Biden's Taiwan comments reveal US strategic dilemma in East Asia

By Lee Jong-eun

Last month, U.S. President Joe Biden visited East Asia, holding a series of summits with the leaders of South Korea, Japan and the member states of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad). The summits addressed multiple agendas, one of which was approaches toward China. Is the U.S. alliance in the Indo-Pacific committed only to defending the existing regional order? Or does the alliance also seek a revision of the geopolitical status quo?

From one perspective, the joint statements appeared to focus on maintaining a "free and open" Indo-Pacific. The U.S.-ROK joint statement pledged cooperation in developing an Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF). The Quad's joint statement opposed "provocative actions that seek to change the status quo" without explicitly mentioning China.

Finally, the U.S.-Japan joint statement criticized China's unlawful maritime activities and non-transparent security agreements with the Solomon Islands. These joint statements appeared to signal prospects for coexistence and cooperation with China if the latter restrains from behaviors destabilizing the regional order.

However, the joint statements also included clauses that China could perceive as interference in its domestic affairs. The U.S.-Japan statement expressed concerns about human rights issues in Hong Kong and Xinjiang. The U.S.-ROK and U.S.-Japan statements affirmed the importance of "peace and stability" across the Taiwan Strait.

China would likely perceive the statements regarding Hong Kong and Xinjiang as an attempt to expand the U.S.-led regional order into China's domestic politics. While the statements on the Taiwan Strait appear only to affirm the maintenance of regional stability, Biden's remarks during the U.S.-Japan summit have raised doubts about the commitment to the key component behind such stability.

Since the normalization of U.S.-China diplomatic relations, U.S. administrations have maintained "strategic ambiguity" toward Taiwan. While the U.S. has formally recognized Taiwan as part of "One China," the U.S. has exported arms to support Taiwan's self-defense and has been equivocal on whether the U.S. would intervene in the case of China's possible military operations against Taiwan. However, at the U.S.-Japan summit's news conference, Biden declared explicitly that the U.S. would intervene militarily to defend Taiwan.

For defenders of Biden's response, "strategic clarity" has become necessary to deter China from escalating provocations against Taiwan. The proponents of strategic clarity have advocated that the U.S. should signal a clear intention of military deterrence to prevent China from altering the geopolitical status quo. However, the proponents' arguments do not address another risk to the status quo. What happens if Taiwan formally declares independence?

China has tolerated Taiwan's de facto independence on the basis most of the international community officially recognizes Taiwan as part of "One China" and that Taiwan has not formally declared its independence. China, however, has threatened military intervention if Taiwan pursues secession. Until now, U.S. strategic ambiguity has contributed to preserving the status quo by deterring China from a military operation and deterring Taiwan from pursuing formal independence.

However, Biden's seemingly unconditional affirmation to defend Taiwan could threaten the delicate balance. If Taiwan declares independence and China intervenes to prevent the former's secession, would the U.S. defend Taiwan militarily? Is Biden tacitly giving Taiwan a choice to reject the "One China" policy? Would such endorsement motivate Taiwan's aspiration for formal independence? Far from deterring China, the threat of U.S. defense of Taiwan's self-determination could motivate China's resolve to defend its geopolitical status quo.

If the U.S. is committed to strategic clarity, Biden could have also been clear on the limits of U.S. military commitment toward Taiwan. Specifically, Biden could have declared that the U.S. will only defend Taiwan if the latter pledges not to pursue formal independence. Yet, such a declaration also risks controversy.

To some proponents of a "free and open" Indo-Pacific, Taiwan is entitled to participate in the regional order as a sovereign state. An explicit repudiation of Taiwan's prospects for independence would reinforce what critics decry as inconsistencies and flaws of the current regional order. A group of U.S. senators has already co-signed a bipartisan letter urging the Biden administration not to exclude Taiwan from the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF).

Though U.S. officials have quickly reiterated their commitment to "One China," Biden's comment on Taiwan reveals that the U.S. faces a strategic dilemma in the region. Is the strategic objective limited to maintaining the existing Indo-Pacific regional order? Then, a strategic bargain might require tolerating China's existing domestic policy and geopolitical status. If, however, the strategic objective is to expand the liberal regional order, then the U.S. strategy would challenge non-liberal features of the regional status quo, including the ambiguous status of Taiwan.

Each strategic choice faces risks. While a more restrained approach improves the prospects of maintaining competitive coexistence with China, it risks highlighting limitations of the regional order promoted by U.S. alliances. However, a more assertive approach risks being perceived as more than deterring or even "containing" China, but rather as an attempt to "diminish" China.

What implication do U.S. strategic choices have for South Korea? South Korea's foreign ministry has affirmed support for the "One China" policy and has reassured that the IPEF's purpose is not to exclude China. Facing difficult diplomacy with China over security issues related to the Korean Peninsula, South Korean policymakers might perceive the proliferation of conflict issues between the U.S. and China as an overstretch for the U.S. regional strategy.

South Korea's strategic interest might then be in persuading its ally to be more "selective and focused" in approaches toward China. In advising the U.S. on balancing between maintenance and revision of the Indo-Pacific order, perhaps South Korean policymakers could share the Korean aphorism on prudence, "stretch your leg after first examining the place to lie down."

Lee Jong-eun (jl4375a@student.american.edu), a Ph.D. candidate, is an adjunct faculty at the American University School of International Service. Prior to this, he has served as a South Korean Airforce intelligence officer. His research specialty includes U.S. foreign policy, South Korean politics and foreign policy, alliance management, East Asian regional security.