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This is premature. While the dispersal of conflict clouds is excellent news for all, unification is not.
North Korea would not want to be swallowed whole by the South. And given the size of its population (half that of the South's) and its economy (around one fortieth the size of the South's) the chance of the North devouring the South looks impossible.
While the prospects of a Southern-led reunification look excellent, long term, over the short term, they are staggeringly expensive. As North Korea expert Andrei Lankov recently noted: For currently working South Koreans, the financial demands of reunification would require this generation to work South Korean hours, for Bangladeshi wages, while paying Swedish taxes.
In sum: North Korea needs to globalize, normalize and economically upgrade before a reunification process begins.
China would resist Southern-led reunification. While some in Beijing have called for a pivot away from its troublesome ally, the strategic criticality of North Korea ― a buffer state separating China from democratic southerners and U.S. troops ― remains.
Likewise Russia, a nation engaged in strategic competition with the United States, sees the value of North Korea, a state which counterbalances American influence regionally.
Japan might like North Korean to evaporate ― but would it welcome South Korea beefing up with an additional 25 million citizens and massive military forces? Given the refusal of Seoul to consider any alliance with Tokyo, and given the regular diplomatic beatings Tokyo receives from Seoul, Japan may well look askance at reunification
The only winner would be the United States, which could expand its influence while maintaining its strategic foothold on the peninsula and enjoying expanded markets for its brands.
Still, the region would not favor reunification ― which, anyway, is hardly likely at present. But a peninsula peace regime looks attainable, and would win support across the region.
A peace treaty would be hugely symbolic, but would change nothing substantive: There would still be two Koreas, two armies, and a border between them. A peace regime, on the other hand, would provide major boons.
If both Koreas renounce their claims to each other in their respective constitutions ― and in North Korea's case, in educational and propaganda materials ― the likelihood of military clashes and Korea War II plummet. Both Koreas could cut military numbers and spending.
And peace is essential for trust. Trust would permit cross-border movements of people and commerce, and the formation of the first inter-Korean networks.
It could also permit the shipment of products through North Korea ― natural gas and electricity from Siberia to South Korea ― and rail links that would speed South Koreans into Eurasia. South Korea would cease to be a political island; North Korea would earn trans-shipment fees.
China would gain increased stability on its northeastern frontier, and might upgrade investments in North Korea. Likewise, Russia would gain a more secure border. Both countries could cooperate with both Koreas on commercial and infrastructure projects on the trilateral border.
Japan could relax its military posture, and start talking with North Korea opening diplomatic relations ― which could possibly result in massive financial injections into North Korea on the model of the loans and colonial-era reparations Tokyo made to Seoul in 1965 ― which provided much of the capital for the "Economic Miracle."
Finally, Washington could pull some troops from Korea, cutting costs. However, it would not need to rewrites its mutual defense treaty with Seoul: That document focuses on overall mutual defense; North Korea is not mentioned in the treaty.
Hopefully, all parties will concentrate their energies on possibilities that are feasible and to the benefit of many ― a peace regime ― rather than on a distant dream which is in the interests of few ― reunification.