By Andrew Salmon
In recent weeks, several editorials by South Koreans have appeared in U.S. media. Their overall thrust is South Koreans' fear of U.S. President Donald Trump's unpredictability; of possible American military action on the peninsula; and of resultant devastation. Doubtless, these articles reflect a legitimate body of South Korean opinion. And they make an important case against war.
Absent from these pieces is mention of North Korea's vileness ― its lethally self-centric hereditary dictatorship; its massive restrictions on individual freedoms; its hideous human rights abuses; its frequent bouts of military aggression against South Korea; its defiance of international norms. Instead, the writers stress the risk that the United States ― the strongest ally this country has had during its national existence - poses to South Korea.
I have issues with these pieces. Firstly: I don't think the current situation merits hysteria. More importantly: In stating South Korean fears and overlooking North Korea evil, the writers lose sight of clear moral imperatives. Most glaringly: In terms of real politick, they overlook U.S. rights to self-defence.
Since the 1953 Korean War armistice, it has been South Korea which has lived under threat of North Korea, not America. Given this, it made sound sense for Washington to defer to Seoul. And America ― a nation frequently criticized for implementing aggressive foreign policies ― has acted with remarkable (and perhaps mistaken) restraint on the peninsula.
Among other incidents, the U.S. has declined to retaliate with military force even when North Korea shot down a spy plane; seized the USS Pueblo; and hacked two officers to death at Panmunjeom.
Now, however, the broad strategic dynamic ― that it is South Korea, not America, which is threatened - is shifting. North Korea is investing scarce resources in nuclear weapons, which are a potential threat to South Korea, Japan and possibly even China. But it is also investing massively in intercontinental ballistic missiles. These missiles are over-engineered for regional targets; they are aimed at America. In other words, the United States is now in the crosshairs.
This shift has profound implications.
I do not believe that the present situation merits a strike by U.S. forces. Nor, in my opinion, does North Korea's possession of a full atomic weapons package (i.e. nuclear warheads and the missiles to deliver them to the US mainland) constitute a causus belli.
However, the situation is dynamic. Things may change. North Korea could become an actual, rather than a potential, danger to the United States. In that situation, the US president would be remiss if he did not put America first.
That would present Seoul with searing choices. Does it stand with its alliance partner? Or does it withdraw support from Washington in hopes that Pyongyang does not retaliate against its own soil?
Given that a clear and present danger to the United States does not (in my opinion), exist at this time, the biggest danger for US policy is falling into North Korea's trap. How might this happen?
Among analysts there are, broadly, two opinions about North Korea's nuclear strategy. One holds that it is designed to deter American attack. The other holds that it is designed to force the United States off the Korean peninsula.
If the U.S. strikes and North Korea retaliates, we are in the nightmare scenario ― a spiral of escalation that could go nuclear. If the US strikes and North Korea does not retaliate, the second strategy may become reality. Both Koreas would have common ground in deploring and opposing the U.S. action. Such a situation could create a crack in the alliance ― possibly, even invalidate it.
In both cases ― a retaliatory spiral or a crippled alliance - we would be in dangerously uncharted territory.
So, absent any imminent threat to the United States, we must hope that Washington keeps doing what it has done for over half a century: Maintains a cool head, while containing and deterring Pyongyang.
Equally, we must hope that Seoul maintains a strong nerve, understands Washington's concerns - and makes very clear, via policy, who its real friends are.
Addressing that last point, some might respond: "North Koreans are blood relatives." Perhaps. But you can't choose family; you can choose friends.
Andrew Salmon (andrewcsalmon@yahoo.co.uk) is a Seoul-based reporter and author.
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Absent from these pieces is mention of North Korea's vileness ― its lethally self-centric hereditary dictatorship; its massive restrictions on individual freedoms; its hideous human rights abuses; its frequent bouts of military aggression against South Korea; its defiance of international norms. Instead, the writers stress the risk that the United States ― the strongest ally this country has had during its national existence - poses to South Korea.
I have issues with these pieces. Firstly: I don't think the current situation merits hysteria. More importantly: In stating South Korean fears and overlooking North Korea evil, the writers lose sight of clear moral imperatives. Most glaringly: In terms of real politick, they overlook U.S. rights to self-defence.
Since the 1953 Korean War armistice, it has been South Korea which has lived under threat of North Korea, not America. Given this, it made sound sense for Washington to defer to Seoul. And America ― a nation frequently criticized for implementing aggressive foreign policies ― has acted with remarkable (and perhaps mistaken) restraint on the peninsula.
Among other incidents, the U.S. has declined to retaliate with military force even when North Korea shot down a spy plane; seized the USS Pueblo; and hacked two officers to death at Panmunjeom.
Now, however, the broad strategic dynamic ― that it is South Korea, not America, which is threatened - is shifting. North Korea is investing scarce resources in nuclear weapons, which are a potential threat to South Korea, Japan and possibly even China. But it is also investing massively in intercontinental ballistic missiles. These missiles are over-engineered for regional targets; they are aimed at America. In other words, the United States is now in the crosshairs.
This shift has profound implications.
I do not believe that the present situation merits a strike by U.S. forces. Nor, in my opinion, does North Korea's possession of a full atomic weapons package (i.e. nuclear warheads and the missiles to deliver them to the US mainland) constitute a causus belli.
However, the situation is dynamic. Things may change. North Korea could become an actual, rather than a potential, danger to the United States. In that situation, the US president would be remiss if he did not put America first.
That would present Seoul with searing choices. Does it stand with its alliance partner? Or does it withdraw support from Washington in hopes that Pyongyang does not retaliate against its own soil?
Given that a clear and present danger to the United States does not (in my opinion), exist at this time, the biggest danger for US policy is falling into North Korea's trap. How might this happen?
Among analysts there are, broadly, two opinions about North Korea's nuclear strategy. One holds that it is designed to deter American attack. The other holds that it is designed to force the United States off the Korean peninsula.
If the U.S. strikes and North Korea retaliates, we are in the nightmare scenario ― a spiral of escalation that could go nuclear. If the US strikes and North Korea does not retaliate, the second strategy may become reality. Both Koreas would have common ground in deploring and opposing the U.S. action. Such a situation could create a crack in the alliance ― possibly, even invalidate it.
In both cases ― a retaliatory spiral or a crippled alliance - we would be in dangerously uncharted territory.
So, absent any imminent threat to the United States, we must hope that Washington keeps doing what it has done for over half a century: Maintains a cool head, while containing and deterring Pyongyang.
Equally, we must hope that Seoul maintains a strong nerve, understands Washington's concerns - and makes very clear, via policy, who its real friends are.
Addressing that last point, some might respond: "North Koreans are blood relatives." Perhaps. But you can't choose family; you can choose friends.
Andrew Salmon (andrewcsalmon@yahoo.co.uk) is a Seoul-based reporter and author.
