By Lee Seong-hyon
As North Korean leader Kim Jong-un prepares for his upcoming two summits (inter-Korean and with the U.S.), he could use some insights from the outside world, in addition to his "in-house" consulting. The gist is twofold. One, he should be strategically committed to denuclearization this time. Two, South Korean President Moon Jae-in could be his last chance. So, Kim should grab this opportunity and chart a new course of action to be regarded as a "normal country" (as Kim wishes to be, according to interlocutors).
The two summits, in fact, are like two components in the same basket. The goal is the same: denuclearization. What Kim will tell Moon at the first summit will be delivered to President Donald Trump with whom Kim will have the second summit. Of course, the challenging part is this one. It's strategically unwise for Kim to succeed in the first summit and fail in the second. Kim should score well in both.
Some of Kim's shrewd advisers may suggest to him that Kim can declare "denuclearization" during his meeting with Trump, so as to avoid U.S. military action, and "wait it out" until Trump steps down. The logic is that Trump won't likely be re-elected. And when Trump is gone, so will be the threat of a U.S. military attack against North Korea. But this could turn out wrong.
When Kim displayed he had mastered nuclear capabilities that could reach the continental United States last year, it earned him two consequences. One, it drew the attention of the U.S. (which North Korea wanted!) and enabled Kim to sit down with Trump bilaterally (which North Korea also wanted) for negotiations. Two, however, by "showing off" its capability to attack the U.S. mainland, the American threat perception of North Korea fundamentally changed. In short, Washington came to perceive that North Korea's nuclear weapons development is not for deterrence only, but for offensive purposes as well.
In other words, Washington now perceives North Korea as a "revisionist" state that attempts to shift the balance of power face to face with the United States. Washington now perceives Pyongyang as a direct threat, not just a threat to its Asian allies.
Since Washington's threat perception of North Korea has fundamentally changed from "a remote threat" to "a direct threat to the United States," subsequent U.S. governments (including a Democrat one!), will plan to remove North Korea's nuclear program. Top U.S. military advisers, especially, will advocate moves in that direction, one way or another.
So, Trump is Kim's best chance. Being an unconventional leader, Trump is the first U.S. president in recent years who takes the North Korean issue seriously by actually mobilizing his policy resources, not just through words.
Trump may be the only U.S. president who can agree to a bilateral summit with North Korea, sign a peace treaty, and normalize relations with North Korea, and establish a U.S. embassy in Pyongyang.
For North Korea, Trump also has a "downside." He may be the only U.S. president who is constantly thinking about a military option against North Korea in the back of his head. A Democrat U.S. president would be more cautious in using this option, but then a Democrat-run U.S. government would also be more cautious in signing a peace treaty with North Korea. So, Trump is "God's gift" to the North. He may be the "one-shot chance" for Pyongyang to denuclearize and yet preserve its current leadership, and also pave the way for economic development by finally joining the international community as a "normal country."
Liberal President Moon Jae-in, also has his chance too. Moon de facto mid-wifed the bilateral summit between Kim and Trump. As Kim knows, an engagement policy toward North Korea is often unpopular in South Korea, which is undergoing a significant demographic change in its perception of the North. In short, the younger South Korean generation is increasingly less tolerant toward North Korea, as demonstrated during the controversy of forming an inter-Korean Olympic ice hockey team.
In a democracy where leaders get elected, public support is critical in pursuing policy. Moon has been risking his popularity to engage North Korea and give it another chance to finally join the international community as a normal country. Moon may be North Korea's last chance too. If North Korea cheats again, Moon will not be able to persuade the public to pursue an engagement policy toward the North. History will remember the upcoming summits either as "epoch-making" or "lost opportunities." The choice is yours.
Lee Seong-hyon (sunnybbsfs@gmail.com), Ph.D., is a research fellow at the Sejong Institute.
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The two summits, in fact, are like two components in the same basket. The goal is the same: denuclearization. What Kim will tell Moon at the first summit will be delivered to President Donald Trump with whom Kim will have the second summit. Of course, the challenging part is this one. It's strategically unwise for Kim to succeed in the first summit and fail in the second. Kim should score well in both.
Some of Kim's shrewd advisers may suggest to him that Kim can declare "denuclearization" during his meeting with Trump, so as to avoid U.S. military action, and "wait it out" until Trump steps down. The logic is that Trump won't likely be re-elected. And when Trump is gone, so will be the threat of a U.S. military attack against North Korea. But this could turn out wrong.
When Kim displayed he had mastered nuclear capabilities that could reach the continental United States last year, it earned him two consequences. One, it drew the attention of the U.S. (which North Korea wanted!) and enabled Kim to sit down with Trump bilaterally (which North Korea also wanted) for negotiations. Two, however, by "showing off" its capability to attack the U.S. mainland, the American threat perception of North Korea fundamentally changed. In short, Washington came to perceive that North Korea's nuclear weapons development is not for deterrence only, but for offensive purposes as well.
In other words, Washington now perceives North Korea as a "revisionist" state that attempts to shift the balance of power face to face with the United States. Washington now perceives Pyongyang as a direct threat, not just a threat to its Asian allies.
Since Washington's threat perception of North Korea has fundamentally changed from "a remote threat" to "a direct threat to the United States," subsequent U.S. governments (including a Democrat one!), will plan to remove North Korea's nuclear program. Top U.S. military advisers, especially, will advocate moves in that direction, one way or another.
So, Trump is Kim's best chance. Being an unconventional leader, Trump is the first U.S. president in recent years who takes the North Korean issue seriously by actually mobilizing his policy resources, not just through words.
Trump may be the only U.S. president who can agree to a bilateral summit with North Korea, sign a peace treaty, and normalize relations with North Korea, and establish a U.S. embassy in Pyongyang.
For North Korea, Trump also has a "downside." He may be the only U.S. president who is constantly thinking about a military option against North Korea in the back of his head. A Democrat U.S. president would be more cautious in using this option, but then a Democrat-run U.S. government would also be more cautious in signing a peace treaty with North Korea. So, Trump is "God's gift" to the North. He may be the "one-shot chance" for Pyongyang to denuclearize and yet preserve its current leadership, and also pave the way for economic development by finally joining the international community as a "normal country."
Liberal President Moon Jae-in, also has his chance too. Moon de facto mid-wifed the bilateral summit between Kim and Trump. As Kim knows, an engagement policy toward North Korea is often unpopular in South Korea, which is undergoing a significant demographic change in its perception of the North. In short, the younger South Korean generation is increasingly less tolerant toward North Korea, as demonstrated during the controversy of forming an inter-Korean Olympic ice hockey team.
In a democracy where leaders get elected, public support is critical in pursuing policy. Moon has been risking his popularity to engage North Korea and give it another chance to finally join the international community as a normal country. Moon may be North Korea's last chance too. If North Korea cheats again, Moon will not be able to persuade the public to pursue an engagement policy toward the North. History will remember the upcoming summits either as "epoch-making" or "lost opportunities." The choice is yours.
Lee Seong-hyon (sunnybbsfs@gmail.com), Ph.D., is a research fellow at the Sejong Institute.
