plenum. It was de facto served a longer version of Kim's New Year's address that he didn't deliver this time.
For example, the word "shocking real action" was mentioned by Kim. Is Kim in the mood for causing provocations in the New Year? Not necessarily, according to the Chinese. The Chinese side seems to understand the word from an "ideological" perspective rather than as an actual action. In other words, it does not mean that the North will automatically launch shocking provocations, rather, the North will make real efforts to improve its defense capabilities, including the development of strategic weapons, and prove it in actuality.
Here, China may be right. North Koreans often uses rhetorical words. This tends to confuse analysts who are from a different political and cultural norm.
There is a debate among South Korean experts on whether Kim is returning to the "byeongjin" strategy. The Chinese side believes that it looks similar to byeongjin at a glance, but not quite the same. They view that strengthening the North's defense capability has been added to the current North Korean policy that prioritizes "economic construction" which remains unchanged.
The word "frontal breakthrough" surfaced as many as 23 times. That does not mean physical force, either. On Jan. 6, North Korea's state-run media clarified it as the "economic front." Good to know North Korea sometimes makes such effort to avoid misinterpretation. But often it doesn't.
Still, the possibility of North Korean provocations is a concern for China. For now, China sees a low possibility of North Korea's likelihood for conducting nuclear tests. Given the North's deepening reliance on China, the Chinese don't think North Korea will easily violate the Chinese "bottom line." That would thrust China into a position to sign up for punitive U.N. sanctions against the North.
In the bigger scheme of things, China does not see the North Korea-U.S. talks as a complete failure. They noted that Trump takes a 180 degrees opposite stance in how he deals with North Korea and Iran, and that Trump is also (at least so far) using expressions favorable to Kim. Against this backdrop, if Trump proposes dialogue to Kim in a "top-down" fashion, there is still a possibility of reopening the North-U.S. dialogue. On the contrary, there seems hardly any possibility that the North will be responsive to the proposals of working-level talks.
Overall, China believes Kim's message should be approached without overreaction. The main message is that North Korea should not rely on powerful nations to decide its fate. North Korea should not rely on negotiations with the U.S. to change its economic conditions, but be responsible for its national defense and economy in the spirit of "self-reliance" (juche) and "socialist construction." The centrality of "economic development" as the North's main policy remains unchanged. In that vein, Kim said that "self-reliance and self-sufficiency have the same power as nuclear bombs."
Lee Seong-hyon (sunnybbsfs@gmail.com), Ph.D., is director of the Center for Chinese Studies at the Sejong Institute.
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First, China believes that South Korea and the U.S. "overreacted" to North Korea's reference to the "Christmas gift," which heightened the crisis on the Korean Peninsula. The very idea of this so-called gift drew wide attention to the point that Trump also mentioned it publicly.
The U.S. media began to report it as Kim's "Christmas gift." Advanced U.S. reconnaissance planes and surveillance aircraft were deployed on the Korean Peninsula one after another. Tensions rose.
However, the term "Christmas gift" was not Kim's wording, but that of Vice Foreign Minister Lee Tae-sung. In his Dec. 3 statement, Lee said, "What remains is America's choice and what it chooses for the upcoming Christmas gift depends entirely on the U.S. decision."
Lee, as a specialist on the U.S., may have succeeded in drawing attention by mentioning the special American holiday. But the deadline set by Kim was the "year's end," not Christmas. In other words, the foreign ministry official uttered "Christmas" and insinuated it to be a deadline, which was different from the wording from the supreme leader. Given the nature of the North Korea's political system, in which people recite the words of the nation's top leader almost verbatim, the mistake of by Lee warrants reprimanding, a Chinese observer said. It partially explains why China was relatively "calm" about the situation on the Korean Peninsula, unlike South Korea and the U.S.
The different threat perception by China regarding the "Christmas gift" also influenced the Chinese interpretation of Kim's seven-hour remarks at the Workers' Party plenum. It was de facto served a longer version of Kim's New Year's address that he didn't deliver this time.
For example, the word "shocking real action" was mentioned by Kim. Is Kim in the mood for causing provocations in the New Year? Not necessarily, according to the Chinese. The Chinese side seems to understand the word from an "ideological" perspective rather than as an actual action. In other words, it does not mean that the North will automatically launch shocking provocations, rather, the North will make real efforts to improve its defense capabilities, including the development of strategic weapons, and prove it in actuality.
Here, China may be right. North Koreans often uses rhetorical words. This tends to confuse analysts who are from a different political and cultural norm.
There is a debate among South Korean experts on whether Kim is returning to the "byeongjin" strategy. The Chinese side believes that it looks similar to byeongjin at a glance, but not quite the same. They view that strengthening the North's defense capability has been added to the current North Korean policy that prioritizes "economic construction" which remains unchanged.
The word "frontal breakthrough" surfaced as many as 23 times. That does not mean physical force, either. On Jan. 6, North Korea's state-run media clarified it as the "economic front." Good to know North Korea sometimes makes such effort to avoid misinterpretation. But often it doesn't.
Still, the possibility of North Korean provocations is a concern for China. For now, China sees a low possibility of North Korea's likelihood for conducting nuclear tests. Given the North's deepening reliance on China, the Chinese don't think North Korea will easily violate the Chinese "bottom line." That would thrust China into a position to sign up for punitive U.N. sanctions against the North.
In the bigger scheme of things, China does not see the North Korea-U.S. talks as a complete failure. They noted that Trump takes a 180 degrees opposite stance in how he deals with North Korea and Iran, and that Trump is also (at least so far) using expressions favorable to Kim. Against this backdrop, if Trump proposes dialogue to Kim in a "top-down" fashion, there is still a possibility of reopening the North-U.S. dialogue. On the contrary, there seems hardly any possibility that the North will be responsive to the proposals of working-level talks.
Overall, China believes Kim's message should be approached without overreaction. The main message is that North Korea should not rely on powerful nations to decide its fate. North Korea should not rely on negotiations with the U.S. to change its economic conditions, but be responsible for its national defense and economy in the spirit of "self-reliance" (juche) and "socialist construction." The centrality of "economic development" as the North's main policy remains unchanged. In that vein, Kim said that "self-reliance and self-sufficiency have the same power as nuclear bombs."
Lee Seong-hyon (sunnybbsfs@gmail.com), Ph.D., is director of the Center for Chinese Studies at the Sejong Institute.
