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Certainly, the cycle has shifted from the soaring tensions of last year, with Kim moving positively on various fronts.
He has courted Seoul after sending his blessings to the Olympics. He has announced (and stood by) a missile and nuclear test moratorium. He has not uttered a squeak about the South Korea-U.S. military drills. The former hermit has traveled to China to meet Xi Jinping, and will soon meet Moon Jae-in and the Donald Trump.
What is going on in the Kimdom's command bunker? I have a suspicion that, after last year's edgy brinksmanship, Kim's sister, Yo-jong has her brother's ear.
She ― it is alleged ― was Kim Jong-il's original choice to wear the crown after his own passing. He only chose to seat Kim Jong-un on the throne when he realized how hostile the international situation had become. This suggests she favors a gentler, more diplomatic approach to foreign relations than her blustering brother.
But even if she is not part of the equation, there are two possibilities, two extremes that might explain Kim's current maneuvers.
He could be acting out of comfort: He owns a well-stocked nuclear arsenal, and most of the components of an ICBM deterrent. That puts him in a decent position to bargain.
Or, he could be acting out of fear: Fear that the United States might actually attack. And/or fear that, with sanctions biting, his foreign exchange reserves will evaporate by year end and he will no longer be able to buy the loyalty of the elite.
Let's add two more extremes to our discussion. While the potentialities of the current situation are massive, so, too, are the risks.
I think we can rest assured that the Moon-Kim summit will pass without catastrophe. In fact, I'll bet it will go swimmingly. Far more critical is the Trump-Kim summit. If Trump is not convinced of Kim's good faith, that could spell the end game for diplomacy.
For Kim, failure raises fearful possibilities. What will Washington do next? More sanctions? More marshalling of the international community against him? Or, an attack that ― like on Bashir Assad ― his forces are unable to counter or respond do?
But hold on. What would be the point of a limited strike? Yes, Kim is a dictator. But we in the free world no longer live in the era of the Tony Blair Doctrine, when the Western democracies took on the burden of eradicating dictatorships. That dream died a bloody death in Iraq. A strike is very different than an invasion, an overthrow. If we lack the fortitude to go all the way (and we do), we need to find a modus vivendi with Kim.
And right now, in terms of trans-Pacific leadership, we have a better chance of dealing with this situation than in the last two decades: the key moving parts are all in synch.
Firstly, both the South Korean and U.S. leaders are early in their terms. This means that they have time to get a process underway, to nurture it, to own it. Contrast this with Roh Moo-hyun's summit with Kim Jong-il: It was promising, but came at the end of his term, and was not followed up by Lee Myung-bak.
Secondly, both Moon and Trump appear to be on the same page. That, alas, could not be said for Kim Dae-jung and George Bush in their approach to the North.
There is of course, a risk in holding separate summits. What if the Kim-Moon summit goes well, the Kim-Trump summit badly? Then, wouldn't Kim have successfully rammed a wedge between the allies? Perhaps. But even Moon is already raising the possibility of a later, trilateral summit.
So, the upcoming summits deserve support, not the kind of cynicism that becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. Various stars have aligned. The summits push this long-simmering crisis to the top of the political ladder.
If they fail, there is nowhere left to go; the last likelihood of a positive outcome will have fizzled. At best, that would mean a return to the high-tension status quo of last year. At worst? Well…
Andrew Salmon (andrewcsalmon@yahoo.co.uk) is a Seoul-based reporter and author.