Harsh consequences of hubris before nemesis

By Cho Hee-kyoung

In ancient Greek mythology, Nemesis was a goddess who meted out retribution to those who succumb to hubris, before the gods. Classic traits of hubris are identified as arrogance and contempt for others' opinions, often resulting from a loss of contact with reality and an overestimation of one's own competence, accomplishments or capabilities. The outcome of the local elections held nationwide earlier this month seems to be an almost perfect illustration.

Back in 2018, basking in the glow of a resounding victory in the nationwide local elections, Lee Hae-chan, the former leader of the Democratic Party of Korea (DPK), claimed that the DPK should rule for the next 20 years. Again in 2020, euphoric with the landslide win in the general election that secured almost two-thirds of the National Assembly seats for the DPK, Lee doubled down on his proclamation that the party would rule for the next score of years at least.

However, now, only two years later, the DPK, which lost the presidential election back in March of this year, suffered a disastrous defeat in the local elections in a result that is almost an exact mirror image of the outcome four years ago. This time around, it was the conservative People Power Party (PPP) trumpeting their triumph over their rival. At this rate, they might expect a similar sweeping victory in the next general election in 2024, enabling them to take back control of the National Assembly.

So, what happened? How did the DPK, which was so confident only two years ago that it would be ruling for the next 20 years, suffer such a thrashing at the hands of a party that even had to change its name to survive, so bad was the stench of failure after the impeachment of former President Park Geun-hye? The answer, in short, was hubris.

It is true that the DPK already had a handicap, having lost the presidential election. When the local elections follow soon after a presidential or general election, the party that wins the earlier, bigger election generally has an advantage. Power has its own gravitational pull and voters tend to support the party that won rather than the opposition. However, in these local elections, because of the many missteps made by the new conservative administration, the DPK initially had good chances to win or retain key seats in the local and provincial governments.

Yet, in the end, the DPK's problem was hubris. After the loss in the presidential election, rather than looking at where they had gone wrong, they seemed to believe that it was just a glitch. The razor-thin margin of victory by winning presidential candidate Yoon Suk-yeol, whose poll rating was even lower than the outgoing president, appeared to present a justification for this mistaken belief in the DPK's eyes. How else could one explain their bull-headedness and bending of their own rules to breaking point to pass the prosecution reform bill despite opposition from even some of their own supporters?

The same attitude manifested again in their campaign for the local elections. With very few exceptions, the DPK's newly formed emergency interim leadership consisted mainly of the same people who had led them to defeat in the presidential election. Song Young-gil, after resigning from the party leadership, ostensibly taking responsibility for the defeat, then ran for the Seoul mayor post in a confounding move.

It was confounding because he was barely a Seoul resident when he announced his candidacy; there were better qualified and younger candidates from the party than Song; and Song himself had argued earlier that old hands in the party, especially the senior 586 generation in their late 50s or older, should move away from the frontlines to make room for new blood. Here was yet another example of "naeronambul," or a double-standard, by the DPK leadership.

Lee Jae-myung, the DPK presidential candidate who ultimately failed to bring with him the DPK's supporter base, let alone persuade many swing voters, ran for the very safe National Assembly seat vacated by Song. It was seen as too hasty a move after his defeat and something of an easy way out. It ultimately cost him dearly, making his by-election a much closer race than it should have been: One that forced him to bring out the big guns of the party to campaign for him in his electorate rather than him supporting other candidates around the country as was his responsibility as the campaign chief.

Not everyone in the DPK was without self-awareness. Park Ji-hyun, who came to prominence for her investigative reporting on the "nth room" digital sex-crime ring while still a university student, was appointed to co-chair the interim leadership of the DPK. A female in her twenties being given such a prominent role in the DPK is unprecedented.

Park held a press conference a week before the local elections apologizing to the public for the mistakes made by the DPK and promising real reforms. It earned her a figurative kick in the backside by the party stalwarts. Park ended up having to apologize for her apology.

The local election results have left the DPK in disarray while putting some much needed wind in the PPP's sails. But it will not be plain sailing for the PPP, which is probably desperately hoping to be able to repeat the DPK's feat in the last general election and take back control of the legislature. They should do well to remember that today's victory can easily turn into tomorrow's defeat.

Cho Hee-kyoung (hongikmail@gmail.com) is a professor at Hongik University College of Law.