By Stephen Costello
What exactly is the problem between NK and the US? Is it regime ideology, as between the US and China, Russia, Vietnam or Burma? Is it human rights, as with Egypt, China, Burma and others? Is it sectarianism, such as Shia vs Sunni in the Mideast? Could it be a border dispute, as between Israel and Palestine? Or is it nuclear weapons? But the US has diplomatic relations with Pakistan, India, China and Russia, each of which has nuclear weapons and tests missiles.
National Security Advisor H.R McMaster has attempted to defend the remaining justification: That Kim Jung-un is suicidal, expansionist, un-deterrable, or all three. And yet US intelligence agencies and level-headed diplomats, analysts and journalists disagree. Rather, the problem seems to be US administration isolation, lingering Cold War myths, and a lack of courage.
In the aftermath of US President Donald Trump's performance at the UN General Assembly in New York, we should remember some basics.
The fundamental premise at the root of most US and SK government policy toward NK is flawed.This makes most of their policy approaches not only unworkable, but counter-productive. The premise is that NK requires economic and military pressure in order to perceive the greater benefits of deal-making rather than embracing its nuclear weapons capability. Abundant evidence shows this to be false. It was the US that rejected the logic of a mutually-beneficial deal, not NK. The US must now embrace it again.
NK requires, instead, credible security arrangements, political acceptance, and access to economic development. Pyongyang has been consistent about this for over 20 years. The Agreed Framework, KEDO, and South Korean engagement embraced that age-old logic. That's why they were successful. For any state that aims to impact human rights, weapons capabilities, or other illicit activities by NK, addressing those requirements as part of its de-weaponization is the demonstrated route to progress.
Some pressure from previous UN sanctions makes sense, as they express the world body's determination to press for accepted standards on a range of issues. These should only be eased as progress is made, just as with other countries. A measure of deterrence by South Korea is also prudent, as long as it is matched to realistic threats. The UN's one-sided statements, neglecting to criticize the US's refusal to enter into sincere negotiations, have tied its hands and reduced its relevance. It can do better.
The main change in security dynamics in Northeast Asia since January 2017 is the extreme expansion of military and economic pressure on the DPRK by the Trump administration, in the context of its continuing refusal to engage in serious or legitimate talks.To engage in diplomacy, in other words. The expansion of North Korea's missile and nuclear programs this year has occurred primarily in response to the US.
Two points are central to understanding this US lack of either ideas for de-escalation or political support for any diplomacy. The first is the staffing of ideologues and non-empowered managers in the White House; the lack of either staff or policy influence at the State Department; and the president's ignorance of the basics of policy.
The second is the political and policy forces that supported Bush's and Obama's rejection of the US or ROK diplomatic engagement with the DPRK. The post-Cold War themes of US triumphalism, unilateralism and invincibility are part of the Republican's core identity. It is not likely that this group, which today is trying to destroy the Iran nuclear pact and US-Cuba engagement, would have any reason to support a new and politically risky outreach to North Korea.
It is not true that the landscape facing the new South Korean government is new or has changed. Policy directions by North Korea and the US since President Moon Jae-in was elected four months ago were both predictable and predicted. Both were on multi-year trajectories in the direction of sanctions, threats, warnings and military posturing. China's position, too, was clear and predictable. Seoul was alone then in its interest, flexibility and capability to impact these three governments. It still is, even if it has so far neglected to accept that responsibility.
South Korea is long overdue for a strengthening and modernizing of its alliance with the US.As Katy Oh, one of the best advisors to the Pentagon for two decades, recently said, it has been costly for South Korea to be a US ally. Three realities today support such a review of the alliance: political and policy evolutions in Seoul and Washington, and weapons developments in North Korea.
Among all the other reasons, the astronomical cost to the ROK of the current government's adoption and expansion of the Park Guen-hye policies is wasteful, prohibitive and unrealistic. In contrast, the economic value of Seoul's increased diplomatic burden-sharing, leadership, and regional stabilizing would far exceed any costs, and could be astronomical.
With these points in mind, what is the justification for abandoning Korea's security and wider interests in order to follow ― unquestioning ― the least strategic, least capable, most dangerous and most shallow US administration in decades? And for following Japan, with its own administration's conflicted reasons for fearing diplomacy?
Today's US government policies and statements are the direct result of political and policy system breakdowns and almost two decades of policy incoherence toward Korea. They express fear, ignorance and weakness, not resolve, understanding or strength. They are not the material to agree with or to adopt without hard questions.
French President Emanuel Macron set an appropriately defiant tone in his remarks at the UN last week, when he educated listeners about the Paris Climate Accords, described why they will be preserved, and rejected any back-sliding by any state. That is the kind of statement ― but on North Korea ― that should be a central part of any self-confident and modestly ambitious South Korean government.
Stephen Costello is a producer of AsiaEast, a web and broadcast-based policy roundtable focused on security, development and politics in Northeast Asia. He writes from Washington, D.C. He can be reached at scost55@gmail.com.
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National Security Advisor H.R McMaster has attempted to defend the remaining justification: That Kim Jung-un is suicidal, expansionist, un-deterrable, or all three. And yet US intelligence agencies and level-headed diplomats, analysts and journalists disagree. Rather, the problem seems to be US administration isolation, lingering Cold War myths, and a lack of courage.
In the aftermath of US President Donald Trump's performance at the UN General Assembly in New York, we should remember some basics.
The fundamental premise at the root of most US and SK government policy toward NK is flawed.This makes most of their policy approaches not only unworkable, but counter-productive. The premise is that NK requires economic and military pressure in order to perceive the greater benefits of deal-making rather than embracing its nuclear weapons capability. Abundant evidence shows this to be false. It was the US that rejected the logic of a mutually-beneficial deal, not NK. The US must now embrace it again.
NK requires, instead, credible security arrangements, political acceptance, and access to economic development. Pyongyang has been consistent about this for over 20 years. The Agreed Framework, KEDO, and South Korean engagement embraced that age-old logic. That's why they were successful. For any state that aims to impact human rights, weapons capabilities, or other illicit activities by NK, addressing those requirements as part of its de-weaponization is the demonstrated route to progress.
Some pressure from previous UN sanctions makes sense, as they express the world body's determination to press for accepted standards on a range of issues. These should only be eased as progress is made, just as with other countries. A measure of deterrence by South Korea is also prudent, as long as it is matched to realistic threats. The UN's one-sided statements, neglecting to criticize the US's refusal to enter into sincere negotiations, have tied its hands and reduced its relevance. It can do better.
The main change in security dynamics in Northeast Asia since January 2017 is the extreme expansion of military and economic pressure on the DPRK by the Trump administration, in the context of its continuing refusal to engage in serious or legitimate talks.To engage in diplomacy, in other words. The expansion of North Korea's missile and nuclear programs this year has occurred primarily in response to the US.
Two points are central to understanding this US lack of either ideas for de-escalation or political support for any diplomacy. The first is the staffing of ideologues and non-empowered managers in the White House; the lack of either staff or policy influence at the State Department; and the president's ignorance of the basics of policy.
The second is the political and policy forces that supported Bush's and Obama's rejection of the US or ROK diplomatic engagement with the DPRK. The post-Cold War themes of US triumphalism, unilateralism and invincibility are part of the Republican's core identity. It is not likely that this group, which today is trying to destroy the Iran nuclear pact and US-Cuba engagement, would have any reason to support a new and politically risky outreach to North Korea.
It is not true that the landscape facing the new South Korean government is new or has changed. Policy directions by North Korea and the US since President Moon Jae-in was elected four months ago were both predictable and predicted. Both were on multi-year trajectories in the direction of sanctions, threats, warnings and military posturing. China's position, too, was clear and predictable. Seoul was alone then in its interest, flexibility and capability to impact these three governments. It still is, even if it has so far neglected to accept that responsibility.
South Korea is long overdue for a strengthening and modernizing of its alliance with the US.As Katy Oh, one of the best advisors to the Pentagon for two decades, recently said, it has been costly for South Korea to be a US ally. Three realities today support such a review of the alliance: political and policy evolutions in Seoul and Washington, and weapons developments in North Korea.
Among all the other reasons, the astronomical cost to the ROK of the current government's adoption and expansion of the Park Guen-hye policies is wasteful, prohibitive and unrealistic. In contrast, the economic value of Seoul's increased diplomatic burden-sharing, leadership, and regional stabilizing would far exceed any costs, and could be astronomical.
With these points in mind, what is the justification for abandoning Korea's security and wider interests in order to follow ― unquestioning ― the least strategic, least capable, most dangerous and most shallow US administration in decades? And for following Japan, with its own administration's conflicted reasons for fearing diplomacy?
Today's US government policies and statements are the direct result of political and policy system breakdowns and almost two decades of policy incoherence toward Korea. They express fear, ignorance and weakness, not resolve, understanding or strength. They are not the material to agree with or to adopt without hard questions.
French President Emanuel Macron set an appropriately defiant tone in his remarks at the UN last week, when he educated listeners about the Paris Climate Accords, described why they will be preserved, and rejected any back-sliding by any state. That is the kind of statement ― but on North Korea ― that should be a central part of any self-confident and modestly ambitious South Korean government.
Stephen Costello is a producer of AsiaEast, a web and broadcast-based policy roundtable focused on security, development and politics in Northeast Asia. He writes from Washington, D.C. He can be reached at scost55@gmail.com.
