By Lee Seong-hyon
President Moon Jae-in and his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping will hold a summit this week in Beijing, and North Korea will be one of the major topics for them to discuss. Here are some of China's key positions, based on recent conversations with Chinese interlocutors.
Despite North Korea's latest Hwaseong-15 ICBM launch, China still does not favor "maximum" pressure, as demanded by Washington. China only supports and recognizes resolutions passed by the U.N. Security Council, while opposing U.S. unilateral sanctions or a "secondary boycott." Beijing is particularly concerned that a complete embargo of crude oil could cause instability in the North Korean regime, and cannot agree to it.
China judges that the sanctions-only approach to North Korea by the U.S. and its allies will not be successful. Therefore, it calls for an incentive to lure Pyongyang back to dialogue. This suggests that there is a considerable cognitive gap between Beijing and Washington's current North Korea policy.
China is in a position that makes it unable to meaningfully cooperate with South Korea, the U.S. and Japan, if they stick to unilateral and tougher sanctions and only add pressure to North Korea, not providing any "way out" that can lead to dialogue and negotiations. Chinese scholars note that Russia is also in the same position on this matter.
Beijing emphasizes a new approach to Pyongyang is necessary since North Korea's nuclear and missile capabilities have been (ironically) strengthened amid continued sanctions and more severe pressure over the years. China believes North Korea's further provocations will invite more sanctions. But China is clear that additional sanctions that deviate from the U.N. mandates wont' be recognized.
Most Chinese experts view that, at this particular time, avoiding the risk of war is more important than North Korea's denuclearization. Therefore, tension-reduction measures are helpful. They also hold the view that Seoul and Washington should also make due efforts for confidence-building with Pyongyang in this regard.
Denuclearization takes a mid- and longer-term approach. China believes that the process can be started by a North Korea nuclear freeze, then North Korea-U.S. normalization, and followed by a peace-treaty on the Korean peninsula. China sees this as the most feasible solution.
Overall, Beijing continues to oscillate between its commitment to strengthen sanctions against Pyongyang on the one hand, and to appease North Korea's dissatisfaction toward it on the other. This is in part to "manage" the North's strong complaints and anger stemming from China's so-far joining strengthened sanctions on it, spearheaded by Washington. In this vein, while China is participating in sanctions against North Korea, it also provides Pyongyang with oil for airplanes. They underscore that they provide only a "limited" amount of oil _ about 60% of what North Korea demands.
Washington and Seoul demand a complete embargo of crude oil supply to Pyongyang. China argues that if it completely ceases to supply crude oil, there will be more of a backlash from the North. A cornered mouse bites the cat, goes the logic. In addition, even if China stops supplying crude oil, it argues that this will have a limited effect because Russia will continue to supply oil instead.
Seoul and Beijing are on the same page in that 1) No war should be allowed on the Korean Peninsula; and 2) The North Korean nuclear issue should be resolved peacefully in the end through negotiations. Beijing quietly appreciated President Moon's recent statement to that effect, including his conversation with President Trump.
Yet President Moon should be aware that Washington and Beijing are increasingly displaying signs of differences over how to resolve the Pyongyang nuclear issue. To recap, Beijing prefers "appropriate" pressure, not "maximum" pressure. It is concerned that "too much pressure" may either push the cornered Pyongyang to resort to more provocations, or to implode. China wants neither. Beijing increasingly believes Trump's current "sanctions only" approach to North Korea is unwise and actually ramps up regional tension to the brink of war.
Lastly, some scholars in China voice their support for tacitly "acknowledging" North Korea as a de facto nuclear weapons state, given that its nuclear capability has advanced "this far." Those who hold this view also increasingly support the notion that CVID (complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement) of North Korea's nuclear program is impossible to implement. More research is due, to find out how much currency this view has gained among China's policymakers.
Lee Seong-hyon (sunnybbsfs@gmail.com), Ph.D., is a research fellow at the Sejong Institute.
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Despite North Korea's latest Hwaseong-15 ICBM launch, China still does not favor "maximum" pressure, as demanded by Washington. China only supports and recognizes resolutions passed by the U.N. Security Council, while opposing U.S. unilateral sanctions or a "secondary boycott." Beijing is particularly concerned that a complete embargo of crude oil could cause instability in the North Korean regime, and cannot agree to it.
China judges that the sanctions-only approach to North Korea by the U.S. and its allies will not be successful. Therefore, it calls for an incentive to lure Pyongyang back to dialogue. This suggests that there is a considerable cognitive gap between Beijing and Washington's current North Korea policy.
China is in a position that makes it unable to meaningfully cooperate with South Korea, the U.S. and Japan, if they stick to unilateral and tougher sanctions and only add pressure to North Korea, not providing any "way out" that can lead to dialogue and negotiations. Chinese scholars note that Russia is also in the same position on this matter.
Beijing emphasizes a new approach to Pyongyang is necessary since North Korea's nuclear and missile capabilities have been (ironically) strengthened amid continued sanctions and more severe pressure over the years. China believes North Korea's further provocations will invite more sanctions. But China is clear that additional sanctions that deviate from the U.N. mandates wont' be recognized.
Most Chinese experts view that, at this particular time, avoiding the risk of war is more important than North Korea's denuclearization. Therefore, tension-reduction measures are helpful. They also hold the view that Seoul and Washington should also make due efforts for confidence-building with Pyongyang in this regard.
Denuclearization takes a mid- and longer-term approach. China believes that the process can be started by a North Korea nuclear freeze, then North Korea-U.S. normalization, and followed by a peace-treaty on the Korean peninsula. China sees this as the most feasible solution.
Overall, Beijing continues to oscillate between its commitment to strengthen sanctions against Pyongyang on the one hand, and to appease North Korea's dissatisfaction toward it on the other. This is in part to "manage" the North's strong complaints and anger stemming from China's so-far joining strengthened sanctions on it, spearheaded by Washington. In this vein, while China is participating in sanctions against North Korea, it also provides Pyongyang with oil for airplanes. They underscore that they provide only a "limited" amount of oil _ about 60% of what North Korea demands.
Washington and Seoul demand a complete embargo of crude oil supply to Pyongyang. China argues that if it completely ceases to supply crude oil, there will be more of a backlash from the North. A cornered mouse bites the cat, goes the logic. In addition, even if China stops supplying crude oil, it argues that this will have a limited effect because Russia will continue to supply oil instead.
Seoul and Beijing are on the same page in that 1) No war should be allowed on the Korean Peninsula; and 2) The North Korean nuclear issue should be resolved peacefully in the end through negotiations. Beijing quietly appreciated President Moon's recent statement to that effect, including his conversation with President Trump.
Yet President Moon should be aware that Washington and Beijing are increasingly displaying signs of differences over how to resolve the Pyongyang nuclear issue. To recap, Beijing prefers "appropriate" pressure, not "maximum" pressure. It is concerned that "too much pressure" may either push the cornered Pyongyang to resort to more provocations, or to implode. China wants neither. Beijing increasingly believes Trump's current "sanctions only" approach to North Korea is unwise and actually ramps up regional tension to the brink of war.
Lastly, some scholars in China voice their support for tacitly "acknowledging" North Korea as a de facto nuclear weapons state, given that its nuclear capability has advanced "this far." Those who hold this view also increasingly support the notion that CVID (complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement) of North Korea's nuclear program is impossible to implement. More research is due, to find out how much currency this view has gained among China's policymakers.
Lee Seong-hyon (sunnybbsfs@gmail.com), Ph.D., is a research fellow at the Sejong Institute.
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