Dissecting Kim's war declaration

By Andrew Salmon

So it's come to this. Stunned newspaper readers worldwide learned on Saturday that Pyongyang had entered "a state of war" with Seoul. War!

Ho hum. The peninsula has been in this very state since June 25, 1950 when North Korea invaded South Korea: The 1953 armistice that halted the carnage was never upgraded to a peace treaty. Moreover, in March, North Korea unilaterally nullified the armistice. (Not for the first time.)

Still, it is worth dissecting some key points in the North's statement, particularly those referring to the Korean People's Army (KPA), for disinformation regarding its capabilities is rampant.

"Marshal Kim Jong-un, brilliant commander of Mt. Baekdu …"

"Brilliant commander?" That's rich, given that Kim's military experience – judging by his physique ― has not even encompassed basic infantry training.

"The important decision…is the declaration of a do-or-die battle…"

This is more on-target, the key point being the "or" clause. It indicates a nation conceding the possibility of death ― and we have seen this before.

No country in history fought as many "to-the-death" stands as did the militaristic Japan of the 1940s. And the nation which most closely resembles 1940s Japan today ― with its god-like ruling family, its "military-first" policy, its ultra-nationalist ideology and its frantic paranoia ― is none other than North Korea.

"The heroic service personnel… are full of surging anger…"

"Heroic" may be overdoing it, but there is a tendency among armchair generals worldwide to dismiss the 1.1 million-strong KPA as a rusty sword that would shatter immediately battle commences. Such thinking seems based on the implosion of Saddam Hussein's war machine, or on a wider belief that soldiers don't fight bravely for dictators.

This is piffle. The biggest, bloodiest conflict in history, fought with ferocious determination on both sides, was the 1941-45 Soviet-German conflict ― a conflict between two nations led by dictators.

All Korean combat experience since 1953 ― notably commando attacks and naval clashes ― suggests that the KPA is motivated, skilled and ruthless.

"If the U.S. and the South Korean puppet group perpetrate a military provocation for igniting a war… it will not be limited to a local war, but develop into an all-out war, a nuclear war."

This is worrisome. Few pundits expect the KPA to launch a June 1950-style offensive, but one scenario for a big war is a sequence of tit-for-tat retaliations spiraling out of control. This increases the possibility of a small action (or even mistake) igniting the peninsula's nuclear powder keg.

"The first strike of the revolutionary armed forces …will blow up the U.S. bases for aggression in its mainland and in the Pacific operational theatres including Hawaii and Guam and reduce not only its military bases in south Korea but the puppets' ruling institutions including Cheong Wa Dae… to ashes."

Cheong Wa Dae lies within range of even short-range missiles, but the wider "Pacific" threat has been laughed off, given the perceived shortcomings bedeviling KPA missile forces, such as range, reliability, accuracy and their apparent lack of nuclear warheads.

But missiles are not the only delivery system for atomic devices, and North Korea's strongest capabilities are asymmetric. A submarine loaded with fissile materials and a detonating device, dispatched on a kamikaze mission to ― say ― Okinawa is frighteningly feasible.

"This war will not be a three day-war but it will be a blitz war through which the KPA will occupy all areas of south Korea…and a three-dimensional war to be fought in the air, land and seas and on the front line and in the rear."

"Three-day war" refers to the time window strategic planners give the KPA to storm across the DMZ, thunder down the Munsan and Uijiongbu corridors and break into Seoul, thereby gaining a negotiating position, before the US can marshal its full strength for a major counterblow.

The references to "blitz war" and boasts of KPA aerial and maritime capabilities are reassuring. They hark back to 1950 and indicate ignorance of massive upgrades to U.S. air power, notably its precision and round-the-clock strike capabilities.

While the KPA's dug-in artillery would be a tough nut, and its 60,000 commandos are formidable, its mass of maneuver ― its infantry and armor, much of which is decrepit ― would be highly vulnerable to US and South Korean air power, and also marine and airborne envelopment on this mountainous peninsula.

Given all the above, I am not clenching my buttocks too tightly. And if Kim plans war, he is not going to diplomatically announce it in advance, any more than his grandfather did in 1950.

Still, there is too much underplaying of the KPA threat, particularly by pundits who focus only on nuclear missile capabilities. The KPA constitutes a formidable force ― one we underestimate at our peril.

Andrew Salmon is a Seoul-based reporter and author. Reach him at andrewcsalmon@yahoo.co.uk.