By Lee Seong-hyon
What was the real reason for China to send troops to aid North Korea during the 1950-53 Korean War?
The stock answer has always been that China made this decision because the fall of North Korea into the hands of the United States would constitute endangering China's security itself. This served as key evidence to reinforce the rationale that China regarded North Korea as China's security "buffer zone." Now, we have a new explanation.
Ever since China's intervention in the Korean War, both Chinese and North Korean leaders called the two countries' relationship "chun chi xiang yi (as close as lips and teeth)" and "chun wang chi han (if the lips are gone, the teeth will be cold)," and defined Sino-North Korean relations as such for the ensuing decades.
These maxims symbolized North Korea's strategic importance for the security of China, implying that China would protect North Korea at all costs whenever the latter's security would be in grave peril.
During the Cold War era, this concept was generally accepted in the West regarding the two nations' relations. Even today, this view is still widely embraced in the West. But the latest academic achievements on Sino-North Korean relations show that we should revisit this view.
In October 1950, China dispatched troops to aid North Korea, which was about to be defeated by U.S. forces. A majority of scholars in both China and the West have been arguing that China made this decision because with North Korea gone, China would directly have a border with America, its main adversary.
However, newly available documents, both Chinese and Russian, reveal that, in the prelude to the Korean War, China's leader Mao Zedong was, in fact, reluctant to dispatch troops to the Korean Peninsula.
Furthermore, Mao's eventual decision to send troops was based on the premise that if China went to Korea, the concerned U.S. and South Korean forces would feel threatened and stop their northward advance at the Pyongyang-Wonsan line. In that case, China could likely secure the northern part of North Korea without shedding a single drop of blood in conflict with American forces.
This indicates that the eventual Chinese intervention in the Korean War was made not in order to save North Korea, but rather to secure the northern part of North Korea, aiming to extend China's "defense line" to the Pyongyang-Wonsan area without bloodshed.
It underscores the Chinese strategic calculus regarding North Korea was opportunistic, calculative, and pragmatic.
In fact, before and after the founding of the PRC in October 1949, Mao turned down Kim Il-sung's request to unify the Korean Peninsula through military means. The reason for Mao's objection was simple.
In June 1949, the U.S. Army completed its withdrawal from the Korean Peninsula. As a result, the PRC had no existing security threat from the peninsula. This had been China's security preference.
On the contrary, a full-scale attack by Pyongyang on Seoul was likely to prompt the Americans to return to the Korean Peninsula. China didn't like this option because the Korean Peninsula was used as a "gateway" for invasion to China by outside powers.
To Mao, the best way to protect the newly established PRC, after a ravaging civil war, was not to have the U.S. military in its vicinity at all. This psychology remains even today. This explains why China is often seen angrily overreacting to American military drills in and around the Korean Peninsula.
Geopolitical calculus undergoes change with time, and China's should be no exception to this general rule. As previously stated, the trait of China's policy toward North Korea showed not only opportunistic but pragmatic characteristics as well.
As examined, a careful review on Sino-North Korean historical relations, surprisingly, shows that China regarded North Korea as "expendable" during the Korean War, even when the U.S. forces were marching toward the Yalu River in the fall of 1950, posing an imminent security threat to the newly established PRC itself.
It provides support to the view that China's policy toward North Korea was flexible, insinuating that Washington and Seoul could inspire changes within China's policy toward North Korea.
The starting point of China's policy shift on North Korea was when the disadvantages generated by North Korea exceed the advantages. In this regard, the key is how to figure out the "tipping point" where North Korea's liability to China begins to outweigh its value as an asset.
Lee Seong-hyon (sunnybbsfs@gmail.com), Ph.D., is a research fellow at the Sejong Institute.
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The stock answer has always been that China made this decision because the fall of North Korea into the hands of the United States would constitute endangering China's security itself. This served as key evidence to reinforce the rationale that China regarded North Korea as China's security "buffer zone." Now, we have a new explanation.
Ever since China's intervention in the Korean War, both Chinese and North Korean leaders called the two countries' relationship "chun chi xiang yi (as close as lips and teeth)" and "chun wang chi han (if the lips are gone, the teeth will be cold)," and defined Sino-North Korean relations as such for the ensuing decades.
These maxims symbolized North Korea's strategic importance for the security of China, implying that China would protect North Korea at all costs whenever the latter's security would be in grave peril.
During the Cold War era, this concept was generally accepted in the West regarding the two nations' relations. Even today, this view is still widely embraced in the West. But the latest academic achievements on Sino-North Korean relations show that we should revisit this view.
In October 1950, China dispatched troops to aid North Korea, which was about to be defeated by U.S. forces. A majority of scholars in both China and the West have been arguing that China made this decision because with North Korea gone, China would directly have a border with America, its main adversary.
However, newly available documents, both Chinese and Russian, reveal that, in the prelude to the Korean War, China's leader Mao Zedong was, in fact, reluctant to dispatch troops to the Korean Peninsula.
Furthermore, Mao's eventual decision to send troops was based on the premise that if China went to Korea, the concerned U.S. and South Korean forces would feel threatened and stop their northward advance at the Pyongyang-Wonsan line. In that case, China could likely secure the northern part of North Korea without shedding a single drop of blood in conflict with American forces.
This indicates that the eventual Chinese intervention in the Korean War was made not in order to save North Korea, but rather to secure the northern part of North Korea, aiming to extend China's "defense line" to the Pyongyang-Wonsan area without bloodshed.
It underscores the Chinese strategic calculus regarding North Korea was opportunistic, calculative, and pragmatic.
In fact, before and after the founding of the PRC in October 1949, Mao turned down Kim Il-sung's request to unify the Korean Peninsula through military means. The reason for Mao's objection was simple.
In June 1949, the U.S. Army completed its withdrawal from the Korean Peninsula. As a result, the PRC had no existing security threat from the peninsula. This had been China's security preference.
On the contrary, a full-scale attack by Pyongyang on Seoul was likely to prompt the Americans to return to the Korean Peninsula. China didn't like this option because the Korean Peninsula was used as a "gateway" for invasion to China by outside powers.
To Mao, the best way to protect the newly established PRC, after a ravaging civil war, was not to have the U.S. military in its vicinity at all. This psychology remains even today. This explains why China is often seen angrily overreacting to American military drills in and around the Korean Peninsula.
Geopolitical calculus undergoes change with time, and China's should be no exception to this general rule. As previously stated, the trait of China's policy toward North Korea showed not only opportunistic but pragmatic characteristics as well.
As examined, a careful review on Sino-North Korean historical relations, surprisingly, shows that China regarded North Korea as "expendable" during the Korean War, even when the U.S. forces were marching toward the Yalu River in the fall of 1950, posing an imminent security threat to the newly established PRC itself.
It provides support to the view that China's policy toward North Korea was flexible, insinuating that Washington and Seoul could inspire changes within China's policy toward North Korea.
The starting point of China's policy shift on North Korea was when the disadvantages generated by North Korea exceed the advantages. In this regard, the key is how to figure out the "tipping point" where North Korea's liability to China begins to outweigh its value as an asset.
Lee Seong-hyon (sunnybbsfs@gmail.com), Ph.D., is a research fellow at the Sejong Institute.
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