By Lee Seong-hyon
There are some qualitative differences in the way China treats South Korea since Chinese leader Xi Jinping's visit to Pyongyang. The visit to Pyongyang, which took place in late June, itself was a significant event in Sino-North Korea ties; China signified it was raising its stake in the geopolitical dividends of the North Korea nuclear matter. Interestingly, without any public announcement, China's dealings with South Korea have since also shown a nuanced shift.
First, the Chinese side did not highlight the THAAD issue in various academic and policy meetings between Seoul and Beijing. The majority of Chinese participants also underscored that the discord has yet to be fully resolved.
The Chinese side expressed concerns over the possibility of additional THAAD battery deployment by Washington to U.S. military bases in South Korea. China's new 2019 Defense White Paper included a clause about THAAD. "The U.S. has severely destroyed the strategic balance of the region by deploying the THAAD system in South Korea, and inflicted severe damage on the strategic security interests of the regional countries," it said.
To sum up, THAAD is still an important issue for China, but Beijing wants to improve ties with Seoul and it doesn't want THAAD to become an obstacle.
Second, China ratcheted up publicly recognizing and praising President Moon Jae-in's mediating role in the nuclear talks between the United States and North Korea. It is notable that the Chinese still praised Moon for his steadfast peace outreach effort in transforming the Korean Peninsula situation even during the recent negotiation impasse.
Chinese note that 'With Xi Jinping's visit to North Korea, relations between North Korea and China have entered a new high period. They also expressed hope that the ties between Seoul and Beijing could be also further strengthened.
Moreover, China has begun to point out the possible room for trilateral cooperation in establishing peace and economic prosperity on the Korean Peninsula, among Beijing, Seoul and Pyongyang. For that purpose, Chinese, once again, emphasizes that it is necessary for Seoul and Beijing to make new efforts to strengthen bilateral ties.
If this is a Chinese "charm offensive" to South Korea, it also brings warnings as well. The most important is that South Korea shouldn't join any U.S. initiative, whether military or economic, that aims to contain China. South Korea shouldn't cow down to take part in the U.S.-led Indo-Pacific Strategy. China warns that whether or not South Korea can avoid U.S. interference and intervention on the matter is bound to pose a significant challenge to Seoul-Beijing relations.
Specifically, the China warns that if South Korea takes the U.S. side in the dispute over the South China Sea, for instance, it will pose a more serious challenge than the THAAD issue between Seoul and Beijing.
According to China, North Korea and the U.S. alone cannot represent the positions of the countries involved in North Korea's nuclear weapons program. Many issues cannot be solved by just bilateral talks between the U.S. and North Korea. That's why it underscores the importance of strategic cooperation between South Korea and China.
"There is room for China and South Korea to form a joint posture and coordinate actions regarding the North Korean nuclear affair," it says. China's suggestions in this regard are: South Korea can persuade the U.S. to contribute to easing sanctions on North Korea, while China can persuade North Korea to make progress in denuclearization.
China also emphasizes that both Beijing and Seoul have a convergence of basic interests on the Korean Peninsula in terms of both of them not wanting an outbreak of war, and both wanting denuclearization in a peaceful manner.
While China also readily acknowledge that the U.S. is still the most influential player in North Korea's denuclearization negotiations, it doubts whether Washington is doing all it can to truly realize the goal. "The U.S. wants to maintain a certain level of tension on the Korean Peninsula so that it can rationalize the presence of U.S. forces in Northeast Asia," the Chinese argue.
Overall, in the aftermath of Xi's visit to Pyongyang, China has been also making charm-offensive inroads to Seoul. The moves are subtle but palpable. They emit a certain underlying strategic goal. That is, they appear to be more about China's checking the U.S. influence on the Korean Peninsula, than the Korean Peninsula itself.
Lee Seong-hyon (sunnybbsfs@gmail.com), Ph.D., is director, the Center for Chinese Studies at the Sejong Institute.
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First, the Chinese side did not highlight the THAAD issue in various academic and policy meetings between Seoul and Beijing. The majority of Chinese participants also underscored that the discord has yet to be fully resolved.
The Chinese side expressed concerns over the possibility of additional THAAD battery deployment by Washington to U.S. military bases in South Korea. China's new 2019 Defense White Paper included a clause about THAAD. "The U.S. has severely destroyed the strategic balance of the region by deploying the THAAD system in South Korea, and inflicted severe damage on the strategic security interests of the regional countries," it said.
To sum up, THAAD is still an important issue for China, but Beijing wants to improve ties with Seoul and it doesn't want THAAD to become an obstacle.
Second, China ratcheted up publicly recognizing and praising President Moon Jae-in's mediating role in the nuclear talks between the United States and North Korea. It is notable that the Chinese still praised Moon for his steadfast peace outreach effort in transforming the Korean Peninsula situation even during the recent negotiation impasse.
Chinese note that 'With Xi Jinping's visit to North Korea, relations between North Korea and China have entered a new high period. They also expressed hope that the ties between Seoul and Beijing could be also further strengthened.
Moreover, China has begun to point out the possible room for trilateral cooperation in establishing peace and economic prosperity on the Korean Peninsula, among Beijing, Seoul and Pyongyang. For that purpose, Chinese, once again, emphasizes that it is necessary for Seoul and Beijing to make new efforts to strengthen bilateral ties.
If this is a Chinese "charm offensive" to South Korea, it also brings warnings as well. The most important is that South Korea shouldn't join any U.S. initiative, whether military or economic, that aims to contain China. South Korea shouldn't cow down to take part in the U.S.-led Indo-Pacific Strategy. China warns that whether or not South Korea can avoid U.S. interference and intervention on the matter is bound to pose a significant challenge to Seoul-Beijing relations.
Specifically, the China warns that if South Korea takes the U.S. side in the dispute over the South China Sea, for instance, it will pose a more serious challenge than the THAAD issue between Seoul and Beijing.
According to China, North Korea and the U.S. alone cannot represent the positions of the countries involved in North Korea's nuclear weapons program. Many issues cannot be solved by just bilateral talks between the U.S. and North Korea. That's why it underscores the importance of strategic cooperation between South Korea and China.
"There is room for China and South Korea to form a joint posture and coordinate actions regarding the North Korean nuclear affair," it says. China's suggestions in this regard are: South Korea can persuade the U.S. to contribute to easing sanctions on North Korea, while China can persuade North Korea to make progress in denuclearization.
China also emphasizes that both Beijing and Seoul have a convergence of basic interests on the Korean Peninsula in terms of both of them not wanting an outbreak of war, and both wanting denuclearization in a peaceful manner.
While China also readily acknowledge that the U.S. is still the most influential player in North Korea's denuclearization negotiations, it doubts whether Washington is doing all it can to truly realize the goal. "The U.S. wants to maintain a certain level of tension on the Korean Peninsula so that it can rationalize the presence of U.S. forces in Northeast Asia," the Chinese argue.
Overall, in the aftermath of Xi's visit to Pyongyang, China has been also making charm-offensive inroads to Seoul. The moves are subtle but palpable. They emit a certain underlying strategic goal. That is, they appear to be more about China's checking the U.S. influence on the Korean Peninsula, than the Korean Peninsula itself.
Lee Seong-hyon (sunnybbsfs@gmail.com), Ph.D., is director, the Center for Chinese Studies at the Sejong Institute.
