Impact of Kim's China visit on Peninsula

By Andrew Hammond

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un visited Beijing this week in his first foreign visit since taking power in 2011. The trip, which was certainly related to recent developments surrounding the Korean peace process, came at a time when Beijing has increasingly supported international sanctions against Pyongyang.

The strain that has been put on relations between the two longstanding allies was underlined when President Xi Jinping described North Korea's long series of recent military provocations as a threat to his country's national security. Kim will hope his visit will have been a turning point given that this is not just his first trip to China, but also his only chance to date to see Xi face-to-face.

For China too, the visit is a potential boon given that Xi will not be in any of the forthcoming meetings between Kim and South Korean President Moon Jae-in in April, nor the planned summit with Donald Trump in May.

For Beijing, Kim's brief visit therefore reinforces its role as a key player in the grand diplomatic game that is now being played out, and Xi will be keen to have a stronger sense of what Kim expects or is seeking in his big, forthcoming meetings, especially with Trump.

Kim's visit is only the latest sign of moving geopolitical plates over the Korean standoff. Following spiraling tensions on the peninsula in 2017 over the North's nuclear weapons and missile programs, 2018 has brought unexpected, and what could yet prove remarkable diplomatic respite that has seen a mini-rapprochement between the North and the South.

Kim's trip to Beijing is only the latest sign that change is in the air and that the diplomatic mood music on the peninsula this year could become very different from last year. By ramping up the sanctions and wider diplomatic pressure on Pyongyang, Xi has played a major role in creating this window of opportunity.

Traditionally, Beijing has been reluctant to take too sweeping measures against its Communist neighbor for fear about squeezing North Korea so hard that it becomes significantly destabilized. Despite the annoyance that Xi has had with Kim, from his vantage point undercutting Pyongyang too much risks the youthful leader there behaving even more unpredictably, and/or the outside possibility of the implosion of the regime.

Xi believes that this is probably not in Chinese interests for at least two reasons. Firstly, if the Communist regime in the North falls, it could undermine the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party too. In addition, he fears that the collapse of order in its neighbor could lead to instability on the North Korea-China border, a potentially large influx of refugees that it would need to manage, and ultimately the potential emergence of a pro-U.S. successor state.

It is for these reasons, and several more, that Xi will have been keen to learn more about what Kim's diplomatic negotiating game will now be with Seoul and Washington. The Chinese leader has welcomed the "positive things unfolding" between North and South Korea in recent weeks and hopes they will prove significant and sustained.

Yet, he will be aware of the downside risks as well as the opportunities that are now in play, especially with the Trump team. Xi will be well aware that 2018 could yet see tensions rise again on the peninsula.

At the end of 2017, the apparently gathering storm between the United States and North Korea was showcased by the latter's test firing in late November of an intercontinental missile (ICBM) which was more powerful and flew higher than any yet by Pyongyang. The launch, condemned by Trump who said he "would take care of the situation," seemingly intensified the U.S. president's headache over how best to tackle Pyongyang's provocations.

While Trump has, unexpectedly, agreed to meet Kim, he has previously said "that talk of appeasement with North Korea will not work, they only understand one thing!" This commentary reflects not just the volatility of Trump, but also the political pressure he is under on this issue having drawn a "red line" on it previously.

He will be well aware that Pyongyang is moving closer to developing a nuclear warhead capable of being fitted onto an intercontinental ballistic missile that can strike the U.S. mainland. The late November missile test, for instance, reached some 4,500 kilometers high and landed around 1,000 kilometers from the west coast of Japan.

Strikingly, the U.S. Union of Concerned Scientists has calculated that if the missile had flown on a standard trajectory rather than a lofted one, it would have had a range of 13,000 kilometers which is enough to strike Europe, Australia, or any part of the continental United States.

As Xi and Kim will likely discuss, while Trump has agreed to a meeting, he is keeping all options on the table. Washington's next steps will depend partly on the outcome on the mini-North-South rapprochement, but the two-decade-long U.S. policy of "strategic patience" towards Pyongyang is now over as indicated last year by Trump's "fire and fury" and "locked and loaded" rhetoric.

Taken overall, Kim's visit to China underlines that the geopolitical plates are moving on the Korean Peninsula. While change is in the air, Xi will have warned Kim to show prudence given downside risks that the North-South dialogue ultimately proves a mirage which would see Trump increasing pressure on Pyongyang again.

Andrew Hammond is an Associate at LSE IDEAS at the London School of Economics. Contact him at andrew.hammond.james@gmail.com.