By Choi Sung-jin
One of the biggest curiosities for journalists interested in diplomacy and national security has been who had the ears of President Park Geun-hye in these matters. This writer has also asked who Park's "main architect" was in foreign policy, whenever I met or interviewed experts.
Nobody knew.
Some "guessed" Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se might be the one. They could not explain, however, how come Yun was at a department store in southern Seoul to have his pants mended minutes before the government announced its decision to deploy a highly controversial U.S. missile defense system in Korea, on July 8.
Was the career diplomat so dull-nerved or was he protesting against the decision-making process from which he was sidelined?
Others suggested it might be Kim Kyu-hyeon, senior secretary to the president for foreign affairs and national security. Yet Kim reportedly has not had a single one-on-one meeting with his boss since he took office about a year ago.
Just five days before announcing the deployment of the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, Park's defense minister told the National Assembly nothing had been decided. Her unification minister had been cautious in shutting down the inter-Korean factory park at a North Korean border city but abruptly turned toward its closure. He had to notify South Korean companies operating in the Gaeseong Industrial Complex of Seoul's decision just "three hours" before the government went into action.
Nothing might be more incomprehensible than Seoul's change of position with respect to the "comfort women" negotiations with Tokyo. President Park, who had said she would not meet Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe until the latter came up with a satisfactory solution to the wartime sex slaves issue, abruptly accepted Japan's insincere, half-baked proposal ― which regressed from even Tokyo's offer in 1995 ― defying strong opposition from surviving victims. Many suspected pressure from the U.S. was behind the sudden turnaround, to reconcile its two allies to form a joint front against a resurgent China.
There is little hard evidence yet to conclude Choi Soon-sil ― Park's longtime confidant who has thrown the whole nation into turmoil with a deep-rooted, far-reaching influence-peddling scandal ― was involved in all these diplomatic about-faces. However, it is all but impossible to understand the series of diplomatic fiascos otherwise, which seemed to have come not through long debates and formal decision-making procedures but by impulsive decisions.
And some rumors seem more reliable than others, such as the connection between Linda Kim, an arms lobbyist, and Choi as well as the reported secretive contacts between Choi and the CEO of Lockheed Martin with respect to the THAAD deployment and Seoul's switch from Boeing's F15-SE to Lockheed Martin's F35-A as its next-generation fighter planes. Officials at the defense ministry and National Security Council attributed these to "political judgments" that couldn't be explained.
There was a time when gurus ― mostly right-wing professors and journalists ― said President Park was poor at internal affairs but good at foreign policy based on "principles and trust." For those who think Seoul should pursue more independent and realistic diplomacy, however, Park's foreign policy was the worst of the worst, confusing its lack of flexibility and alternatives with principle while demanding trust from counterparts without showing its own first. At the end of the day, North Korea's nuclear capability has drastically strengthened despite ― rather because of ― sanctions sans attempts at dialogue, while Japan has been able to solve one of its biggest diplomatic headaches conceding little with substance.
All these show that foreign policy might be the biggest victim of the "Choi-gate" scandal and why the governing camp's proposal to let Park engage in diplomacy and national security while leaving domestic administration to the prime minister is completely wrong.
Already, Seoul's opinions can hardly win the respect of its major partners on the diplomatic stage. If Park's domestic administration has been influenced by a shaman and sorcerer whose roots are based in a fringe religious cult, foreigners might as well distrust her foreign policy decisions. What do Japanese Premier Shinzo Abe and Chinese President Xi Jinping think of their South Korean counterpart? The three East Asian leaders started their tenures almost simultaneously in late 2012 or early 2013. Nearly four years later, Xi's China has regained much of its glory of the Middle Kingdom and Abe's Japan is reemerging, economically and militarily, while Park's South Korea is faltering under an unprecedented scandal created by the President herself.
Moreover, a new U.S. president will occupy the White House early next year and set the keynote of her or his foreign policy for the next four or eight years. It is out of the question for a vegetated president and her administration to be able to handle the situation in such a crucial year. The Japanese government has already contacted the chief foreign policy advisors to both Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump; while Seoul has still to decide who should take part in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Peru on Nov. 19 and 20. President Park won't be able to leave the country and the equally incapacitated Prime Minister Hwang Kyo-an may not be able to have bilateral meetings with the top leaders of major countries.
There are more than a dozen reasons for President Park to step down, and foreign policy should top the list.
What's happening in Korea now should be a lesson for U.S. voters who started to hit the poll when this page went to press. A U.S. conservative daily compared Park to Clinton because they are both female leaders experiencing difficulties because of secret emails. Actually, however, Park's fiasco shows what could happen when voters opt for an incompetent, ignorant and unqualified candidate because of their hatred of the other, ideologically or otherwise.
It's an ill wind that brings no good to anybody, but that's too cold a comfort for Koreans.
Choi Sung-jin is a contributing op-ed writer to The Korea Times and an adjunct professor at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies. Contact him at choisj1955@naver.com.
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Nobody knew.
Some "guessed" Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se might be the one. They could not explain, however, how come Yun was at a department store in southern Seoul to have his pants mended minutes before the government announced its decision to deploy a highly controversial U.S. missile defense system in Korea, on July 8.
Was the career diplomat so dull-nerved or was he protesting against the decision-making process from which he was sidelined?
Others suggested it might be Kim Kyu-hyeon, senior secretary to the president for foreign affairs and national security. Yet Kim reportedly has not had a single one-on-one meeting with his boss since he took office about a year ago.
Just five days before announcing the deployment of the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, Park's defense minister told the National Assembly nothing had been decided. Her unification minister had been cautious in shutting down the inter-Korean factory park at a North Korean border city but abruptly turned toward its closure. He had to notify South Korean companies operating in the Gaeseong Industrial Complex of Seoul's decision just "three hours" before the government went into action.
Nothing might be more incomprehensible than Seoul's change of position with respect to the "comfort women" negotiations with Tokyo. President Park, who had said she would not meet Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe until the latter came up with a satisfactory solution to the wartime sex slaves issue, abruptly accepted Japan's insincere, half-baked proposal ― which regressed from even Tokyo's offer in 1995 ― defying strong opposition from surviving victims. Many suspected pressure from the U.S. was behind the sudden turnaround, to reconcile its two allies to form a joint front against a resurgent China.
There is little hard evidence yet to conclude Choi Soon-sil ― Park's longtime confidant who has thrown the whole nation into turmoil with a deep-rooted, far-reaching influence-peddling scandal ― was involved in all these diplomatic about-faces. However, it is all but impossible to understand the series of diplomatic fiascos otherwise, which seemed to have come not through long debates and formal decision-making procedures but by impulsive decisions.
And some rumors seem more reliable than others, such as the connection between Linda Kim, an arms lobbyist, and Choi as well as the reported secretive contacts between Choi and the CEO of Lockheed Martin with respect to the THAAD deployment and Seoul's switch from Boeing's F15-SE to Lockheed Martin's F35-A as its next-generation fighter planes. Officials at the defense ministry and National Security Council attributed these to "political judgments" that couldn't be explained.
There was a time when gurus ― mostly right-wing professors and journalists ― said President Park was poor at internal affairs but good at foreign policy based on "principles and trust." For those who think Seoul should pursue more independent and realistic diplomacy, however, Park's foreign policy was the worst of the worst, confusing its lack of flexibility and alternatives with principle while demanding trust from counterparts without showing its own first. At the end of the day, North Korea's nuclear capability has drastically strengthened despite ― rather because of ― sanctions sans attempts at dialogue, while Japan has been able to solve one of its biggest diplomatic headaches conceding little with substance.
All these show that foreign policy might be the biggest victim of the "Choi-gate" scandal and why the governing camp's proposal to let Park engage in diplomacy and national security while leaving domestic administration to the prime minister is completely wrong.
Already, Seoul's opinions can hardly win the respect of its major partners on the diplomatic stage. If Park's domestic administration has been influenced by a shaman and sorcerer whose roots are based in a fringe religious cult, foreigners might as well distrust her foreign policy decisions. What do Japanese Premier Shinzo Abe and Chinese President Xi Jinping think of their South Korean counterpart? The three East Asian leaders started their tenures almost simultaneously in late 2012 or early 2013. Nearly four years later, Xi's China has regained much of its glory of the Middle Kingdom and Abe's Japan is reemerging, economically and militarily, while Park's South Korea is faltering under an unprecedented scandal created by the President herself.
Moreover, a new U.S. president will occupy the White House early next year and set the keynote of her or his foreign policy for the next four or eight years. It is out of the question for a vegetated president and her administration to be able to handle the situation in such a crucial year. The Japanese government has already contacted the chief foreign policy advisors to both Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump; while Seoul has still to decide who should take part in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Peru on Nov. 19 and 20. President Park won't be able to leave the country and the equally incapacitated Prime Minister Hwang Kyo-an may not be able to have bilateral meetings with the top leaders of major countries.
There are more than a dozen reasons for President Park to step down, and foreign policy should top the list.
What's happening in Korea now should be a lesson for U.S. voters who started to hit the poll when this page went to press. A U.S. conservative daily compared Park to Clinton because they are both female leaders experiencing difficulties because of secret emails. Actually, however, Park's fiasco shows what could happen when voters opt for an incompetent, ignorant and unqualified candidate because of their hatred of the other, ideologically or otherwise.
It's an ill wind that brings no good to anybody, but that's too cold a comfort for Koreans.
Choi Sung-jin is a contributing op-ed writer to The Korea Times and an adjunct professor at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies. Contact him at choisj1955@naver.com.
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