How US Republicans might influence US East Asian foreign policy after midterms

By Lee Jong-eun

In the U.S. midterm elections this month, the Republicans were widely predicted to win a big victory. Pre-election forecasts suggested Republicans could take control of both the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate. The actual election results, however, were, overall, a mixed outcome. While Republicans appear to have taken narrow control of the House of Representatives, their margin of the majority appears to be far smaller than expected.

As the votes for the Senate elections completed, Democrats managed to retain their current narrow majority. Nonetheless, if Republicans, even if by a narrow margin, take control of the House, Congressional pressures against the Biden administration's foreign policy will increase.

The Republicans in control of the House (and potentially the Senate) are more likely to focus on domestic political issues and, due to their narrow majority, might face difficulty taking a unified stance on foreign policy issues such as the Russia-Ukraine War. On East Asia, however, the Republicans are unified in their policy stance toward China and are more likely to assert their foreign policy agenda to the Biden administration.

U.S. foreign policy toward China and East Asia is one of the few policy areas where broad bipartisan consensus exists between the two U.S. political parties. In the recently published U.S. National Security Strategy document, the Biden administration described China as "the most consequential geopolitical challenger" for the United States.

The Biden administration has lobbied for the passage of the U.S. Innovation and Competition Act to boost U.S. competitiveness over China in the tech sector, and the law was passed in Congress this summer with large bipartisan support. Congressional Republicans and Democrats have supported increased military aid for Taiwan's defense against China, and the U.S. defense budget for the next year is expected to include $10 billion in aid for Taiwan to purchase U.S. military equipment.

As Congressional Republicans share similar policy objectives as the Biden administration in strategically restraining China, the current direction of U.S. foreign policy in East Asia will continue. However, Republicans will likely attempt to outflank Biden by taking more aggressive stances and pressuring his administration to escalate the speed and scale of confrontation with China and North Korea.

Last September, U.S. House Republicans announced a document called "Commitment to America," which listed key policies Republicans will pursue if they take over Congress. On foreign policy, the document pledged to create a special select committee on China, tasked to coordinate other congressional committees in organizing policy measures to counter China.

Some measures Republicans have proposed include preventing U.S. Defense Department funds from investing in China, investigating the CCP's influence within U.S. educational institutions, incentivizing the decoupling of U.S. supply chains from dependence on China and investigating the origins of the COVID-19 virus in Wuhan, China.

Despite the skepticism among some Republicans toward foreign military intervention since the Trump presidency, the Republican leadership in Congress has advocated for expanding the defense budget and maintaining a U.S. military presence in Asia-Pacific. Criticizing the Biden administration for not sufficiently upgrading military capacity to deter China, Congressional Republicans have advocated increased funding for the expansion of the U.S. Navy and the modernizing of the U.S. nuclear arsenal as deterrence against nuclear threats from China and North Korea.

In October, a group of Republican representatives and senators in the foreign relations committees submitted a letter to the U.S. Defense Department, expressing concerns toward the news of the possible replacement of U.S. fighter squadrons in Okinawa. Advocating the importance of the U.S. maintaining a military posture in the region to deter China's "aggression against Taiwan," the letter requested a briefing on the deterrent value and military capacity of U.S. assets deployed in Asia-Pacific.

Though North Korea has received less attention than China, a Republican-led Congress will likely implement several measures against the North Korean regime. First, Republicans will support the renewal of the North Korea Human Rights Act, which expired this year in June. Republican Senator Marco Rubio and Korean American Republican Representative Young Kim have been leading the legislative efforts for its renewal. Second, Republicans will likely call for the Biden administration to appoint a special envoy for North Korean human rights, an ambassador-level position vacant since 2017.

The Biden administration will be open to supporting some of the Congressional Republicans' proposals on defense spending and strategic deterrence in Asia-Pacific. The Biden administration, however, has been cautious in maintaining the balance of diplomacy and deterrence toward China and North Korea and will display reservations toward proposals that could be excessively provocative for China and North Korea and risk regional instability.

The Biden administration will be wary that the Republican-led Congress will pursue diplomatic gestures to elevate U.S.-Taiwan relations, challenging the administration's formal adherence to the One China Policy. The Biden administration has also been noncommittal in appointing the North Korean human rights envoy.

Congressional Republicans could play Biden's dilemma to their political advantage. Republicans could pressure Biden to either take a "tougher stance" on China and North Korea by supporting Republicans' policy proposals or face political criticisms as being "weak" and "soft" on these two countries. With U.S. domestic politics trending toward negative perceptions of China, the Biden administration will face a political challenge in balancing the domestic political pressure and international risks, particularly as Biden faces a reelection campaign in 2024.

For foreign policy hawks, the GOP-led Congress might serve a slightly excessive but useful role in anchoring the Biden administration toward a trajectory of a clearer, more resolute geostrategic role in Asia-Pacific. For foreign policy doves, however, even a GOP-led House could pose a worrisome intrusion of domestic political opportunism that could constrain the strategic maneuverability of the Biden administration in Asia-Pacific.

Lee Jong-eun (jl4375a@student.american.edu), a Ph.D. candidate, is an adjunct faculty member at the American University School of International Service. Prior to this, he served as a Republic of Korea Air Force intelligence officer. His research specialties include U.S. foreign policy, South Korean politics and foreign policy, alliance management and East Asian regional security.