By Lee Seong-hyon
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Furthermore, we should note that since the collapse of the Hanoi summit, it is North Korea's foreign ministry, not the United Front Work Department that has been back on the frontline in dealing with the United States. Having been resuscitated from marginalization in political infighting, now the foreign ministry, including its vocal vice minister Choe Son-hui, will try to prove their loyalty to Kim, by accentuating how the U.S. "insulted" Kim, the top leader, and advising him to become hardline.
The background: Trump walked away from a scheduled lunch with Kim Jong-un in Hanoi, only 30 minutes before the meal was to be served. The table was set, the meal was ready and water was poured into the glasses. The guests didn't show up.
It was not just the chef's disappointment. It is also quite certain that Kim took it as a personal insult. In Asian political culture, a meal isn't just a meal. It's an important political ritual ― an occasion for trust building, sizing up the other, and also an opportunity to reach a deal. If not, at a minimum, it is a means of sending a signal for amicability and human bonding.
In this context, we could understand why former President Park Geun-hye refused to have a meal with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe when he visited Seoul, symbolizing their bad chemistry. Trump may not have fully grasped what he did to Kim in Hanoi.
Now what? It's no use crying over spilt milk. Then, perhaps we can pause and ask a fundamental question. What is this whole Trump-Kim situation about? How could it be approached for any deal to be made?
One, given the decades of deep-seated mistrust and the sheer complexity of the nuclear negotiation (26 years so far), the negotiations should have been seen as a long-haul, incremental game of concessions and gains.
Two, the Trump administration wants to "shorten" the game and hopes to finish it by the end of Trump's presidency (likely within next two years).
Three, this means the matter should be solved through a "grand bargain." This, this author believes, is actually tenable. In a way, the Trump-Kim top-level summit was designed as such, because years of working-level negotiations didn't work anymore. The deal should find a "political" solution at the top decision-making level, rather than expert-level nitpicking on details of nuclear science.
Four, the previous point is particularly important and worth repeating in North Korea where Kim and only Kim can make any meaningful decisions. For instance, at the working-level negotiations in Hanoi, the North Korean officials, when faced with the American side's questions regarding logistics of nuclear dismantlement and scope, mostly answered this way: "Only Chairman Kim can make decisions." That's so true. Their answer makes them look powerless, but it's the only safe game they know in a system like North Korea.
Five, it means Kim and Trump, if they are still committed to negotiations and want to reach a deal, from now on, should be more closely in communication and contact, including through the reported "phone calls" that Trump once divulged. They should give instructions and deadlines to their subordinates to accomplish a certain task or meet a certain goal, while they themselves should have timely exchanges and give feedback.
Trump and Kim should meet every six months, face to face, for the next two years. Kim should be willing to travel to the United States (So far, it's Trump who has travelled to Asia to meet with Kim).
Six, an important part. A year ago, when pundits discussed whether Kim was serious about denuclearization, we also discussed whether "this Kim" is any different from "the other Kims" ― his father and grandfather. Frankly, Kim has a long way to go to prove that he is decisively different.
One critical way to do that is to change the North Korean negotiators. Kim Yong-chol should go. (Please don't kill him though). He is a member of the old guard who knows only the old game. Likewise, Trump should let Bolton go. There is no place for him in what is supposed to be a new game. We should not put new wine in old wineskins.
Lee Seong-hyon (sunnybbsfs@gmail.com), Ph.D., is director of the Center for Chinese Studies at the Sejong Institute.
