Why China won't push NK

By Andrew Salmon

Here we go again: Another "North Korean nuclear crisis" (snore). Having been reporting these since the first Nork nuke test in 2006, a drearily predictable pattern soon becomes apparent.

First, Pyongyang makes a big bang. Then, the pattern rolls into action. Global news headlines blare about "rising tensions." The "international community" feverishly consults, wags its finger and storms into the U.N. Security Council in a huff. Tables are thumped. More "targeted sanctions" are announced.

Pundits warn of "no good options," before asking, "Why is Beijing not leaning on Pyongyang?"

That last question deserves a response. After all, 21st century China is a civilized nation, a place we all do business with. A member of the UNSC, the G20 and the WTO, China is plugged deeply into global diplomacy and economics. It benefits from a stable trade/business environment. So why does Beijing put up with Pyongyang's risky shenanigans?

Let's remove our rose-tinted spectacles.

China has two key reasons to keep North Korea alive and kicking. It just does not necessarily make them public ― preferring instead, to either place the blame on outside forces, or to pretend that it possesses no leverage.

Both reasons are geostrategic. One is historical; one is contemporary.

First, let's examine history. For centuries, the barbarian-infested region to the northeast of the Middle Kingdom was fraught with peril. For evidence, look at the start point of the Great Wall of China, the world's mightiest manmade fortification: It lies just outside the city of Dandong, across the Yalu River from North Korea's Sinuiju. The last invaders to conquer China were the Manchus (from ― you guessed it! ― Manchuria), the founders of the Qing Dynasty.

South of Manchuria, Korea was the land bridge enabling the "devils across the East Sea" to punch into China. Hideyoshi's samurai stormed up the peninsula in the 1590s; the first Sino- Japanese War was fought over Korea; and Hirohito's legions used Korea as the jumping-off point for their 1931 seizure of Manchuria and their devastating 1937 invasion of China.

In late 1950, with Stalin having abandoned Kim Il-sung and U.N. forces advancing toward the Sino-Korea border, Mao unleashed his "human wave." Beijing's intervention rescued Kim Il-sung and underwrote the existence of the North Korean state. This is often overlooked. In the days before China became the "workshop of the world," it was in Korea that the erstwhile "sick man of Asia," became the "waking dragon."

With Manchuria now part of China proper, North Korea provides China with a convenient buffer state against South Korea and Japan.

The above is history. But isn't 21st century China an economic, rather than a military superpower these days? And doesn't it do more trade with South than North Korea?

Yes. But today's China is still engaged in strategic competition across Asia. In Northeast Asia, South Korea and Japan are staunch US allies, replete with bases and resident GIs, while Taiwan remains a "renegade province." In Southeast Asia, Beijing's maneuvers in the South China Sea are pushing states such as Vietnam and the Philippines closer toward the orbit of U.S. interests.

So across East Asia, Beijing boasts few allies. The one it does have is a fiery rogue, one of the few nations that routinely defies Washington. Regardless of Beijing's public statements, there is obviously a Chinese constituency that is quietly happy to see its feisty ally rattling its saber.

These historical and current geostrategic imperatives trump any collateral damage that support for Pyongyang does to Beijing's international image or diplomatic profile. More critically, China has suffered no economic fallout from supporting North Korea.

Some argue that China dares not apply pressure for fear of sparking a Pyongyang regime implosion. Nonsense. China is North Korea's largest aid donor and trading partner. It is heavily invested in North Korean natural resources, infrastructure and trade. This grants it multiple levers.

Beijing could calibrate leverage ― enough to cause Pyongyang discomfort ― as it did in 2003, halting fuel shipments to prod North Korea toward the six-party talks. Since then, Beijing has declined to apply pressure.

International diplomats should mull this, and also accept that without China fully on board, international sanctions face massive leakage.

All Japanese, South Korean, U.S. and Western European strategies to halt North Korea's strategic arms programs have failed. Pyongyang is determined to possess nuclear warheads and delivery devices. Endless wishful thinking about "regime collapse" is nixed by China's ongoing support.

China is playing a longer-term game, and has a wider focus on North Korea, than the international community, which narrowly concentrates on missiles and fissile materials.

If we want change in North Korea, it is time for a big rethink ― a rethink that frankly and realistically assesses China's priorities and position.

Andrew Salmon is a Seoul-based reporter and author. Reach him at andrewcsalmon@yahoo.co.uk.