Comfort women, uncomfortable issues

By Andrew Salmon

So, Shinzo Abe has finally done it.

To most of Korea, the Japanese prime minister ― considered an ultra-nationalistic historical revisionist here ― is more despised than Kim Jong-un. But, in the dying days of 2015, Abe did exactly what Koreans have long demanded: He apologized and offered governmental compensation to the Korean ex-comfort women.

It was unequivocal. Abe's statement of "sincere apologies and remorse" was carried by global media, as was his foreign minister's admission of "the involvement of the military authorities of the day" in comfort stations and his statement, "the government of Japan painfully acknowledges its responsibility."

A related agreement reached between Seoul and Tokyo, designed to heal a long-festering sore that has infected bilateral relations across the board, includes official compensation to be paid by Japan to South Korea.

The surprise deal ― the fruit of back-breaking diplomatic labor ― was applauded by Washington and U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon.

Post-apology, the best thing Tokyo can do is swiftly cough up the promised cash. To make payment conditional upon the removal of a comfort woman statue outside the Japanese Embassy ― which some reports suggest is Tokyo's policy ― looks (at best) petty. Japanese diplomats know there is far too much public emotion currently invested for that statue to be removed by any Korean politician.

Speedy delivery of compensation would also demonstrate good faith ― after which one might assume that this thorny problem would finally be overcome.

Alas, some ex-comfort women and the vocal NGOs supporting them are vehemently denouncing the deal ― and not for the first time.

Tokyo made occupation-era reparations in 1965 the price of diplomatic normalization by paying $800 million in grants and soft loans to Seoul ― which used them to kick-start the "economic miracle" rather than to compensate victims. Even so: With hindsight, I suspect most Koreans would consider that money well spent.

When the comfort women issue rose to prominence in the early 1990s, it was clear that the 1965 agreement had not covered them; another mechanism was required. So Tokyo ― having already made official governmental reparations ― collected private money and established the Asian Women's Fund to compensate the ex-comfort women.

However, when seven Korean ex-comfort women accepted this money ― which was accompanied by a letter of apology from the Japanese prime minister ― they were harshly criticized by civic groups and media. Subsequently, they were denied Korean government handouts.

This undermined Tokyo's effort by effectively preventing other ex-comfort women in Korea from accepting the funds. (At least in public; one expert claims that 60 additional Korean ex-comfort women did take the compensation and apology, but quietly.)

The civic groups' grounds for opposition were that the money did not come from Tokyo's "official" purse ― albeit this argument overlooked the fact that the Japanese government administered the fund, and disingenuously ignored the personally signed letters of apology to the victims from the prime minister.

In this context, arch-conservative Abe's apology (not the first delivered by a senior Japanese official) and the offer of official compensation looked tailor-made to dissolve the problems that bedeviled the Asian Women's Fund.

In fact, it has done neither. While Seoul desperately tries to sell the deal to the public and the media sits on the fence, the Opposition is (inevitably) opposed. More seriously, NGOs and some ex-comfort women are furious, saying they were not consulted and that Abe's apology does not constitute "legal responsibility."

This raises an uncomfortable question. After so many apologies from so many Tokyo officials, and after differing formats of compensation, can these aggrieved parties ever be satisfied?

Perhaps not. But if they refuse to accept anything less than their own extensive demands ― which cover certain issues over which even expert historians hold different opinions ― then, as non-governmental actors, the NGOs and ex-comfort women have every right to continue protests; Korea is a democracy. But they need to consider the risk that their efforts to sabotage this deal could cost them support in the court of international public opinion.

Meanwhile, even if the Seoul-Tokyo agreement ends inter-governmental disputes on the issue, it does not prevent historians and civic society from continued research, discussion and debate.

Indeed, in Seoul, a Korean professor is facing trial for defaming comfort women in her book. This trial will place before the public certain under-reported (and possibly suppressed) facts, and may even add nuance to the simplified but highly emotive conventional wisdom that currently defines the issue.

Regardless, this was a deal reached between two governments. (Hence, does not cover comfort women in Japan, China, North Korea or Southeast Asia). The time has now come for Seoul and Tokyo to unshackle policy from debates better left to historians, and move forward on a broad range of political, strategic and economic issues.

Andrew Salmon is a Seoul-based reporter and author. Reach him at andrewcsalmon@yahoo.co.uk.