By Andrew Salmon
So: A sitting U.S. leader will meet a sitting North Korean leader for the first time, ever. The promise is colossal; so is the risk. Regardless of how cynical you are about the end result, the summit alone will, if it happens (as seems likely), be a historic diplomatic landmark.
Who deserves the credit for planting this milestone?
The obvious answer is South Korean President Moon Jae-in. Since assuming office in May 2017, he has consistently held out for engagement with North Korea, even while aligning himself with his key ally, U.S. President Donald Trump, to apply "maximum pressure" to North Korea, both in deploying strategic U.S. assets in war games and applying sanctions.
He has also managed to convince Washington ― quite a feat ― to tone down the belligerence during what he has dubbed (with considerable justification, we can say in retrospect) "The Peace Olympics." On the sidelines, he has created good vibes with senior North Koreans, without offering to postpone spring military exercises. In short, Moon has wielded a stick while offering a carrot, rather than relying exclusively on either. This is adroit.
Then there is Chinese President Xi Jinping. Beijing has customarily paid lip service to sanctions at the U.N. Security Council, while looking the other way as trucks cross the North Korean border in both directions. While Xi may not have gone as far as Washington would like, he has gone further than before, upping Chinese pressure on North Korea to the point where ― by most accounts ― sanctions are finally biting.
But if Moon set the scene, and Xi aided and abetted, the key players are Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un.
While Kim deserves some acclaim for his New Year's declaration, he may not have been the initiator of recent North-South interactions. There are credible rumors of behind-the-scenes meetings taking place between Gangwon Governor Choi Moon-soon and senior North Korean officials in China last year.
Still; Why would the head of one of the world's most hideous dictatorship, be willing to talk now? Possibly because he is facing unprecedented external pressures, and China is turning its back. Possibly he is truly alarmed by Trump's war talk.
Possibly, he sees the opportunity for Moon to play the mediator. Possibly ― as he stated after his last intercontinental ballistic missile test ― his strategic arms programs are now formidable enough that he is confident enough to talk, and perhaps even away a few components.
Whatever his reasoning ― it could be a combination of the above, or something else entirely ― he deserves (and I say this grudgingly) credit for offering talks, and the necessary preconditions, to Trump.
Should we ― as Moon and his officials have done ― applaud Trump? It is unclear if Moon's men actually believe this or are feeding his voracious ego, but Trump may offer a bigger chance of resolving the North Korean crisis than his two predecessors. He is neither ideological nor diplomatic, but pre-negotiation, has presented the broadest spectrum of options. He has said repeatedly he is willing to blow Kim to kingdom come ― or sit down and chat. Neither Bush nor Obama seemed willing to venture far in either direction.
In fact, Trump has been pushing for negotiations with North Korea since 1999. Meanwhile, the fact that North Korean officials have been sounding out foreign officials on Trump suggests that Pyongyang is alarmed by Trump's un-presidential threats, uncertain if they are real or bluff.
But this game is not just about credit. Discredit, and the approbation of posterity, could besmirch Kim or Trump's legacy if either is held responsible for the summit's failure.
Few capitals share as much mutual mistrust as Pyongyang and Washington. What happens if the key players fail to get along? If the Americans demand denuclearization as a starting condition rather than an end result? If the North Koreans pull a fast one?
These are fearful thoughts. If the leaders fail, what can their subordinates realistically achieve?
Let us hope both participants sense the weight of history on their shoulders, for they and their interpreters will not be alone in the negotiating chamber. Unseen in the shadows, but as present as any participant, will be the Man with the Scythe. If the summit bears no fruit, he may anticipate a bountiful harvest.
Andrew Salmon (andrewcsalmon@yahoo.co.uk) is a Seoul-based reporter and author.
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Who deserves the credit for planting this milestone?
The obvious answer is South Korean President Moon Jae-in. Since assuming office in May 2017, he has consistently held out for engagement with North Korea, even while aligning himself with his key ally, U.S. President Donald Trump, to apply "maximum pressure" to North Korea, both in deploying strategic U.S. assets in war games and applying sanctions.
He has also managed to convince Washington ― quite a feat ― to tone down the belligerence during what he has dubbed (with considerable justification, we can say in retrospect) "The Peace Olympics." On the sidelines, he has created good vibes with senior North Koreans, without offering to postpone spring military exercises. In short, Moon has wielded a stick while offering a carrot, rather than relying exclusively on either. This is adroit.
Then there is Chinese President Xi Jinping. Beijing has customarily paid lip service to sanctions at the U.N. Security Council, while looking the other way as trucks cross the North Korean border in both directions. While Xi may not have gone as far as Washington would like, he has gone further than before, upping Chinese pressure on North Korea to the point where ― by most accounts ― sanctions are finally biting.
But if Moon set the scene, and Xi aided and abetted, the key players are Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un.
While Kim deserves some acclaim for his New Year's declaration, he may not have been the initiator of recent North-South interactions. There are credible rumors of behind-the-scenes meetings taking place between Gangwon Governor Choi Moon-soon and senior North Korean officials in China last year.
Still; Why would the head of one of the world's most hideous dictatorship, be willing to talk now? Possibly because he is facing unprecedented external pressures, and China is turning its back. Possibly he is truly alarmed by Trump's war talk.
Possibly, he sees the opportunity for Moon to play the mediator. Possibly ― as he stated after his last intercontinental ballistic missile test ― his strategic arms programs are now formidable enough that he is confident enough to talk, and perhaps even away a few components.
Whatever his reasoning ― it could be a combination of the above, or something else entirely ― he deserves (and I say this grudgingly) credit for offering talks, and the necessary preconditions, to Trump.
Should we ― as Moon and his officials have done ― applaud Trump? It is unclear if Moon's men actually believe this or are feeding his voracious ego, but Trump may offer a bigger chance of resolving the North Korean crisis than his two predecessors. He is neither ideological nor diplomatic, but pre-negotiation, has presented the broadest spectrum of options. He has said repeatedly he is willing to blow Kim to kingdom come ― or sit down and chat. Neither Bush nor Obama seemed willing to venture far in either direction.
In fact, Trump has been pushing for negotiations with North Korea since 1999. Meanwhile, the fact that North Korean officials have been sounding out foreign officials on Trump suggests that Pyongyang is alarmed by Trump's un-presidential threats, uncertain if they are real or bluff.
But this game is not just about credit. Discredit, and the approbation of posterity, could besmirch Kim or Trump's legacy if either is held responsible for the summit's failure.
Few capitals share as much mutual mistrust as Pyongyang and Washington. What happens if the key players fail to get along? If the Americans demand denuclearization as a starting condition rather than an end result? If the North Koreans pull a fast one?
These are fearful thoughts. If the leaders fail, what can their subordinates realistically achieve?
Let us hope both participants sense the weight of history on their shoulders, for they and their interpreters will not be alone in the negotiating chamber. Unseen in the shadows, but as present as any participant, will be the Man with the Scythe. If the summit bears no fruit, he may anticipate a bountiful harvest.
Andrew Salmon (andrewcsalmon@yahoo.co.uk) is a Seoul-based reporter and author.
