By Lee Seong-hyon
A specter is haunting the Korean Peninsula - the specter of THAAD. It was the Chinese leader Xi Jinping who has brought it back from the grave. Xi, quite unexpectedly, raised the matter with President Moon Jae-in on the sidelines of the G20 summit in Osaka, Japan.
South Korea had been slowly reeling from the trauma of THAAD, making conscientious efforts to let it go and mend ties with Beijing. When we thought we were finally leaving THAAD behind and moving on, the specter was waiting for us in the next room!
Apparently, Xi's move seems to reflect China's strategy that wants to hold onto the THAAD card as a pressure tactic against South Korea, instead of leaving it behind, in the bilateral political dynamics. Amid deteriorating U.S.-China relations, the move by China is also seen as a thinly veiled message to Seoul to "choose wisely" between the U.S. and China on the matter of Huawei.
Both Chinese and American top diplomats in Seoul recently counseled the South Korean government to take their sides on the Huawei issue. It has put Seoul in a dilemma, between its most important military ally and its largest trading partner.
?
When it comes to THAAD, Seoul assumed that it was a matter that was finally signed off from the negotiation table in October 2017 when the Moon administration made its "Three No's" announcement of its positions regarding the affair. They were: No additional deployment of THAAD, no participation in the U.S. anti-missile shield network, and no plan to advance the three-way security cooperation among Seoul-Washington-Tokyo into a formal three-way military alliance.
Many observers and media outlets at that time stated that South Korea made "three-no promises" to China. The Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying also used the word "cheng nuo" (promise). It was later clarified that what South Korea did with China was "announcement of its positions" (입장 표명) regarding THAAD; not a "promise." The Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson also later corrected the wording and began to use the proper term "biao tai" (to make one's position known) to characterize what South Korea did.
However, even today, it is widely misstated that South Korea made three-no "promises" to China regarding THAAD. It is not clear whether this detail has been clarified to Washington since.
At any rate, South Korea thought that China would no longer take issue with the THAAD, which they believed was solved in 2017. With Xi's remarks at the G20, however, now we know that is not the case.
Looking back on it, how China handled the THAAD matter (read, "retaliation") leaves much to be desired, especially in terms of China's depletion of "soft power" with the South Korean public.
In fact, the way China retaliated against South Korea over the THAAD dispute has fundamentally changed the South Korean public's perception of China, from positive to negative, from the image of a peacefully rising power to one aggressivly bullying its neighbor.
Conversations with Chinese interlocutors on this matter, however, continues to show how little awareness they had on this matter. Rather, they tend to downplay this aspect. Some even claim that the Chinese retaliation was "measured," meant to teach a lesson, but not to derail the relationship.
Well, China may have thought so. But the South Korean perception was different.
Some other Chinese observers say the Seoul-Beijing relationship could easily bounce back to the "normal track" because the South Korean public reactions were merely "emotional" and could be smoothed out. To support their argument, they cite the Sino-Japanese relationship as a case for a really hard problem because it is "structural," leaving little room for genuine reconciliation (despite the recent warming trend).
Such a mismatched "self-assessment" by China would serve as an obstacle in China's soft-power outreach to its Asian neighbors. It could be also seen as a reflection of China's incumbent leadership's foreign policy thinking that prioritizes hard power over soft power, amid intensifying rivalry with the United States in the fields of technology, military, big data, artificial intelligence, among others.
South Korea used to be one country in Asia that was immune to the so-called "China threat theory." Now China is proving otherwise, with the resuscitation of THAAD. If China wants to become a bona fide superpower that commands respect from other nations (In fact, it hopes so), it should think twice. There is a difference between coercion and persuasion.
Lee Seong-hyon (sunnybbsfs@gmail.com), Ph.D., is director of the Center for Chinese Studies at the Sejong Institute.
 |
South Korea had been slowly reeling from the trauma of THAAD, making conscientious efforts to let it go and mend ties with Beijing. When we thought we were finally leaving THAAD behind and moving on, the specter was waiting for us in the next room!
Apparently, Xi's move seems to reflect China's strategy that wants to hold onto the THAAD card as a pressure tactic against South Korea, instead of leaving it behind, in the bilateral political dynamics. Amid deteriorating U.S.-China relations, the move by China is also seen as a thinly veiled message to Seoul to "choose wisely" between the U.S. and China on the matter of Huawei.
Both Chinese and American top diplomats in Seoul recently counseled the South Korean government to take their sides on the Huawei issue. It has put Seoul in a dilemma, between its most important military ally and its largest trading partner.
?
When it comes to THAAD, Seoul assumed that it was a matter that was finally signed off from the negotiation table in October 2017 when the Moon administration made its "Three No's" announcement of its positions regarding the affair. They were: No additional deployment of THAAD, no participation in the U.S. anti-missile shield network, and no plan to advance the three-way security cooperation among Seoul-Washington-Tokyo into a formal three-way military alliance.
Many observers and media outlets at that time stated that South Korea made "three-no promises" to China. The Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying also used the word "cheng nuo" (promise). It was later clarified that what South Korea did with China was "announcement of its positions" (입장 표명) regarding THAAD; not a "promise." The Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson also later corrected the wording and began to use the proper term "biao tai" (to make one's position known) to characterize what South Korea did.
However, even today, it is widely misstated that South Korea made three-no "promises" to China regarding THAAD. It is not clear whether this detail has been clarified to Washington since.
At any rate, South Korea thought that China would no longer take issue with the THAAD, which they believed was solved in 2017. With Xi's remarks at the G20, however, now we know that is not the case.
Looking back on it, how China handled the THAAD matter (read, "retaliation") leaves much to be desired, especially in terms of China's depletion of "soft power" with the South Korean public.
In fact, the way China retaliated against South Korea over the THAAD dispute has fundamentally changed the South Korean public's perception of China, from positive to negative, from the image of a peacefully rising power to one aggressivly bullying its neighbor.
Conversations with Chinese interlocutors on this matter, however, continues to show how little awareness they had on this matter. Rather, they tend to downplay this aspect. Some even claim that the Chinese retaliation was "measured," meant to teach a lesson, but not to derail the relationship.
Well, China may have thought so. But the South Korean perception was different.
Some other Chinese observers say the Seoul-Beijing relationship could easily bounce back to the "normal track" because the South Korean public reactions were merely "emotional" and could be smoothed out. To support their argument, they cite the Sino-Japanese relationship as a case for a really hard problem because it is "structural," leaving little room for genuine reconciliation (despite the recent warming trend).
Such a mismatched "self-assessment" by China would serve as an obstacle in China's soft-power outreach to its Asian neighbors. It could be also seen as a reflection of China's incumbent leadership's foreign policy thinking that prioritizes hard power over soft power, amid intensifying rivalry with the United States in the fields of technology, military, big data, artificial intelligence, among others.
South Korea used to be one country in Asia that was immune to the so-called "China threat theory." Now China is proving otherwise, with the resuscitation of THAAD. If China wants to become a bona fide superpower that commands respect from other nations (In fact, it hopes so), it should think twice. There is a difference between coercion and persuasion.
Lee Seong-hyon (sunnybbsfs@gmail.com), Ph.D., is director of the Center for Chinese Studies at the Sejong Institute.
![[INTERVIEW] North Korean defectors bear brunt of remittance scams](https://img.koreatimes.co.kr/upload/thumbnailV2/75c261156ac7415fad92dc1d7c1b30cf.jpg/dims/resize/178/optimize)
![[INTERVIEW] Foreign-born entertainers seek to revolutionize local industry](https://img.koreatimes.co.kr/upload/thumbnailV2/4a6b2bd3d23044d699dee3c5bb956863.jpg/dims/resize/178/optimize)
